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ABSTRACT 
Confidence ratings are one of the most frequently used measures of 
metacognition. Is has traditionally been assumed that confidence ratings can be 
elicited from individuals without affecting their underlying cognitive and 
metacognitive processes. Recently, research into other metacognitive ratings, such as 
judgements of learning, has challenged this assumption by demonstrating changes in 
cognitive performance in reaction to providing a self-report measure of 
metacognition, so-called reactivity. The purpose of this thesis was to extend these 
findings by examining reactivity to confidence ratings in reasoning and problem-
solving tasks.  
After introducing theory relevant to metacognition and reactivity in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 provides a meta-analysis of reactivity to judgements of learning. This meta-
analysis indicated that positive reactivity (a facilitation of cognitive performance) 
occurs in response to related, but not unrelated word-pairs. Chapter 3 presents one of 
the first empirical studies of reactivity to confidence ratings, demonstrating that 
confidence ratings benefit performance on an IQ test, but reactivity is moderated by 
trait-like self-confidence. Specifically, when ratings are collected, performance is 
facilitated in high self-confidence participants, but impaired in low self-confidence 
participants. 
In Chapter 4 the effect of eliciting confidence ratings on metacognitive monitoring 
and control is examined. The results replicate the previous findings with regard to 
reactivity, while additionally showing that collecting confidence ratings impairs 
metacognitive monitoring (assessed using a retrospective self-appraisal of 
performance). Additionally, metacognitive control is affected, in that confidence 
ratings prompt participants to focus on short-term performance (getting the current 
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item right), rather than long-term performance (getting as many items right as 
possible). Chapter 5 further examines the mechanism underlying reactivity to 
confidence ratings. It shows that even task-irrelevant confidence ratings are reactive, 
but removing the word ‘confident’ greatly negates any reactivity effects. Collectively 
this chapter shows that the word ‘confident’ may prime pre-existing beliefs about 
one’s competence, which results in reactivity effects.  
Finally, Chapter 6 evaluates reactivity to prospective confidence ratings. The 
results indicate that eliciting prospective confidence ratings facilitates performance on 
a cognitive task, in both a younger student sample and an older community sample. 
Notably, reactivity to prospective confidence ratings did not depend on either 
participants’ self-confidence or the difficulty of the item. Implications for the 
measurements of metacognition and the use of confidence ratings in research, as well 
as the potential use of confidence ratings as an educational intervention are discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 1: Thesis Introduction 
1.1 Metacognition 
The term metacognition has been adopted into the nomenclature of many diverse 
fields and used in reference to a range of phenomena (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, 
& Afflerbach, 2006). The term was originally used to distinguish children’s 
knowledge of their own cognition from their cognition itself (Brown, 1978; Flavell 
1979). Over the following decades the use of the term (and the many related terms) 
has bourgeoned and the concept has gained prominence within psychology and 
related disciplines (Winne, 1996). Although metacognition is a multifaceted concept, 
broadly speaking, it refers to the knowledge and regulation of one’s own cognition 
(Veenman et al., 2006). At its highest level the conceptualisation of metacognition is 
frequently broken into two discernible processes – a monitoring process and a control 
process (Flavell, 1979) - although many more specific processes within the concept of 
metacognition can be distinguished (Tarricone, 2011). Nelson (1996) places 
metacognition within a hierarchical model of consciousness, distinguishing between 
“meta-level” processes which monitor and control “object level” cognitive processes. 
The distinction between meta-level process and object-level process is relational in 
nature. Many processes can in some instances act as a higher-order meta-level 
process, governing and acting upon a lower-level cognitive process but should not be 
considered meta-level by their very nature. As is often the case, however, the 
taxonomy and components of metacognition remain in dispute (Veenman et al., 
2006).  
Many of these broad definitions of metacognition make it difficult to distinguish 
metacognition from other aspects of cognitive control. Here we adopt the narrow 
definition of metacognition proposed by Shea et al. (2014) “as control processes that 
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make use of one or more metacognitive representations, that is, representations of a 
property of a cognitive process” (p. 187). The ability to monitor and control one’s 
own cognition effectively is vital to cognitive performance and everyday function. 
Metacognition is crucial in the performance of many cognitive processes, including: 
error monitoring (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012), regulating learning (Efklides, 2011), 
allocating cognitive resources (Son & Metcalfe, 2000), strategy selection and 
evaluation (Karpicke, 2009)1.  
Metacognitive monitoring allows an individual to detect errors and allocate 
resources effectively (Carter et al., 1998). Theories of metacognition regard 
monitoring as central to an individual’s ability to regulate their own thinking and 
behaviour (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). In particular metacognitive monitoring is 
vitally important in study time decisions (e.g. Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Son & 
Metcalfe, 2000). Learners need to continually evaluate the effectiveness of different 
study activities on their learning in order to select the best possible study behaviours 
(Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive monitoring is typically measured using item-level self-
report measures, including judgments of learning (e.g. Baldi, 1997; Baumeister, 
Alquist, & Vohs, 2015; Castel, McCabe, & Roediger, 2007; Dunlosky, Mueller, & 
Tauber, 2015) and confidence ratings (e.g. Cockrum, 1979; Markell, 1987; Lazar 
Stankov, 2000; Stankov & Crawford, 1996; Stankov & Lee, 2014a). These measures 
have provided significant insights into individuals’ metacognitive monitoring 
calibration (Stankov, 1998; Lazar Stankov, 2000) and how such judgements influence 
subsequent behaviours (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). 
1.2 Metacognitive Ratings  
                                                 
1 This list of cognitive processes to which metacognition contributes should of 
course not be taken as exhaustive (for a review, see Beran, Brandl, Perner, & Proust, 
2012)  
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The calibration of confidence ratings or judgements of learning with actual 
performance has often been used as a measure of the effectiveness of individuals’ 
metacognitive monitoring process (Nelson, 1996; Stankov, 1999). These judgements 
are thought to reflect an individual’s real-time self-monitoring and awareness during a 
task (Efklides, 2011). Retrospective confidence ratings typically involve an individual 
rating the likelihood that they answered the proceeding item correctly and are judged 
in terms of a percentage. Judgements of learning (JoL) are a metacognitive judgment 
typically used in word-pair or word-list learning paradigms, where a participant rates 
the likelihood that they will recall the word/word-pair on a later test. Both kinds of 
judgements have been used extensively within the research literature (e.g. Finn & 
Metcalfe, 2008; Matvey, Dunlosky, & Guttentag, 2001; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; 
Rhodes, 2016a; Stankov, 1998; Lazar Stankov, 2000; Stankov & Crawford, 1996; 
Stankov & Lee, 2008; Tauber & Rhodes, 2010) and increasingly have been used in 
practical settings such as school and university testing. For convenience we will refer 
to confidence ratings and judgements of learning jointly as metacognitive ratings. 
Pragmatically, metacognitive monitoring measured using metacognitive ratings 
can be broken into two related concepts of bias and calibration (Jackson & Kleitman, 
2014). Bias is the extent to which an individual typically rates his or her confidence 
high or low independent of performance (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014). For instance, 
regardless of performance differences some individuals will tend to be very confident, 
while others will tend to be less confident. Bias can therefore be considered largely as 
a personality factor. Calibration on the other hand, refers to the extent to which an 
individual is able to align their confidence with their performance on a task (Fleming 
& Lau, 2014). Calibration can be measured in both relative and absolute terms. The 
absolute accuracy of confidence judgements asks just how precisely does an 
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individual’s confidence across a test aligns with their performance in absolute terms. 
For example, does a participant who, on average, rates themselves as 20% confident 
answer more or less than 20% of trials correctly? Alternatively, relative calibration of 
confidence judgments assesses whether a participant calibrates changes in their 
confidence with changes in their performance over time, relative to how they typically 
use the metacognitive judgement’s scale. For example, if an individual generally 
shows little variation in his or her confidence regardless of actual accuracy, then 
relatively minor changes in confidence are regarded as more substantial compared 
with an individual who displays significant variation in confidence across trials. 
Metacognitive ratings can of course be used simply as a measure of confidence, 
which is sometimes referred to as cognitive confidence. Cognitive confidence is a 
good predictor of cognitive outcomes (Stankov, Morony, & Lee, 2014) and fluid 
intelligence (Stankov & Crawford, 1997). Cognitive confidence is a stable individual 
difference trait across cognitive tasks (Stankov & Crawford, 1997), although some of 
the reliability in measures of cognitive confidence may be due to reliability in 
cognitive performance across tasks, which forms the basis of confidence ratings. 
1.3 Reactivity 
 A significant concern for psychology is the potential for participants to react 
in some way to the fact that they are being measured. A number of such effects have 
been observed and researched including the Hawthorne Effect (when participants alter 
their behaviour due to researcher attention; see McCarney et al., 2007), the John 
Henry Effect (where the control group alters their behaviour due to an awareness of 
being in the control group; see Saretsky, 1972) and more generally the observer-
expectancy effect (where experimenters subtly communicate their expectations to 
participants and they alter their behaviour to meet these expectations; see Rosenthal, 
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1966). When self-report measures are collected ‘online’, that is while a participant is 
preforming a task (e.g. item-by-item confidence ratings) there is an even greater risk 
of reactivity. As such, self-report measures such as those used to assess 
metacognition, may be particularly susceptible to reactivity effects (Mitchum, Kelley, 
& Fox, 2016). In a cognitive task, preforming a self-report measure can either 
facilitate performance, so called positive reactivity, or alternatively it may impair 
performance, which is referred to as negative reactivity. Given the widespread use of 
‘online’ self-report measures to assess metacognitive processes (see section 1.2), 
reactivity is a significant concern for metacognitive research because it implies the 
ratings themselves may never be truly accurate.  
1.3.1 Current Evidence for Reactivity to Metacognitive Ratings 
Below we review the evidence for reactivity to metacognitive ratings. This section 
will concern itself with studies of ‘unintentional’ reactivity whereas Section 1.3.2 
address the area of intentional reactivity. The two can be distinguished in that 
unintentional reactivity occurs as the unintended consequence of attempting to 
measure internal processes, while conversely intentional reactivity studies are those 
where a self-report prompt has been used intentionally to improve performance (e.g. 
prompting students to identify the strategy they are currently using when solving a 
task) – this is typically referred to as metacognitive prompting.  
1.3.1.1 Think-aloud protocols  
Think-aloud protocols involve participants verbalising their internal cognitive 
processes (Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011). Think-aloud protocols are one of the most 
regularly used tools to study metacognitive processes and the subjective experience of 
engaging in cognitive activities. Reactivity to think-aloud protocols has been a topic 
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of considerable research, at least compared with other methods for measuring 
metacognitive processes. In a comprehensive meta-analysis of 94 studies, Fox et al. 
(2011) found that think-aloud procedures that do not demand additional information 
from a subject (i.e. they require only that the subjects vocalises their current 
cognitions), were not reactive, whereas protocols that directed subjects for additional 
information such as to provide explanations for their thought processes displayed 
positive reactivity. 
Although the average reactivity effect reported in the above meta-analysis 
indicates that think-aloud protocols are unlikely to be reactive unless they demand 
additional information from individuals, there is some evidence that this may depend 
on the task. Fox and Charness (2010) found that performance on Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (a measure of fluid intelligence) was particularly reactive to think-aloud 
procedures in older participants (but not younger participants), even when no 
additional information was sought from participants. In fact the think-aloud group 
gained an average of 11 IQ points. Performance on other tasks (paired-associates, 
cube comparison, and mental multiplication), however, was not affected by 
performing the think-aloud protocol. The authors tested a hypothesis that think-aloud 
procedures helped older adults inhibit the processing of irrelevant information but 
found no evidence for such a process. As such the mechanism by which think-aloud 
protocols benefit problem-solving performance, along with the extent to which these 
findings generalise to participants of other ages, other tasks, or other self-report 
measures is as yet unclear. 
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1.3.1.2 Judgements of Learning 
In terms of unintentional reactivity, think-aloud protocols have received the 
majority of research investigation. Recently, however, there have been a number of 
studies investigating reactivity to judgements of learning (JoL). The evidence for 
reactivity to JoL is so far equivocal, while some researchers have observed positive 
reactivity (Dougherty, Scheck, Nelson, & Narens, 2005; Janes, Rivers, & Dunlosky, 
2018; Soderstrom, Clark, Halamish, & Bjork, 2015; Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 
1980), others have found no reactivity (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Kelemen 
& Weaver III, 1997; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012), and still others have found negative 
reactivity (Mitchum et al., 2016). These studies may also be hindered by the fact that 
their individual sample sizes are sometimes small and therefore unable to detect small 
reactivity effects (Fox et al., 2011). To address this concern, a systematic review and 
meta-analysis of JoL effects is conducted and presented in Chapter 2. 
 Recently, Mitchum et al. (2016) directly investigated reactivity to JoL in a series 
of five experiments. They demonstrated negative reactivity to JoL when the series of 
presented word-pairs contained both easy and difficult items, but not if only difficult 
items were presented. The authors argue that their results are consistent with the 
changed goal hypothesis - the idea that JoL prompted participants to adopt a 
performance goal rather than a mastery goal. This hypothesis is discussed more 
closely in Section 1.5. 
In contrast, using a similar paradigm Soderstrom et al. (2015) found that 
performing JoL resulted in better recall of related pairs, but had no effect on unrelated 
pairs. They hypothesize that performing a JoL enhances the information used in 
making the judgement (i.e. the information that was used to make the JoL), which in 
their participants’ case was most likely the relatedness of the cue. The fact that cue-
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target relatedness moderated the effect was therefore, they argue, driven by the fact 
that the cue (relatedness) was easily discernable on related pairs and less discernable 
on unrelated pairs. An alternative hypothesis to which these results are congruent is 
explored in Chapters 3-6, namely the possibility that self-confidence moderates 
reactivity effects. Specifically, we evaluate the idea that reactivity is positive when a 
participant’s self-confidence is high, but negative when a participant’s self-confidence 
is low. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Soderstrom et al. (2015), as 
participants were more confident on related word-pairs compared to unrelated pairs. 
1.1.1.3 Confidence Ratings 
The current thesis extends the examination of reactivity to confidence ratings. 
Confidence ratings are one of the most frequently used measures of metacognition 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014; Stankov, 1998; Lazar Stankov, 2000; Stankov & Lee, 2008; 
Yeung & Summerfield, 2014) and have been integrated into a range of study domains 
including intelligence (e.g. Lazar Stankov, 2000), learning paradigms (e.g. Don, 
Goldwater, Otto, & Livesey, 2016), reasoning tasks (e.g. Crawford & Stankov, 1996; 
Lazar Stankov, 2000), decision making (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014), and perceptual 
tasks (Stankov, 1998). To date few studies of reactivity to confidence ratings have 
been carried out and as such it remains unclear whether using confidence ratings to 
measure metacognitive processes is an non-reactive process. In one of the only studies 
to examine reactivity to confidence ratings, Petrusic and Baranski (2003) found that 
eliciting confidence ratings resulted in slower decision responses using a perceptual 
choice paradigm. Furthermore, while they found that confidence ratings did not affect 
accuracy, they noted that error rates were higher on 80% of the stimuli when 
confidence ratings were elicited and the lack of significance may be due to a lack of 
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power. Given confidence ratings represent an explicit demand for a participant to 
quantify and monitor their performance, such a demand may well cause them to react 
by modifying their cognition or behaviour. The current thesis will attempt to directly 
examine reactivity to confidence ratings, as well as extend any findings by exploring 
both the mechanism for reactivity and individual differences in the effect.  
1.3.2 Metacognitive Prompting 
Reactivity is not limited to the unintentional effect of self-report measures; 
often interventions are designed based on a potential positive reaction to a self-report 
measure. Theories of self-regulated learning, which have become extremely 
prominent in the education literature, stress the role of self-monitoring as a tool to 
facilitate learning (for comprehensive reviews, see Carver & Scheier, 2001; Carver, 
Scheier, Boekaerts, Pintrich, & Zeidner, 2000). Specifically, self-monitoring is 
important for strategy selection (Roberts & Erdos, 1993), error monitoring (Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012), and knowledge transfer (Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008; 
Belenky & Nokes, 2009). The goal of such self-focusing practices is typically to 
improve future performance by reflecting on past performance. A meta-analysis by 
Sitzmann and Ely (2011) demonstrated that metacognitive variables provide 
significant incremental prediction (in the order of 17%) of work-related learning 
outcomes after controlling for cognitive ability. 
Due to the strong theoretical and empirical link between educational outcomes 
and metacognition (Sitzmann & Ely, 2011), many educational interventions have 
been specifically designed to improve metacognitive performance (e.g. Belenky & 
Nokes, 2009; von der Linden, Schneider, & Roebers, 2011). Many of these rely on 
what could be considered metacognitive prompts (e.g. prompting students to report 
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their strategy use during problem-solving). Metacognitive prompts are argued to be 
effective because they assist learners to develop problem-solving frameworks and 
adopt more complex strategies (Berardi-Coletta, Buyer, Dominowski, & Rellinger, 
1995). A number of empirical studies have shown that metacognitive prompts are 
effective at improving performance and academic outcomes (Bannert, 2006; Bannert, 
Hildebrand, & Mengelkamp, 2009; Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008; Bannert & 
Reimann, 2012; Berthold, Nuckles, & Renkl, 2007; Peters & Kitsantas, 2010). These 
interventions differ substantially in terms of the content and complexity and many of 
the prompting procedures used are tailored for a particular domain. For example, 
Peters and Kitsantas (2010) prompted students to consider how a scientist would 
approach a particular problem that students were solving during a science class. In 
addition, somewhat impractically, these prompts often require active involvement of a 
teacher or experimenter (for instance, a teacher prompts a student to identify why they 
are using a particular problem-solving strategy). Although it is often presumed that 
such prompts assist individuals to better monitor their performance, a number of 
studies have indicated that prompting has no benefit to performance monitoring 
(Berthold et al., 2007; Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984).  This leaves open the 
question of how such prompts lead to improvements in performance, if it is not by 
enhancing performance monitoring. We explore this in detail in Chapter 4. 
1.3.3 Factors that Determine Reactivity 
Reactivity can be assessed both in terms of direction (positive vs. negative 
reactivity) as well as magnitude (the size of the effect). These factors are likely to be 
determined by a complex interaction of participant, task, and self-report 
characteristics (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Turning firstly to whether a self-report 
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measure is likely to be reactive, the most essential criterion in determining this is 
whether it causes an individual to consider or attend to information when they would 
not have ordinarily done so. As briefly mentioned, Ericsson and Simon (1993) outline 
a theoretical framework which proposes that if a self-report measure (in their case a 
think-aloud protocol) demands additional mental activities on behalf of the 
participants (e.g. explaining why they are using a particular strategy to solve a 
problem), then they may well react to this information and their performance might be 
affected. Conversely, if a self-report measure simply involves the reporting of 
thoughts already activated in attention then there is unlikely to be an effect of the self-
report measure on performance, although response times may increase nonetheless 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
In the context of metacognition there are two sets of findings that appear relevant 
to the above criterion. Firstly, individuals are generally good at monitoring their own 
cognitive performance in terms of providing retrospective judgements in line with 
their actual performance. Evidence suggests that the correlation between 
metacognitive ratings and performance is high (Stankov et al., 2014) and that in a 
large majority of cases individuals are aware of errors they make even without 
feedback (Rabbitt, 1966; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). This might suggest that 
performance monitoring occurs ordinarily and as such metacognitive self-report 
measures such as confidence ratings will provide little added information and 
therefore not be reactive. However, despite the fact that in general, individuals are 
aware of their errors and able to monitor their performance, there exists marked 
individual differences in the accuracy and richness of metacognitive reports (De 
Groot & de Groot, 1978; Pallier et al., 2002b) as well as the extent to which such 
monitoring occurs spontaneously (Baker & Brown, 1984; Wong & Jones, 1982). 
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Based on these individual differences in metacognitive monitoring it seems 
reasonable to suspect that metacognitive self-report measures may in fact be reactive, 
at least for some people.  
Considering now the factors that determine the direction of reactivity, the most 
obvious is the valence of the behaviour. In a series of studies looking at the effect of 
self-monitoring, Kazdin (1974) found that self-monitoring increased the frequency of 
positive behaviours, decreased the frequency of negative behaviours, and had no 
effect on the frequency of neutral behaviour. This finding is supported by the fact that 
self-monitoring has been used as an effective intervention tool in a variety of 
domains, in order to decrease negative behaviours such as compulsive nail biting 
(Adesso, Vargas, & Siddall, 1979), smoking (McCarthy, Minami, Yeh, & Bold, 
2015), and over-eating (Latner & Wilson, 2002) as well as increase positive 
behaviours such as on-task behaviour (Carr & Punzo, 1993) and exercise maintenance 
(Izawa et al., 2005). The extent to which individual differences and interactive factors 
(between person and task level characteristics) affect the magnitude and direction of 
reactivity have not received considerable attention. Section 1.4 further outlines a 
theoretical framework for hypothesising about the role of various factors in 
determining reactivity. 
1.4 Objective Self-awareness Theory   
 Objective Self-awareness Theory (OST; Duval & Wicklund, 1972, 1973; 
Silvia & Duval, 2001) provides an alternative framework for understanding the 
individual differences in reactivity to confidence ratings (and metacognitive 
prompting) as well as the mechanism by which reactivity occurs, particularly if it is 
not via enhanced performance monitoring (Pressley et al., 1984). OST is an 
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experimentally driven theoretical framework for understanding the effect of self-
directed attention on cognition and behaviour.  
It is often assumed both explicitly and tacitly that paying attention to an object 
leads to a more accurate understanding of the object (Silvia & Duval, 2001). This 
hypothesis, which is sometimes referred to as the perceptual accuracy hypothesis 
(Silvia & Duval, 2001), suggests that self-directed attention should lead to more 
accurate self-knowledge. In contrast, OST contends than self-directed attention leads 
to self-standards comparison. Self-standard comparison refers to a comparison 
between one’s current behaviour/performance and a relevant internal standard, 
criterion, or goal. Importantly, if there is a gap between behaviour and the compared 
standard, henceforth a goal-discrepancy, then this will be uncomfortable for the 
individual, thus motivating them to attempt to reduce the discrepancy in some way. In 
this way, self-directed attention drives motivated behaviour rather than leading to 
more accurate self-knowledge or as Silvia and Gendolla (2001) argue, while 
introspection might lead to greater insight in some situations, often it is more likely to 
“change the self that is viewed instead of exposing what was there all along” (p. 264). 
These ideas have also been suggested by the region of proximal learning theory 
(Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005), the discrepancy-reduction model (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 
1998), and agenda-based monitoring (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009). 
 The way in which an individual responds to a goal-discrepancy is 
hypothesised to depend on their self-confidence. According to OST, when confronted 
with a goal-discrepancy, high self-confidence individuals will attempt to improve 
their performance to bring it inline with their goal. In contrast, individuals low in self-
confidence will disengage from the task/self-directed attention so as to reduce the 
discomfort associated with the discrepancy, or lower their goal to bring it inline with 
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their current performance. This is explained in terms of the necessity for an individual 
to believe that they are able to perform at a level consistent with their goal, in order 
for them to attempt to improve their performance. This processes is illustrated in 
Figure 1-1. The framework suggests that there is a likely interplay between current 
performance, self-confidence, and a participant’s goal in determining a participant’s 
behaviour after completing a self-report measure.  
1.5 Goals and Reactivity 
 Goals are hypothesised to play an important role in determining (i) if a goal-
discrepancy exists as well as (ii) driving an individuals behaviour if they perceive a 
goal-discrepancy. We differentiate goals along both a qualitative and quantitative 
dimension. Goals can be quantitatively different in that individual’s may expect more 
or less of themselves (e.g. setting a goal of an A+ vs. a B- in an exam). This will 
affect both whether an individual perceives a goal discrepancy and their self-
confidence in their ability to reach the goal (e.g. if an individual sets a particularly 
unrealistic goal they might not have much confidence that they can obtain it). The 
second way we distinguish goals is along a qualitative dimension that differentiates 
between performance and mastery goals.  
 
  
 
15 
 
Figure 1-1. A representation of the hypothesised relationship between self-directed 
attention, confidence, and goals based on OST. 
 
This qualitative distinction, referred to as goal orientation, distinguishes 
between a motivational pattern for either developing or demonstrating ability in 
achievement situations (Dweck, 1986; Huang, 2012; Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, 
Sheldon, & Deci, 2004). Within this framework performance-orientated individuals 
set goals in terms of demonstrating their ability on a task, and they are motivated to 
perform at a high level. Alternatively, mastery-orientated individuals aim to learn the 
material and develop their ability – performance is secondary. Goal orientations are 
linked to educational and performance outcomes (Bouffard, Boisvert, Vezeau, & 
Larouche, 1995; Dweck, 1986; Pintrich, 2000). Performance and learning orientations 
are orthogonal, such that an individual can be both performance and learning 
orientated (i.e., score high/low on both; Huang, 2012). It should be noted that goal 
orientation has both trait and state-like qualities, such that individuals may have a 
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dispositional preference for one goal type but will modify their orientation depending 
on local/proximal demands (DeShon & Gillespie, 2005). 
Like quantitative differences in goals, goal orientation will also influence 
reactivity by determining whether a goal-discrepancy is perceived (e.g. a participant 
may be performing poorly, but not perceive a goal discrepancy if they are mastery-
orientated). A second consideration, however, is the potential for individuals to react 
to confidence ratings by changing their goal orientation. As mentioned in Section 
1.3.1.2, Mitchum et al. (2016) put forward the hypothesis that performing JoL causes 
individuals to shift to a performance-orientation and away from a mastery-orientation. 
To support this claim they demonstrated that negative reactivity to JoL occurs only 
when a series of presented word-pairs contained both easy and difficult items, but not 
if only difficult items were presented. They argue this stems from the fact that when 
easy and difficult items were presented together, JoL prompted participants to 
consider that they would inevitably be unable to recall all the words, so they shifted 
their study time to the easier items and away from the more difficult items (response 
time data supported this contention). In Chapter 4 we examine the changed goal 
hypothesis with respect to confidence ratings by examining the differential effect of 
performing confidence ratings on strategy selection within a timed cognitive task. 
1.6 Overview and Aims of the Thesis 
The studies that comprise this thesis aim to systematically evaluate reactivity to 
confidence ratings during reasoning and problem solving tasks as well as understand 
the interplay between confidence, goals, and reactivity. Each of the empirical chapters 
(Chapters 3-6) deliberately varies the reasoning/problem solving task. The intention 
of using a variety of tasks was to ensure that observed reactivity effects generalised to 
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reasoning and problem solving, rather than being a phenomena driven by a specific 
feature of a particular task.  
Briefly, Chapter 2 (Double, Birney, & Walker, 2018) provides a systematic 
review and meta-analysis of reactivity to JoL. Such a review was conducted to 
synthesise reactivity to a prompt that closely resembles confidence ratings, 
specifically on a meta-analytic level in order to reduce the likelihood of small 
individual sample sizes obscuring any effects. Chapter 3 (Double & Birney, 2017a) 
outlines two experiments that examined reactivity to confidence ratings in Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices, as well as the role of self-confidence in moderating reactivity 
effects. Chapter 4 evaluates the effect of confidence ratings on the metacognitive 
processes of monitoring and control, specifically to examine if confidence ratings 
improve monitoring (the perceptual accuracy hypothesis) and if they lead to changes 
in metacognitive regulation strategies (the changed goal hypothesis). Chapter 5 
examines the role of priming in reactivity, to evaluate whether introspection or simple 
priming of confidence is responsible for reactivity. Finally, Chapter 6 explores 
whether reactivity to confidence ratings occurs to prospective confidence ratings, and 
whether these effects are moderated by item difficulty or self-confidence.  
The major aim of the thesis is to evaluate reactivity to confidence ratings in order 
to better understand the effect of self-directed attention on performance. In addition, 
the intention of this research is to evaluate the role of moderators in order to better 
understand the situational and task characteristics that determine reactivity. In a 
practical sense, confidence ratings represent a content general and uninvolved method 
of prompting metacognitive processes and potentially improving cognitive outcomes 
and therefore confidence ratings may serve as an effective educational tool. 
Furthermore, while metacognitive and self-evaluative practices are typically 
  
 
18 
encouraged in workplaces and schools, often with the tacit assumption that such 
practices benefit performance, this assumption has rarely been tested empirically, thus 
we hope to provide to provide a comprehensive empirical evaluation of this claim. 
Overall, the intention of this project is to helps qualify reactivity effects by better 
understanding when, how and for whom metacognitive judgements might prove 
beneficial. 
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CHAPTER 2: A Meta-analysis and Systematic Review of Reactivity to 
Judgements of Learning 
  
The contents of this chapter are a minor revision of the following publication: 
 
Double, K. S., Birney, D. P., & Walker, S.A. (in press). A Meta-analysis and 
Systematic Review of Reactivity to Judgements of Learning. Memory, in press.  
 
2.1 Chapter Synopsis 
Judgements of learning (JoL) are often used in memory research as a means 
for assessing an individual's metacognitive beliefs about their learning. JoL have 
generally been shown to reliably predict performance as well as learning behaviours 
and decisions. Participants may, however, modify their behaviour in response to 
performing JoL. There has, however, been little consensus as to the reliability and 
direction of the effect. We report on a meta-analyses that assesses the evidence that 
memory performance is reactive to JoL. The results indicate that overall providing 
JoL does not have a significant effect on memory performance (g = 0.054, 95% CI -
0.027 to 0.135). However, sub-groups analysis showed that this effect depends on the 
nature of the stimuli to be recalled, with moderate positive reactivity observed for 
related word pairs (g = 0.323, 95% CI 0.083 to 0.563) and word lists (g = 0.384, 95% 
CI 0.146 to 0.622) but no reactivity when pairs were unrelated or a mixture of related 
and unrelated pairs. These results indicate that researchers should be aware that 
eliciting JoL may well influence participants' underlying encoding processes, 
especially when using related word pairs or word lists. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Judgements of Learning (JoL) are metacognitive ratings whereby participants 
indicate the likelihood that they will recall learnt material on a future test (Rhodes, 
2016b). JoL are typically elicited after each item within a series of items that are to be 
remembered. For example, when participants are memorising a series of word-pairs, 
JoL are often elicited after the presentation of each word-pair. This methodology may 
make JoL susceptible to what is commonly referred to as reactivity (Rhodes & 
Tauber, 2011). Reactivity occurs when an individual either intentionally or 
unintentionally alters their performance or behaviour in response to being measured 
(Harris & Lahey, 1982). Reactivity can occur when participants are observed by an 
experimenter (e.g. McCarney et al., 2007), or when a participant self-reports on their 
own behaviour (e.g. Fox & Charness, 2010).  
Due to the potential for reactivity, researchers have criticised the use of self-
report measures collected concurrently with behaviour (Leow & Morgan-Short, 
2004). So called ‘online’ self-report measures, however, remain commonplace in 
cognitive psychology (Fox et al., 2011). Online self-report measures have been 
widely used in studies of memory (Ackerman, 2014; Koriat, 2000, 2012; Koriat & 
Ma'ayan, 2005), reasoning (Pallier et al., 2002b; Stankov & Lee, 2008), and decision-
making (Balakrishnan & Ratcliff, 1996; Jackson & Kleitman, 2014). Despite 
widespread use of online self-report measures, empirical studies directly examining 
reactivity are relatively rare (Fox et al., 2011). Furthermore, reactivity may vary 
depending on a number of factors including participant characteristics, 
methodological differences, and features of the self-report measure itself (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993). The current systematic review and meta-analysis focuses on the effect 
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of online self-report measures on cognitive performance, specifically reactivity to 
judgements of learning (JoL) on memory performance.  
A number of researchers have argued that the additional data gathered from 
online self-reports measures justifies the risk of reactivity (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). 
Online self-report measures have typically been used to provide insight into an 
individual’s metacognitive processing (Koriat & Helstrup, 2007). The accuracy of 
these self-report measures can often provide a behavioural measure of the 
effectiveness of an individual’s metacognitive monitoring (W. Thompson, 1999; Yan, 
2015). For example, a large body of research has demonstrated that JoL made after a 
delay are more accurate than immediate JoL (e.g. Narens, Nelson, & Scheck, 2008; 
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011), which may help guide 
educational practice (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). Furthermore, online self-report 
measures have been shown to predict performance, not only on the task at hand, but 
also on real world outcomes such as academic achievement (Stankov, 2013).  
In other areas, reactivity to self-report measures has been used as the basis of 
an intervention. For instance, in a series of experiments, Kazdin (1974) demonstrated 
that the direction of reactivity depends on the valence of the behaviour. Participants 
will tend to reduce negative behaviours, while at the same time increasing positive 
behaviours. In contrast, eliciting self-report measures does not appear to affect neutral 
behaviours. As such, reactive self-monitoring has been used as the basis for reducing 
a wide variety of negative behaviours including compulsive nail biting (Adesso et al., 
1979), smoking (McCarthy et al., 2015), and over-eating (Latner & Wilson, 2002). 
Additionally, self-monitoring has been used to increase positive behaviours such as 
staying on-task (Carr & Punzo, 1993) and exercise maintenance (Izawa et al., 2005).  
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JoL are one of the most frequently used concurrent self-report measures. JoL 
have been used to gain a range of insights into metacognitive evaluations and the 
study decisions individuals make when learning material. For example, JoL are often 
used to evaluate how various experimental manipulations can affect a participant’s 
subjective confidence in their learning (e.g. Susser, Jin, & Mulligan, 2016; 
Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 1980).  Traditionally, reactivity is rarely assessed and it 
is particularly rare that evaluating reactivity was the primary aim of a study (Fox et 
al., 2011). In a previous review of JoL reactivity, Rhodes and Tauber (2011) 
compared immediate JoL and delayed JoL in terms of the effect they have on memory 
performance. Their review found that, compared to immediate JoL, delayed JoL have 
a small positive effect on memory performance. The present systematic review and 
meta-analysis aims to extend on this work by summarising the findings of studies that 
compare immediate JoL to no judgement control conditions in order to assess whether 
immediate JoL, like delayed JoL, affect memory performance relative to 
‘uncontaminated’ controls. 
Reactivity occurs when a self-report measure elicits information that would 
not otherwise be consciously attended to (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Reactivity effects 
are problematic from a measurement perspective because they suggest that a self-
report measure is unintentionally directing attention to information related to the 
judgment. This may over-inflate the importance of such information for an individual 
and modify their judgement and/or their learning. For example, if a participant is 
asked to provide a JoL, they may be more likely than otherwise to base study time 
decisions on whatever information is utilised when making the JoL. As a result, 
eliciting JoL may over-emphasise the importance of judgement relevant information 
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and inflate correlations between such judgments and behavioural measures such as 
study time and performance. 
Assessing reactivity effects is important not only for determining if a self-
report measure is unintentionally affecting the performance of a participant but can 
also indicate whether such judgements occur without prompting. If providing JoL 
affects the performance of participants then this suggests that such metacognitive 
judgements are not necessarily made spontaneously in the same way as they are when 
JoL are elicited. This would imply that under conditions where JoL are not elicited, 
the equivalent metacognitive judgments are not made, or at least not made in the same 
way. Reactivity research provides some insight into basic learning processes, and 
could be utilised to better understand the contexts where such judgements occur 
spontaneously (and where they do not). Together, they facilitate a better 
understanding of the role of metacognition in various settings and the conditions that 
give rise to metacognitive monitoring. 
Although there are relatively few studies looking at reactivity to JoL, there are 
a number of reasons why a meta-analytic approach is appropriate. Firstly, as reactivity 
is rarely the primary aim of a study, such effects are often underemphasised when 
reporting results, and thus it is important for these findings to be more closely 
evaluated. Secondly, reactivity effects are not necessarily large and may well not 
reach significance in individual studies with small sample sizes (Fox et al., 2011). A 
meta-analytic approach may therefore observe trends that may have otherwise been 
overlooked. Finally, specific characteristics of the stimuli used within an experiment 
(e.g. the relatedness of the word-pairs used) may affect the magnitude and direction of 
reactivity effects (Mitchum et al., 2016), therefore it is preferable to average across a 
variety of stimuli to assesses overarching trends in the data, as well as utilise meta-
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analytic procedures to determine if specific stimuli characteristics determine reactivity 
effects in a systematic way.  
This review is timely given that a number of recent studies have started to 
investigate reactivity to JoL directly. Mitchum et al. (2016) reported a series of five 
experiments that examined the contextual situations under which reactivity to JoL 
occurs. They found that reactivity in a word-pair learning tasks depended on the 
relatedness of the word pair and the presence of cues that indicate the relative 
difficulty of a word pair (i.e. whether unrelated and related pairs were presented as 
part of the same list). Specifically, recall of unrelated word pairs was disrupted by the 
provision of JoL, whereas recall of related pairs was not reactive to JoL. Alternatively 
and in apparent contradiction, using a similar paradigm Soderstrom et al. (2015) 
found that recall to related pairs was facilitated by JoL whereas unrelated pairs were 
not reactive. Such studies indicate that pair-relatedness may be important at 
determining reactivity effects, a hypothesis which we will test across studies in the 
present meta-analysis. 
In addition to indicating the possible moderating role of word-pair relatedness, 
the contradictory nature of these findings is representative of the mixed findings 
regarding reactivity to JoL in the extant literature. Overall, a number of authors have 
found positive reactivity (Dougherty et al., 2005; Soderstrom et al., 2015; 
Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 1980), whereas others have found no reactivity 
(Benjamin et al., 1998; Kelemen & Weaver III, 1997; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012), and 
still others have found negative reactivity (Mitchum et al., 2016). Hence, a meta-
analysis will be useful to summarise this contradictory literature. 
2.3 Method 
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2.3.1 Study Eligibility 
Study Types: In order to be eligible for inclusion, a study had to be a published 
peer-reviewed article that compared performance on a cognitive task performed with 
a JoL vs. with a no judgement control condition. Only published studies were sought 
because the authors could not guarantee the integrity of unpublished results and the 
likelihood of publication bias was relatively low (due to the fact that reactivity is 
rarely the primary effect being studied). Both between-subject designs and within-
subject designs were eligible, provided that participants were randomly allocated to 
condition/order. Only English language papers were considered. 
Participant Types: Only studies using neuro-typical and non-clinical populations 
were eligible for inclusion. 
Outcome Types: Studies needed to assess performance on a recognized 
cognitive task, including memory tasks, reasoning tasks, intelligence tasks, and 
decision-making tasks2.  
Judgement Types:  Studies were eligible if they assessed performance with 
vs. without JoL, regardless of the specifics of the scale or the wording of the question. 
2.3.2 Study Selection 
 Given that reactivity is rarely assessed directly, a deliberately broad set of 
search terms was selected. A search of PsychINFO and Science Direct was conducted 
in August 2016. Search terms for judgements of learning ("judgements of learning" 
                                                 
2 Originally the review was open to looking at reactivity to confidence ratings as 
well, because they are retrospective judgements and would have provided a useful 
comparison to JoL, hence the more expansive list of keywords and outcome types. 
Unfortunately, no such studies at the time of the literature search (August 2016) 
examining confidence ratings were found thus the focus of the review was 
subsequently narrowed. Subsequently, work included in this thesis has been published 
related to this research question 
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OR "judgments of Learning" OR "JOL" OR “delayed judgments of learning” OR 
“delayed judgements of learning” OR "confidence ratings" OR "confidence 
judgements" OR "metacognitive judgements" OR "metacognitive ratings”) were 
combined with cognitive ability search terms (“reactivity" OR "cognitive 
Performance" OR "cognitive ability" OR "Memory" OR "problem solving" OR 
"decision making" OR "Intelligence") (see Footnote 2). Reference lists were also 
scanned for eligible studies. 
Assessing Eligibility  
Two reviewers independently screened the titles and abstracts of the search 
results for eligibility. When eligibility was unclear full text versions of the articles 
were assessed. In the instance of disagreement between the two reviewers a third 
reviewer was consulted to assessed eligibility and resolve any disagreements. If a 
study was eligible but did not provide sufficient data regarding the comparison, then 
the original authors were contacted requesting the necessary data.  
2.3.3 Meta-analytic Approach 
A fixed effects meta-analysis was carried-out as they are considered more 
conservative and less susceptible to bias (Greenland, 1994; Poole & Greenland, 
1999). The primary outcome was standardized mean difference (SMD) between JoL 
and No-JoL conditions, calculated using Hedge’s g. A positive SMD indicates 
comparatively better cognitive performance in the JoL group (i.e. positive reactivity). 
Between subjects and within-subjects designs were combined by first converting to a 
common effect size metric (Morris & DeShon, 2002). Stimuli type was entered as a 
subgroup variable with 4 categories (related, unrelated, mixed, word-list) found. All 
analyses were performed using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (CMA). Figures were 
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created using the ‘metafor’ package (Viechtbauer, 2010) in R version 3.2.4 (R Core 
Team, 2017). 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Description of Studies 
 The study selection processes and the associated outcomes are presented in 
Figure 2-1. Eight studies comprising 17 experiments were included in the final meta-
analysis. 4 experiments were within-subjects designs and the remaining 13 were 
between-subjects designs. Two experiments manipulated pair relatedness within 
subject so the effects were entered separately3 (increasing the total number of effect 
sizes to 19). One author provided additional data upon request. A summary of the 
included studies is presented in Table 2-1. 
Included studies consisted of 1321 participants (mean JoL group size = 45.54 (SD 
= 25.86); mean control group size = 44.77 (SD = 25.59); mean within subjects study 
size = 36.75 (SD = 13.60). For studies in which multiple JoL effects were reported 
(e.g. immediate and delayed JoL) the immediate JoL vs. control condition effect was 
used due to the fact that delayed JoL have previously been shown to have a greater 
effect on memory than immediate JoL and thus examining the immediate JoL 
condition should provide a minimal baseline for possible reactivity effects (Rhodes & 
Tauber, 2011). All included experiments involved either word-pair learning (n = 14) 
or word-list learning (where participants were presented a list of single words to learn; 
n = 3). 
                                                 
3 Including two outcomes from the same set of participants in the meta-analysis is 
sometimes problematic due to the fact that the participants are not independent. This 
procedure was, however, considered preferable to averaging out the effects due the 
marked differences between related and unrelated pairs. In order to prevent inflation 
of the weighting of the two studies in question, half (rounded to the nearest person) of 
their respective samples was used when calculating weighted effect sizes.   
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Figure 2-1. Study selection and exclusion procedure. 
   
2.4.2 Study Design 
In the 14 word-pair learning experiments, participants were presented with a series of 
word-pairs to learn after which they completed a recall test wherein they were 
presented with one member of the pair and had to recall the other. In 4 of the 
experiments, the JoL group was allowed to restudy the word after making the JoL. In 
4 of the word-pair learning experiments participants were able to decide how long to 
study the word-pair, whereas 10 of the word-pair experiments had a fixed study 
duration with a mean study duration of 6.91 seconds (SD = 2.02 sec). In one word-
pair learning experiment presentation time was experimentally manipulated (3 vs. 12 
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seconds)4. The 3 word-list experiments presented participants with a list of words to 
learn after which participants performed either a recognition test (n = 1) where they 
had to discriminate between learnt words and distractors or a free-recall test (n = 2) 
where they had to recall as many words from the list as possible.   
2.4.3 Stimuli  
The mean number of word pairs to be recalled was 70.35 pairs (SD = 75.54). 
The mean number of words in the word-list experiments was 106.8 words (SD = 
142.52). Three experiments included only related pairs, 6 included only unrelated 
pairs, and 5 included both related and unrelated pairs.  In addition, Mitchum et al. 
(2016; Experiment 1) manipulated the direction of the associative relatedness 
(forward and backward) and Mitchum et al. (2016, p.; Experiment 2) manipulated the 
emotional valence of the words, although neither manipulation was found to affect 
reactivity. Furthermore, Tauber and Rhodes (2012) manipulated the abstractness of 
the words in their list, but found no effect of abstractness on reactivity. Mitchum et al. 
(2016; Experiment 1 and 2) and Soderstrom et al. (2015) performed within-subjects 
comparisons of reactivity using related and unrelated pairs presented as part of the 
same series. Mitchum et al. found recall of unrelated pairs was subject to negative 
reactivity, but recall of related pairs showed no reactivity, while Sederstrom et al. 
found related pairs exhibited positive reactivity whereas there was no reactivity in 
unrelated pairs. As reactivity was demonstrably different between related and 
unrelated pairs we opted not to average across the stimuli types, instead including the 
unrelated and related word pairs separately in the meta-analysis (see Footnote 3).  
                                                 
4 For the meta-analysis, data was averaged across the 3 second and 12 second 
conditions as recommended by Higgins and Green (2008). 
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Table 2-1 
A summary of study characteristics of all included studies 
Author Year Exp. Word Type Stimuli Other Man. 
No.  
Wds 
Study 
Time 
Set Study 
Time 
Re-
study 
Test 
Type Test Delay Design Reactivity 
Mitchum et al. 2016 1* 
RWP/ 
UWP 
Word 
pair 
Pair 
direction 60 
 
Participant 
defined No Recall Immediate BS 
Negative/
NO 
Mitchum et al. 2016 2* 
RWP/ 
UWP 
Word 
pair Valence 44 
 
Participant 
defined No Recall Immediate BS 
Negative/
NO 
Mitchum et al. 2016 4a UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
48 
 
Participant 
defined No Recall Immediate BS No 
Mitchum et al. 2016 4b UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
48 
 
Participant 
defined No Recall Immediate BS No 
Mitchum et al. 2016 5 
RWP/ 
UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
48 5s Fixed No Recall Immediate BS No 
Soderstrom et 
al. 2015 1a RWP 
Word 
pair 
 
60 8s Fixed Yes Recall 3 min BS Positive 
Soderstrom et 
al. 2015 1b RWP 
Word 
pair 
 
60 8s Fixed Yes Recall 3 min BS Positive 
Soderstrom et 
al. 2015 2 RWP 
Word 
pair 
 
50 8s Fixed Yes Recall 3 min BS Positive 
Dougherty et 
al. 2005 2 UWP 
Word 
pair 
Duration/ 
Dummy 52 3/12s Fixed No Recall Immediate BS Positive 
Tauber & 
Rhodes 2012 5 UWL 
Word 
list 
Abstract vs. 
concrete 30 4s Fixed Yes recall 3 min BS No 
Kelemen & 
Weaver III 1997 1 
RWP/
UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
60 6s Fixed no recall 10-20 mins WS No 
Kelemen & 
Weaver III 1997 3 
RWP/
UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
60 6s Fixed no recall 10-20 mins WS No  
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Table 2-1 (continued) 
A summary of study characteristics of all included studies 
Author Year Exp. Word Type Stimuli Other Man. 
No.  
Wds 
Study 
Time 
Set Study 
Time 
Re-
study 
Test 
Type Test Delay Design Reactivity 
Zechmeister & 
Shaughnessy 1980 1 UWL 
Word 
list 
 
24 6s Fixed No recall 1 min WS Positive 
Yang et al. 2015 1 UWL 
Word 
list 
 
360 2s Fixed no 
recogni
tion 24 hours WS Positive 
Tauber,  
Dunlosky, & 
Rawson 2015 1 UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
60 8 Fixed no recall Immediate BS No 
Tauber,  
Dunlosky, & 
Rawson 2015 2 UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
66 8s Fixed no recall 
Half 
Immediate/Half 2 
days BS No 
Tauber,  
Dunlosky, & 
Rawson 2015 3 UWP 
Word 
pair 
 
66 8s Fixed no Recall 2 days BS No  
Note. UWP = unrelated word pair; RWP = related word pair; UWL = unrelated word list; s = seconds; no. wds = number of words/pairs; other man. = other manipulations.  Experiments marked with an asterisk were entered using separate effects for related and unrelated pairs. For the Soderstrom et al. (2015) paper only. 
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However, as Soderstrom et al. (2015) only reported that p > .05 for the 
unrelated pairs effect, only the related pairs effect could be included in the meta-
analysis.  
2.4.4 Reactivity 
 Three experiments found that performance was better under the JoL condition 
compared to the no-judgement condition. Nine experiments found no significant 
difference between the JoL group and controls. Five experiments found that the effect 
depended on cue relatedness (described above). Finally, no experiments found 
negative reactivity. 
2.4.5 Meta-analysis 
The meta-analyses indicated that overall there was no significant effect of JoL on 
memory performance (g = .054, 95% CI -.027 to .135, p = .190, see Figure 2-2). 
Heterogeneity between the included studies was assessed using a chi-square test, 
which assesses whether observed differences in results are likely due to chance alone 
(Schwarzer, Carpenter, & Rücker, 2015). This chi-square test indicated there was 
significant heterogeneity among the studies (Q = 53.59 p < .001), as such a number of 
sub-groups analyses were performed to attempt to explain the heterogeneity in 
observed effect (see below). Funnel plots comparing the relationship between 
observed effects and standard error were inspected for asymmetry, where symmetry 
would indicate possible risk of publication bias in the included studies (Schwarzer et 
al., 2015). A regression test for funnel plot asymmetry (Viechtbauer, 2010) indicated 
that the meta-analyses showed significant signs of asymmetry and the Egger’s Test, a 
test of symmetry, was not significant (p = .124), suggesting that the risk of 
publication bias in the included studies is relatively low, see Figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-2. Fixed effects meta-analysis of reactivity. Positive effects sizes 
indicate positive reactivity 
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Figure 2-3. A funnel plot of overall effects as a function of standard error. 
2.4.6 Sub-groups Analysis  
Firstly, a sub-groups analysis examined whether there was a difference in 
between and within-subject designs. The sub-groups analysis indicated that there was 
no significant difference between the effect sizes as a function of between-subjects vs. 
within-subjects design (p > .05). A second sub-groups analysis compared effects as a 
function of stimuli type. Four groups (related, unrelated, mixed, word-list) were 
formed. The sub-groups analysis indicated significant differences in reactivity as a  
function of stimuli type, see Figure 2-4. Moderate positive reactivity was observed for 
related word-pairs (g = .323, 95% CI .083 to .563, p = .008) and word-lists (g = .384, 
95% CI .146 to .622, p = .002) but no reactivity was found when pairs were unrelated 
(g = -.014, 95% CI -.156 to .128, p = .128) or in studies with a mix of related and 
unrelated pairs (g = -.049, 95% CI -.169 to .071, p = .424).  
2.5 Discussion 
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 Researchers are often interested in the metacognitive judgements that an 
individual makes when learning new material. Although these metacognitive 
processes are likely to determine a number of important learning behaviours (e.g. the 
allocation of study time), the current meta-analytic results suggest that JoL, 
theprimary way in which we currently assess such processes, may unintentionally 
influence the underlying behaviour in some circumstances. This finding has important 
implications for research practice and challenges the presumption that JoL can be 
used as an unobtrusive measure of metacognitive processes.  
 
Figure 2-4. Effect sizes as a function of stimuli type 
 
The current results imply that participants either intentionally or 
unintentionally modify their behaviour in response to JoL in some situations. This has 
a number of implications for researchers interested in measuring metacognitive 
processes during learning. Although the potential for reactivity may not be 
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particularly problematic in some experimental contexts, it is worth noting that having 
participants perform JoL may improve their monitoring processes and decrease the 
likelihood that participants will engage in ineffective learning practices, which may 
be of primary interest to a researcher. Given such measures are not uncommon in the 
memory research literature, reactivity should be considered as a potential threat to the 
interpretation of findings. In order to avoid reactivity effects, researchers may wish to 
use alternative measures of metacognitive processes that are less reactive, such as 
think aloud protocols (for a meta-analytic review, see Fox et al., 2011). Think-aloud 
protocols may be less reactive because they do not elicit extra information that an 
individual would not otherwise have attend to, instead participants are encouraged to 
verbally report their internal thoughts only as they are (for a review, see Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993). 
The results of the sub-group analysis provide a clear indication that the type of 
stimuli drives the magnitude and direction of reactivity. While, related word-pairs and 
word-lists showed a moderate positive reactivity effect, non-significant effects were 
found in all other sub-groups. This raises the question of why (positive) reactivity 
only occurs in related word pairs and word-lists? A possible explanation comes from 
recent work examining reactivity to confidence ratings, where it has been shown that 
positive reactivity only occurs for high-confidence participants, whereas negative or 
no-reactivity is observed in low-confidence participants (Double & Birney, 2017a). 
Participants generally have higher confidence in their ability to recall related word-
pairs compared to unrelated-word pairs and it may be that performing a JoL draws 
participant’s attention to their subjective confidence, which is beneficial when 
confidence is high but detrimental when confidence is low. Double and Birney 
(2017a) put forward the cognizant confidence hypothesis as a way of explaining the 
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mechanisms underlying heterogeneity in reactivity effects. The cognizant confidence 
hypothesis proposes that, rather than providing a direct enhancement of metacognitive 
monitoring, self-report measures draw attention to activated self-related beliefs (e.g. 
confidence and goals), which may be beneficial to performance if such beliefs are 
affirming but in contrast may impair performance if those beliefs are negative or 
threatening. More research is needed to establish if confidence similarly moderates 
JoL reactivity, particularly as such findings may not generalise from confidence 
ratings as JOL differ from confidence ratings in that they are a prospective rather that 
retrospective judgements which may change the nature of the relationship between 
confidence and reactivity. Speaking more broadly, additional empirical research is 
needed to examine the mechanisms underlying the affect of pair-relatedness on 
reactivity, particularly as the effect may be complex and depend on numerous factors 
such as participant goals and precise experimental characteristics (Mitchum et al., 
2016). In particular, it is currently unclear why word-list experiments show reactivity 
effects, although this effect should be interpreted cautiously as only three word-list 
experiments were included in the meta-analysis. Nevertheless, the current findings 
provide a clear indication of when reactivity is likely to occur, which is both useful 
for future investigations of reactivity and for establishing when researchers should be 
most concerned about unintentional reactivity.  
Although some researchers have suggested that JoL enhance performance by 
increasing the quality of monitoring processes, the specifics of such a cognitive effect 
(e.g. the precise cognitive mechanisms that improve when JoL are performed) are 
relatively unknown. JoL require a participant to retrospectively evaluate the 
effectiveness of their learning. At least in the studies reported here, this is done 
repeatedly during testing and thus a prospective evaluation is also likely to be primed. 
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That is, the continued task demand to evaluate one’s own performance may lead to 
enhanced learning due to incidental improvements in the effectiveness of the learning 
processes or as a strategic response by the individual to perform better in the face of 
frequent self-assessment. Future research is needed to disentangle and specify the 
mechanisms by which reactivity occurs and the contextual factors that give rise to 
reactivity effects.  
The results also have interesting practical implications because they suggest 
that there is sometimes a benefit to performing behaviours that enhance monitoring. 
As such, JoL may be a useful tool for enhancing learning particularly for low-
performing students who do not naturally engage in performance monitoring 
effectively (for a review see Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). Further 
experimental work is necessary to investigate the role of JoL in enhancing monitoring 
in those that display a monitoring deficit. Compared with previous metacognitive 
interventions, JoL are noteworthy in that they are reasonably domain general. While 
there are a host of prompts that have specifically been devised for use in a particular 
domain, for instance reading (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995) and mathematics 
(Kramarski & Mevarech, 2003), JoL can be implemented into most learning and 
training environments with little modification across content domains, making them 
an easy tool to integrate into classroom and learning environments. For example, 
some researchers have used computerised programs to prompt and enhance the 
metacognitive processes with success (Azevedo, 2005).  
It is also pertinent to note that the above effects may have important individual 
difference qualifiers. If JoL enhance the performance monitoring processes of 
participants, then the direction and magnitude of any reactivity effects will depend on 
the difference between the quality of an individual’s natural unprompted monitoring 
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processes and their prompted monitoring process. Further, consideration is needed to 
determine the task and person characteristics that influence the direction and 
magnitude of reactivity.   
Reactivity to online self-report measures is a general problem in psychology 
and it is worth noting that reactivity to other common self-report measures has 
received far less attention and may be equally problematic. For example, confidence 
ratings have often been incorporated into fluid intelligence tasks (Crawford & 
Stankov, 1996; Lazar Stankov, 2000; Stankov & Lee, 2008) with little consideration 
of whether judgements influence performance. Although the above results can only 
speak to reactivity to JoL, it seems pertinent that reactivity to a broad range of self-
report measures receives greater attention in cognitive psychology.  
It is worth acknowledging that the current meta-analysis may have been 
limited by the nature of reactivity research. Evaluating reactivity effects is rarely the 
primary aim of a study; often such comparisons are only carried out as a pre-
cautionary step (Fox et al., 2011). As a result, while every effort to find and include 
relevant studies has been made, it is possible that relevant effects have been evaluated 
but not directly mentioned in paper abstracts and therefore overlooked in the current 
analysis. In addition, it is worth considering that the findings may have been 
influenced by the included studies choice of control groups. In particular, while 
almost all studies in the meta-analysis used passive controls where the participant 
simply moved on to the next item rather than performing a JoL, Tauber, Dunlosky, 
and Rawson (2015) utilised an active control group that performed retrieval practice 
rather than JoLs. More research is needed to determine the effect of JoL compared 
with different control groups to better understand the size of reactivity effects and the 
mechanism driving reactivity. Encouragingly, recent research by Janes et al. (2018) 
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has largely replicated the findings reported here, namely that related word-pairs are 
reactive whereas unrelated word-pairs are not. 
 The current meta-analysis has provided an indication that JoL are positively 
reactive when related word-pairs are used. These finding suggest that researchers, 
when designing experimental paradigms that rely on online JoL, should consider the 
potential for reactivity. A further implication of these results is the potential to use 
JoL in some situations as a mechanism to enhance learning. The next challenge is to 
determine the mechanisms that influence the magnitude and direction of reactivity 
effects, in particular the mechanisms driving the link between pair-relatedness and 
reactivity, as well as the extent to which the above findings generalize beyond JoL.   
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CHAPTER 3: Are You Sure About That? Eliciting Confidence Ratings May 
Influence Performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
 
The contents of this chapter are a minor revision of the following publication: 
 
Double, K. S., & Birney, D. P. (2017). Are you sure about that? Eliciting confidence 
ratings may influence performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Thinking and 
Reasoning, 23(2), 190-206. 
 
3.1 Chapter Synopsis 
Confidence ratings (CR) have often been integrated into reasoning and 
intelligence tasks as a means for assessing metareasoning processes. Although it is 
often assumed that eliciting these judgements throughout reasoning tasks has no effect 
on the underlying performance outcomes, this is yet to be established empirically. The 
current study examines whether eliciting CR from participants during a fluid-
reasoning task influences their performance and how this effect is moderated by their 
initial self-confidence in their own reasoning abilities. In a first experiment we found 
that participants performing CR during Raven’s Progressive Matrices significantly 
out-performed a control group who did not provide ratings. Additionally, a second 
experiment demonstrated that CR only facilitated performance in participants who 
have a high level of initial self-confidence in their reasoning ability, whereas they 
were detrimental to participants low in self-confidence. 
3.2 Introduction 
Metareasoning refers to the meta-level processes involved in regulating and 
monitoring reasoning (Ackerman & Thompson, 2015). Confidence ratings (CR) have 
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often been used as a convenient behavioural measure of metareasoning processes 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014). In the domain of reasoning and intelligence, confidence 
research has typically involved eliciting CR from a participant in an ‘online’ fashion, 
either after each response or concurrently as part of the response (Overgaard, 2015). 
Academic interest in these judgements has largely focused on the accuracy of such 
judgements (e.g. Fleming & Lau, 2014; Schraw, 2009; Stankov, 1998) or on the 
unique variance captured by confidence over and above performance (e.g. Stankov & 
Lee, 2014b; Stankov, Lee, Luo, & Hogan, 2012). Although this research has provided 
valuable insight into metareasoning processes, it has largely presumed that the act of 
eliciting confidence judgements does not alter the underlying pattern of performance. 
Here, we describe two experiments that evaluate whether integrating CR into 
reasoning tasks affects performance. 
 The notion that task performance changes in reaction to a self-report measure 
is sometimes referred to as reactivity (e.g. Fox et al., 2011; Mitchum et al., 2016). 
Positive reactivity occurs when a self-report measure facilitates performance, whereas 
negative reactivity occurs when a self-report measure has a detrimental effect on 
performance. Although some self-report measures such as think-aloud protocols are 
rarely reactive (for a review see Fox et al., 2011), performance on reasoning tasks 
may be particularly positively reactive to prompted self-report measures (Russo, 
Johnson, & Stephens, 1989). For instance, Fox and Charness (2010) found that the 
performance of older participants on Raven’s Progressive Matrices improved by 11 
IQ points if they were asked to verbally report their thoughts as they solved each 
problem.   
Currently, there appears to be little literature specifically and directly 
assessing reactivity to CR. A much larger examination of reactivity has, however, 
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occurred in the memory literature, particularly in regards to the effect of judgements 
of learning (JoL) on word-pair recall, a task that involves learning and memorization 
rather than reasoning. JoL closely resemble CR, except, rather than a participant 
rating their confidence in the previous response, they rate the likelihood that they will 
accurately recall the previously presented word-pair at a later time. The findings from 
this line of research are largely equivocal about an effect of eliciting JoL on 
performance. Recently, in an extensive series of experiments, Mitchum et al. (2016) 
found that performance on a word-pair recall task was lower for participants who 
provided JoL during the encoding phase compared to a control group who did not, but 
negative reactivity only occurred when both easy and difficult items were presented in 
the same word list,  when the entire list was difficult there was no reactivity effect. In 
contrast, using a similar word-pair learning paradigm, Soderstrom et al. (2015) and 
Dougherty et al. (2005) found that JoL facilitated recall performance, while others 
have found that providing JoL had no affect on recall (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; 
Benjamin et al., 1998; Kelemen & Weaver III, 1997; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). The 
mixed nature of these results may be due to subtle differences in methodology, such 
as the timing of the judgement within the encoding process (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) 
and participant characteristics (Fox & Charness, 2010). For example, when examining 
screen vs. paper performance, Sidi, Ophir, and Ackerman (2016) found that 
performing confidence ratings interacted with disfluency cues in the task, such that 
disfluency improved performance on screen and hindered it on paper when 
confidence ratings were elicited but had no effect when they were not. 
Reactivity occurs when a self-report measure increases awareness of 
information that the participant would not otherwise be cognizant of (Mitchum et al., 
2016). Online CR represent an explicit requirement for participants to monitor and 
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assess their prior performance. However, if a participant naturally performs such 
monitoring with an equivalent level of awareness without being prompted, then there 
is unlikely to be any effect of providing CR. Most research suggests that participant’s 
are largely unaware of their cognitive and metacognitive processes. For example, 
Cary and Reder (2002) found that participants are often unaware of the cognitive 
strategies they employ when solving a reasoning task and apply different strategies 
without conscious awareness.  
In addition to examining whether there is reactivity to CR during reasoning 
tasks, a secondary aim of the present study is to better understand the mechanisms by 
which reactivity occurs. Below we propose two alternative pathways that we 
hypothesize may assist in explaining how CR affect cognitive performance – the 
general cognitive benefit hypothesis and the cognizant confidence hypothesis. 
3.2.1 General Cognitive Benefit 
The general cognitive benefit hypothesis predicts that CR confer some kind of 
benefit to performance monitoring, which in turn facilitates cognitive processes, such 
as more effective strategy selection or rule-learning, and leads to better performance. 
To report CR, a participant must retroactively quantify their subjective confidence in 
the accuracy of their previous response (Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013) and reflect on 
the reasoning process to devise their response. The continued requirement to assess 
performance may lead to enhanced performance monitoring on succeeding items, 
either due to an incidental facilitation of the cognitive process or as a strategic 
behaviour performed by the participant to enhance the accuracy of subsequent CR. 
Evidence suggests that monitoring plays an important role in cognitive processes such 
as strategy selection and decision making during reasoning tasks (Ackerman, 2014).  
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There is evidence that metacognitive prompts facilitate performance 
monitoring. Previous successful efforts to enhance metacognition have largely 
involved instructional questions or prompts designed to encourage learner reflection. 
For example, Kramarski and Mevarech (2003) found that asking students who were 
solving mathematical problems comprehension questions about their strategy use and 
connections between the current problem and pre-existing knowledge, improved their 
metacognitive strategy knowledge and performance. Similarly, Sahakyan, Delaney, 
and Kelley (2004) found that providing aggregate JoL reduced the likelihood that 
participants would carry on using ineffective encoding strategies.  
Effective metacognitive monitoring has been linked to better performance in a 
number of domains including perceptual tasks (Prins, Veenman, & Elshout, 2006), 
problem solving (Desoete & Roeyers, 2006), and reading (Pressley, 2002). 
Monitoring is particularly important for deciding when to progress to new stimuli 
(Ackerman, 2014). For instance, if you are confident that you have correctly answered 
a question in a reasoning task then you will progress to the next item, whereas you 
may stay on the current item if your confidence in your success so far has not reached 
an acceptable level. Effectively deciding when to progress to the next problem/item in 
a task therefore requires optimal monitoring of one’s own performance (Ackerman, 
2014; V. A. Thompson, 2009). 
3.2.2 Cognizant Confidence  
 With respect to dispositional or trait-level confidence (as opposed to the micro 
level confidence captured by confidence ratings), a large body of literature has 
established that confidence is a strong predictor of cognitive performance over and 
above ability, with concepts like confidence and self-efficacy predicting academic 
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outcomes even after prior ability is controlled for (Stankov, 2013; Stankov & 
Crawford, 1997; Stankov & Lee, 2008, 2014b). Specifying the precise mechanism by 
which confidence influences cognitive performance is difficult, but there is evidence 
that confidence affects the level of on-task behaviour (Vancouver, 2000), motivation 
(Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998), and persistence with problem solving (Lester, Garofalo, 
& Kroll, 1989). The cognizant confidence hypothesis predicts that repeatedly 
prompting elicitation of CR increases participant’s awareness of their confidence. CR 
act as a form of self-assessment which may be affirming if a participant believes they 
are performing well, or alternatively, be seen as threatening if the participant thinks 
they are performing poorly. Therefore if a participant is currently confident in their 
performance, then performing CR will reaffirm their sense of confidence by 
increasing their cognizance of their current level of confidence. By the same logic, if 
a participant is not confident, CR will make them more aware of their lack of 
confidence and be seen as a threat to their self-concept. Reaffirming self-confidence 
leads to greater persistence, motivation, and self-efficacy (Pajares & Johnson, 1994; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1979). In contrast, Vancouver and Tischner (2004) argue that 
threats to self-confidence divert resources away from the task leading to even poorer 
performance. As a result, the cognizant confidence hypothesis predicts that CR will 
have a contrasting effect on confident and unconfident participants – ratings will 
facilitate performance in confident participants but be detrimental to performance in 
unconfident participants. This distinction separates the cognizant confidence 
hypothesis from the general cognitive hypothesis, in that the cognizant confidence 
hypothesis predicts that the benefit of providing CR will be exclusive to confident 
participants. 
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3.2.3 Current Study 
 The current study aims to contribute to our understanding of reasoning by 
examining reactivity to CR in the context of reasoning tasks and evaluating whether 
CR provide a general cognitive benefit or instead benefit self-confident participants 
selectively. Briefly, in Experiment 3-1 participants completed Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices either with or without providing CR after each item. This initial experiment 
was designed to establish how, if at all, CR influence the underlying pattern of 
performance in reasoning tasks. Raven’s Progressive Matrices was selected as it is a 
classic test of reasoning abilities and a prolific assessment tool, that has often 
incorporated CR (e.g. Stankov & Crawford, 1997). Experiment 3-2 examines whether 
a participant’s initial levels of self-reported confidence in their own reasoning abilities 
moderates reactivity to CR.  
3.3 Experiment 3-1 
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants and Materials 
 A power analysis using G*Power was performed to determine the intended 
sample size. An effect size of d = .5 was utilized in the analysis, as effect sizes in this 
region have been found by previous studies (Kelemen & Weaver III, 1997; Mitchum 
et al., 2016). The analysis indicated a recommended sample of 65. We attempted to 
meet this recommendation, as well as recruit a number of extra participants in case 
some participant’s data needed to be excluded. 
Sixty-nine participants were recruited from the first-year psychology student 
pool at the University of Sydney, and received course credit for completing the study. 
All assessments were completed in the university laboratory on a computer under the 
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supervision of an experimenter. Up to ten participants were tested concurrently in 
each testing session. Participants were randomly allocated to either the CR group (n = 
33), who had to provide CR after each trial/item, or the control group (No-CR; n = 
36), who completed the task without providing any CR.  
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM, Raven & Court, 1998): Participants 
completed a computerised 20-item set drawn from the Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices Task. RPM is a classic fluid intelligence task that involves matric reasoning 
and is widely used in the research literature. A 3 x 3 matrix of tiles is presented to the 
participants with a section missing. The participant must infer the nature of the 
missing piece based on the relationship between the horizontal and vertical 
arrangement of tiles. Reduced versions of RPM have been shown to have similar 
concurrent validity and predictive power as the full version (Bors & Stokes, 1998). 
Both groups completed the same set of 20-tems, which consisted of the odd numbered 
items from the original version as well as the two hardest even numbered items. Items 
were ordered in the traditional fashion, which roughly corresponds to ascending 
difficulty. Participants were given 20-minutes to complete the task. A countdown 
timer was displayed at all times; however, the timer was paused while the confidence 
group completed their confidence judgements, such that there was no time limit for 
making confidence judgements. The CR group had to rate their confidence on a 6-
point scale ranging from 0% to 100% that asked “how confident are you in your 
previous answer?”. The CR were displayed after a participant’s response and 
participants could neither view nor change their earlier question/answer when making 
the CR. 
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3.3.2 Results  
 All analyses were performed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS, version 23). 68 (98.6%) participants completed all 20 items within the 20-
minute time limit. The average score was 54.49% (SD = 17.05) and the average 
response time for each item was 37.56 seconds (SD = 12.42 ). The average confidence 
for the CR group was 60.64% (SD = 15.87), indicating that participants were 
somewhat over-confident, see Figure 3-1a for calibration plots. The average time 
taken to make confidence judgments was 1.96 seconds. The correlation between 
confidence and accuracy was significant, r = .469, p = .006.  
 
 
Figure 3-1. Calibration plots depicting average performance for given confidence 
ratings in (A) Experiment 3-1 and (B) Experiment 3-2. Error bars represent + 1 
standard error of the mean. 
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 The results indicated that the CR group (M = 11.85, 95% CI 10.70 to 13.00) 
significantly out-performed the No-CR group (M = 10.03, 95% CI 8.93 to 11.13); 
F(1, 67) =5.22, p = .026, η2 = .072. This suggests that participants reacted positively 
to performing CR. A subsequent analysis indicated that response time did not differ 
between groups (p > .05). 
An additional analysis examined the effect of performing CR compared with 
No-CR controls, breaking down the CR group by mean confidence (as assessed by the 
item-level CR). A median split was used to obtain a high and low CR group (MHigh = 
650, MLow = 499), which were then compared to the No-CR group. The results 
indicated that there was an overall effect of group on performance F(2,66) = 6.44, p 
=.003. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction indicated that high-
confidence CR group out performed both the low-confidence CR group (p = .028) and 
the No-CR group (p = .002). There was no significant difference between the low-
confidence CR group and the No-CR group (p > .05; see Figure 3-2). This result 
provides a preliminary indication that the benefit of providing CR may be exclusive to 
high confidence participants; however, this finding is of course limited by the fact that 
the No-CR group cannot be broken down by task confidence. 
3.4 Experiment 3-2 
 Experiment 3-1 provides some evidence that overall participants react 
positively to providing CR. However, the fact that high-confidence participants out 
performed the No-CR group, but participants in the low-CR group did not, provides 
some preliminary evidence for the cognizant confidence hypothesis. Specifically this 
affords some indication that the benefit of eliciting confidence ratings may be 
moderated by a participant’s confidence. This effect may of course simply be an  
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Figure 3-2. Performance as a function of condition with the CR group broken 
down by mean confidence on the task. A median split was performed to obtain the 
High and Low groups respectively. Error bars represent + 1 standard error of the 
mean. 
 
artifact of the fact that we are unable to assess participants’ confidence in the No-CR 
group when performing this comparison. Experiment 3-2 is designed specifically to 
disentangle this confound by obtaining measures of confidence before the task from 
all participants and using this confidence measure to examine the moderating effect of 
confidence proposed by the cognizant confidence hypothesis. 
The aim of Experiment 3-2 was (1) to replicate the findings of Experiment 3-1 
in a more heterogeneous sample and (2) to examine the moderating role of initial 
confidence on the performance effects of eliciting CR. To accomplish this a diverse 
community sample completed a self-report measure of their confidence in their 
reasoning and problem solving abilities before performing RPM with or without CR. 
In addition, participants completed a number of problem solving tasks so that their 
baseline cognitive abilities could be controlled for and we could evaluate the 
moderating effects of confidence over and above ability. 
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3.4.1 Method 
3.4.1.1 Participants and Materials 
As with Experiment 3-1, a G*Power analysis was performed using an effect 
size of d = .5.  Based on this analysis, a sample of 100 was sought, again with a 
number of extra participants in case data needed to be excluded. A community sample 
of 104 participants (48 No-CR; 56 CR) was recruited using an advertisement placed 
in a newsletter of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation as part of a research 
partnership with the University of Sydney (Mage = 62.51, SD = 9.68). Participants 
received no remuneration for participating in the study.  
Before completing RPM in the exact same method as Experiment 3-1, 
participants first completed the following self-report assessment of their reasoning 
and problem solving confidence.  
Reasoning Self-confidence. Reasoning self-confidence was assessed using the 
Memory and Reasoning Competence Inventory (MARCI; Kleitman & Stankov, 
2007).  The MARCI consists of two sub-scales, one assesses memory confidence and 
the other reasoning confidence. Participants completed only the 8 reasoning items 
from the MARCI (e.g. I feel confident when solving problems that require reasoning 
skills). The observed Cronbach’s Alpha in the current sample was .94. 
3.4.1.2 Problem Solving Ability 
 Our goal was to examine whether confidence moderated the reactivity effect, 
however, as confidence and task performance are related (e.g. Lazar Stankov, 2000) 
we attempted to control for objective intellectual ability by administering a short 
battery of reasoning tasks that representatively captured, verbal, numerical, and 
figural (non-verbal) reasoning domains, a common high-level taxonomy of 
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intellectual abilities (Marshalek, Lohman, & Snow, 1983). These also represent a 
broad range of the reasoning abilities typically used in formalised notions of 
reasoning (McGrew, 2009; Sternberg, Kaufman, & Grigorenko, 2008) as well as 
public conceptions of reasoning (Sternberg, 1985).  
The problem solving battery was administered online in two separate sessions 
after participants had completed RPM. The number series task was administered in a 
first session and the figure exchange and verbal comprehension were administered in 
the second follow-up session. All task were completed by participants on their own 
computers but were presented in a standardized fashion.  
Figure Exchange Task (working memory, fluid intelligence; (Schweizer, 
1996): A modified version of the original figure exchange task was administered, 
where participants were presented with four figures arranged in a random order (e.g. a 
spade, heart, diamond and club) and the same four figures in a target arrangement. 
Participants had to indicate how many exchanges needed to be made to the observed 
set so that it matched the target set. Only directly adjacent figures could be 
exchanged. Both arrangements of figures were displayed on the screen the entire time. 
The number of exchanges ranged from 1-5. Participants had 4 minutes to complete as 
many items correctly as possible.  
Verbal Inference (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976): A modified 
version of the original verbal inference task was performed. Participants were 
presented with a series of statements that they were required to read (e.g. One year a 
particular farmer’s stand of wheat yielded 40 bushels per acre), they then selected 
from 4 possible statements the one that could be logically inferred from the sentence 
without assuming any additional information. The 20-item task was presented in a 
multiple-choice fashion.  
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Number Series Task (Thurstone, 1938): The number series task presented 
participants with a series of numbers (e.g. 53 , 55, 57, 59, ?) and they were required to 
indicate what number would complete the series. There were 7 items and participants 
had 6 minutes to complete as many items as possible. 
3.4.2 Results  
81 (77.9%) participants completed all 20 items within the 20-minute time 
limit. The average score was 43.03% (SD = 17.00) and the average response time for 
each item was 49.06 seconds (SD = 16.12). The average confidence for the CR group 
was 51.80% (SD = 21.76), indicating that participants were somewhat over-confident 
(see Figure 3-1b for calibration plots). Due to the diverse nature of the sample, group 
differences in age and sex were examined but neither were significant (both p > .05). 
A multiple regression analysis was performed using RPM performance as the 
dependent variable. Experimental group (CR vs. No-CR) and scaled reasoning self-
confidence were entered as the predictor variables along with the relevant 
interaction5.  
The results indicated that the main effect of group fell just below significance; 
β = .170, t = 1.83, p = .070, 95% CI = -.01 to 2.40. Additionally, reasoning self-
confidence was not a significant predictor of RPM performance β = .072, t = .619, p = 
.537, 95% CI -.54 to 1.03. Crucially, however, the reasoning self-confidence X group 
interaction was also significant; β = .315, t = 2.74, p = .007, 95% CI = .49 to 3.09. An 
examination of simple effects indicated that the relationship between confidence and 
performance was significant for the CR group (β = .358, t = 3.90, p < .001, 95% CI = 
1.00 to 3.07) but not the No-CR group (β = .057, t = .619, p = .537, 95% CI = -.539 to 
                                                 
5 The moderating effects of response time and age on the group difference (CR vs. No-CR) were 
also examined, but neither was significant (p > .05). 
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1.03). As suggested by Aiken, West, and Reno (1991), an examination of group 
differences using the value one standard deviation above, and the value one standard 
deviation below the mean as values of the moderator indicates that providing CR was 
beneficial to those high in reasoning self-confidence, but detrimental to those 
participants low in reasoning self-confidence, see Figure 3-3a. We attribute our 
inability to replicate the main effect of experimental group found in Experiment 3-1 to 
the presumed higher heterogeneity in the reasoning confidence of a diverse 
community sample compared to a student sample. 
 
Figure 3-3. Average performance on RPM as a function of experimental group. 
Moderator values of 1 standard deviation above and below the mean were used for 
high and low reasoning self-confidence respectively. Reasoning SC = reasoning self-
confidence. Error bars represent + 1 standard error of the mean. Results are depicted 
(A) without problem solving covariates and (B) with problem solving ability 
covariates (figure exchange, verbal inference, number series) mean centred. 
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3.4.2.1 Controlling for Problem Solving Ability 
 As cognitive ability and reasoning self-confidence may be related (although 
reasoning self-confidence was not a significant predictor of RPM performance in the 
current sample), the previous results could instead be interpreted as a product of 
cognitive ability rather than confidence moderating the effect of performing CR. In 
order to disentangle these hypotheses the three measures of problem solving ability 
were entered as covariates in the model. Due to attrition in the follow-up sessions 
only 68 participants were included in this analysis.  
The model was the same as above but included scaled scores from the three 
problem solving ability tasks as covariates. The results indicated that the main effect 
of experimental group was again not significant; β = .039, t = .352, p = .726; 95% CI 
= -1.31 to 1.87, nor was the main effect of reasoning self-confidence; β = -.015, t = 
.108, p = .914, 95% CI = -.91 to .82. Crucially, however, the reasoning self-
confidence X group interaction remained significant even after problem solving 
ability scores were entered as covariates; β = .321, t = 2.47, p = .016, 95% CI = .315 
to 2.99; see Figure 3-3b. These results expand on the results of Experiment 3-1 in 
suggesting that providing CR was beneficial to participants high in reasoning self-
confidence and detrimental to participants low in reasoning self-confidence, even 
after problem solving ability was controlled for.  
3.5 General Discussion 
Experiment 3-1 is in line with previous studies of young, educated adults (e.g. 
Mitchum et al., 2016) and supports the view that eliciting self-report measures may 
have an effect on performance, while expanding these findings to CR and reasoning 
performance. Results from Experiment 3-2 in an older, more diverse community 
sample, suggests self-confidence is an important qualifier to be considered.  
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Participants high in reasoning self-confidence were shown to react positively to CR, 
whereas participants low in reasoning self-confidence reacted negatively. This effect, 
which holds even after controlling for participants’ cognitive ability, supports the 
predictions of the cognizant confidence hypothesis that differential reactivity may in 
part be determined by increasing participants’ focus on their own confidence (or lack 
thereof), rather than conveying a general benefit to strategy selection, attention or 
some other cognitive mechanism that applies equally to all.  
This is important because it has often been thought that reactivity to self-
report measures occurs due to unintended positive effects on cognitive processes, e.g. 
improved strategy selection (e.g. Fox et al., 2011). Our findings indicate that CR may 
lead to differential performance as a function of an important metacognitive process – 
confidence in the correctness of ones response. This is in line with the earlier findings 
of Mitchum et al. (2016), who found that metacognitive study decisions were affected 
by making JoL and further supports the notion that online self-report measures are not 
inert, and can cause substantial changes in the processes they are designed to measure 
and have unintended effects on performance.  
These results have important methodological and theoretical implications. CR 
have often been utilised under the assumption they are an unobtrusive means for 
assessing and evaluating metacognitive processes. The current results suggest that CR 
have the potential to exaggerate the affect of confidence on reasoning performance. 
Given how prevalent such measures are in the metacognitive literature, it is possible 
that reactivity may play some role in previous research. For instance, the strong 
positive correlation between performance and confidence on a task, which is 
pervasive in the metacognition literature (Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; Pallier et al., 
2002a; L. Stankov, 2000), may be somewhat inflated due to reactivity effects. 
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Eliciting confidence ratings, at least in the current context, appears to 
strengthen/exaggerate the relationship between confidence and performance, which 
may result in artificial inflations of the correlation between the two. Because 
measuring confidence appears to cause changes in performance (and potentially 
confidence itself), deriving an estimate of confidence effects is not straightforward; 
indirect assessments of self-confidence are one avenue to consider in future research 
design, as are within-subject designs and item-trajectory designs. 
Of course there are a number of factors that may contribute to reactivity which 
have not yet been fully explicated and may limit the generalizability of reactivity 
findings, including our own. For example, time pressure, item difficulty, or the nature 
of the community population used. In particular, confidence may play a more 
important role in the older population utilised here. In addition, the extant literature 
surrounding reactivity and cognitive abilities is currently characterised by equivocal 
results (e.g. Mitchum et al., 2016; Soderstrom et al., 2015), which may have resulted 
from important individual differences not being captured by the commonly used 
protocols. For instance, studies may differ in terms of the confidence of participants 
or factors that may affect this (e.g. the difficulty of the task). While, our results do not 
offer any conclusive resolution to the mixed findings with respect to reactivity, we 
argue that a better understanding of the individual differences, such as the self-
confidence of participants, may go some way to clarifying some of the person-level 
factors that determine reactivity.  
The mechanism by which self-confidence moderates the effect of performing 
confidence ratings is not yet entirely clear. Given that confidence has been well 
established as a predictor of performance (e.g. Lazar Stankov, 2000; Stankov, 2013), 
it is possible that by explicitly referring to confidence, confidence ratings simply 
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increase participants’ awareness of their confidence and in turn heighten the 
relationship between confidence and performance. Alternatively, the self-evaluation 
that comes from eliciting confidence rating may increase arousal and engagement, 
motivating better performance for those who are confident in their reasoning ability, 
but inducing anxiety in those with lower confidence in their ability. Research has 
shown that, in individuals with low self-confidence, self-evaluation can lead them to 
disengage from a task if they become aware of the fact that they are performing below 
their self-selected standards and do not believe they can reduce the performance 
discrepancy (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001). If a participant has 
high self-confidence, however, when they become aware of a performance 
discrepancy they are often motivated to perform better to reduce the discrepancy 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001). Future research should examine 
whether these effects can be explained by stress/anxiety as well as task engagement. 
Further research is also needed to clarify the role of metacognitive accuracy in 
moderating these effects. Although participants with high self-confidence benefited 
from providing CR, it is not clear to what extent this effect depends on the 
accuracy/alignment of a participant’s belief in their reasoning abilities. In particular, 
individuals with highly developed metacognitive processes may tend to perform these 
monitoring and control processes naturally, whereas individuals with less well 
regulated metacognitive processes may benefit more from prompting as they are less 
likely to perform such judgments naturally (Zimmerman, 1998b). 
One limitation of the current set of experiments is that they do not control for 
overall time spent on the task. The CR condition was able to spend longer on the task 
because the timer was paused while confidence ratings were performed. While both 
groups were given the same amount of time to answer the actual items, it is possible 
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that having extra time in between items contributed to the positive effect of 
confidence ratings. This possibility is addressed in later chapters (3,4,5,6) by 
including a rest time for the control group (with the effects replicating regardless).  
The present set of experiments has shown that integrating a metareasoning 
judgement into a reasoning task may influence performance outcomes. Although, 
more research is needed to clarify the mechanism for these benefits and the role of 
self-confidence at moderating this effect, the current results nonetheless suggests that 
assessing metacognition using CR may be beneficial to the reasoning performance of 
high-confidence individuals and detrimental to the performance of low-confidence 
individuals at least within a broad community-based sample. Further research is, 
however, needed to clarify the situational and individual differences factors that 
determine the direction and magnitude of reactivity.  
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CHAPTER 4: Reactivity to Confidence Ratings in Older Individuals 
Performing the Latin Square Task 
 
The contents of this chapter have been submitted for publication in Metacognition 
and Learning. 
 
4.1 Chapter Synopsis 
Confidence ratings (CR) are often used to evaluate the metacognitive processes 
that occur during reasoning and problem solving. Typically CR are elicited with the 
assumption that they do not affect performance on the task being performed. 
However, recent evidence suggests that eliciting CR can cause changes in cognitive 
performance. What is not yet clear is the metacognitive pathways by which CR affect 
overall performance in older individuals. In order to better understand the 
mechanisms driving reactivity to CR, we evaluated the impact of eliciting CR in an 
older sample (N = 89) on two aspects of the metacognitive framework - monitoring 
and control. We found evidence that eliciting CR leads to poorer metacognitive 
monitoring. In addition, we found that participants with high initial prospective self-
confidence who perform CR adopt a more immediate performance-orientated control 
strategy, which improves short-term performance but has no effect on overall 
performance in a timed latin square task.   
 4.2 Introduction 
Metacognition is an important component of reasoning and problem-solving 
(Ackerman & Thompson, 2015). Metacognitive processes such as confidence and 
error detection are important components in both simple perceptual choices and more 
complex decision-making environments (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Most often 
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metacognitive processes are measured ‘online’, using confidence ratings elicited after 
each trial (Fleming & Lau, 2014). In general, there is a strong correlation between 
confidence ratings and cognitive performance (Stankov, 2013; Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2014), however, there are also a number of observable systematic 
biases (Rhodes & Castel, 2009; Stankov & Crawford, 1997). While confidence 
ratings have been widely adopted into both experimental and individual differences 
methodologies, little attention has been given to whether eliciting confidence ratings 
in an online fashion affects performance – often referred to as reactivity (Fox & 
Charness, 2010; Harris & Lahey, 1982; Leow & Morgan-Short, 2004). 
Reactivity represents a challenge for the study of metacognition as many of the 
methodologies that are used to measure metacognition have proven to be reactive. For 
example, think-aloud protocols (Fox & Charness, 2010) and judgements of learning 
(Mitchum et al., 2016; Soderstrom et al., 2015), and confidence ratings (Birney, 
Beckmann, Beckmann, & Double, 2017; Double & Birney, 2017a) have been found 
to be reactive. Although, others have found such measures not to be reactive (Fox et 
al., 2011; Kelemen & Weaver III, 1997; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). Indeed there is 
little consensus over either the direction and magnitude of reactivity effects, or what 
factors determine these outcomes (For meta-analytic reviews, see Double et al., 2018; 
Fox et al., 2011).  
4.2.1 Reactivity to Confidence Ratings 
Recent evidence suggests that, like other metacognitive measures, eliciting 
confidence ratings from participants affects their cognitive performance. In a sample 
of mid-level business managers, Birney et al. (2017) found that eliciting confidence 
ratings resulted in poorer performance on Raven’s Advance Progressive Matrices 
  
 
66 
(APM) compared to controls, but this effect was complexly moderated by a number 
of personality factors. In contrast, Double and Birney (2017a) found in a sample of 
university students, that APM performance was better for participants who performed 
the task with confidence ratings than without. Importantly, a second experiment in a 
sample of older adults, showed that a beneficial effect of confidence ratings was 
moderated by participants’ self-reported reasoning confidence (assessed by a separate 
self-report measure administered before APM). Even after baseline cognitive ability 
(also assessed separately before APM) was controlled for, participants who were high 
in reasoning self-confidence performed better if asked to provide confidence ratings, 
whereas participants low in reasoning self-confidence performed worse if asked to 
provide confidence ratings. Double and Birney speculated that the self-evaluation 
involved in confidence ratings is affirming for participants who believe they are 
performing well, but threatening for participants who believe they are performing 
poorly, hence the differential effect on performance.  
4.2.2 Reactivity and Age 
Older individuals may be particularly susceptible to reactivity (Double & 
Birney, 2017a; Fox & Charness, 2010). For example, Fox and Charness found that 
older participants, but not younger participants, performed better on Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices if they were asked to think-aloud as they solved the problems. 
Although it is not yet clear why older people may be particularly reactive to 
confidence ratings, elsewhere it has been speculated that older individuals may 
benefit from such metacognitive prompts because it allows them to externalise their 
monitoring and regulatory processes or because such self-report demands prompts 
monitoring and control that would not otherwise occur (Fox & Charness, 2010). This 
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is particularly important because metacognitive abilities have been shown to decrease 
with age (Palmer, David, & Fleming, 2014; Soderstrom, McCabe, & Rhodes, 2012; 
Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012), although others have found no such age effects (Eakin & 
Hertzog, 2006; Haber, 2012)6.  
4.2.3 The Current Study 
 The current study aims to extend these recent findings by examining the effect 
of confidence ratings on both cognitive and metacognitive processes to better 
understand the full impact of eliciting confidence ratings on older individuals. To do 
this, we assess the moderating role of prospective confidence, a measure of pre-
existing self-confidence, on reactivity within a timed cognitive task, both in terms of 
performance and metacognitive regulation. Subsequently, we have participants 
provide a retrospective appraisal of their performance in order to assess how 
confidence ratings impact metacognitive monitoring. Below we discuss the 
hypothesised impact of confidence ratings on the Nelson and Narrens’ framework of 
metacognition (Nelson, 1996; Nelson & Narens, 1994) and how these metacognitive 
consequences may give rise to performance effects. 
4.2.4 Nelson and Narrens Metacognitive Framework 
We adopt the Nelson and Narrens framework (Nelson, 1996; Nelson & Narens, 
1994) of metacognition in order to describe the metacognitive effects of eliciting 
confidence ratings. This framework distinguishes between an object-level where 
                                                 
6 The equivocal findings regarding age effects on metacognitive performance are 
most likely due to the difficulty of disentangling cognitive performance from 
metacognitive accuracy. When more sophisticated signal detection based measures 
are used to disentangle the two, there appears to be age related deficits (Palmer et al., 
2014). The interested reader is referred to Fleming and Lau (2014) for a discussion of 
the difficulty in disentangling cognitive and metacognitive performance, as well as a 
possible solution. 
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cognitive activity occurs and a meta-level that governs the object-level processes 
(Veenman et al., 2006). These two levels are linked together by a downward control 
process and an upward monitoring processes, see Figure 4-1. These two 
metacognitive processes are communicative in that they inform each other in order to 
direct behaviour and cognition towards a goal (Nelson, 1996). Importantly the 
communicated information is imperfect and may be influenced by other aspects of the 
self such as motivation and affect (Efklides, 2011). The object-level process is 
typically operationalized as cognitive performance on a criterion activity (Nelson, 
1996). In addition, we operationalize metacognitive monitoring by assessing 
retrospective appraisals of cognitive performance and metacognitive control by 
examining response time data. Below we consider specific hypotheses about how the 
metacognitive framework might be influenced by reactivity.  
 
Figure 4-1. A representation of the metacognitive framework proposed by Nelson 
and Narens (1994) and Nelson (1996) 
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4.2.4.1 Monitoring Effects 
Item-level confidence ratings require participants to repeatedly self-assess and 
quantify aspects of their performance. Metacognitive monitoring is likely to be 
impacted by this repeated demand to self-assess. While it is intuitive to assume that 
more frequent self-assessment will lead to more accurate metacognitive monitoring, 
this is not necessarily the case. Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, and Shaked (2008) 
distinguish between information-based and experience-based processes in 
metacognition, with the former referring to metacognitive inferences based on their 
beliefs about their own ability and preconceived notions about their competence, and 
the latter referring to cues based on subjective feelings that occur during a cognitive 
experience. If confidence ratings are based on participants’ online subjective 
experience of their performance, then they may indeed result in more accurate 
metacognitive monitoring (assessed using retrospective appraisals). However, if 
confidence ratings are largely based on information-based cues, confidence ratings 
may activate pre-existing beliefs about one’s ability and may in fact accentuate pre-
existing over/under confidence. This information-based cue account would align well 
with the previous finding that self-confidence moderates reactivity in terms of the 
effect on cognitive performance (Double & Birney, 2017a). 
Changes in metacognitive monitoring may act as a pathway for reactivity 
effects. Performance monitoring is hypothesised to detect conflicts between task-
relevant information and current performance and signal when increased top-down 
control is required, which in turn improves task processing (Yeung, 2013). 
Metacognitive monitoring deficits are associated with poorer performance in a large 
number of domains (see the Dunning-Kruger effect; Dunning, 2011; Dunning et al., 
2003). There is mixed evidence to whether metacognitive monitoring is impaired in 
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older individuals with some studies finding impaired metacognition relative to young 
adults (Palmer et al., 2014; Soderstrom et al., 2012; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012) and 
others finding that monitoring is relatively spared (Halamish, McGillivray, & Castel, 
2011; Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; Hertzog, Sinclair, & 
Dunlosky, 2010). 
The idea that monitoring prompts facilitate performance monitoring (and 
performance) is perhaps most clearly advocated for in self-regulatory theories of self-
focused attention (Carver & Scheier, 2001; Carver et al., 2000). Self-regulation 
theories argue metacognitive reflection is necessary for an individual to regulate their 
cognitive resources relative to task demand and performance, and to gain insight into 
their own knowledge (Zimmerman, 1998a). According to these theories, self-focused 
attention leads to improved performance monitoring because it provides greater 
clarity into momentary performance and learning and allows for better regulation of 
behaviour and cognitive resources (Carver & Scheier, 2001). Bannert and Reimann 
(2012) argue that metacognitive prompts, such as confidence ratings, activate 
monitoring and self-regulatory processes during learning, and because such 
performance monitoring processes are not carried out by all learners spontaneously, 
prompting will be beneficial to learning. 
4.1.4.2 Control Effects 
 The demand of performing confidence ratings is also likely to impact 
metacognitive control process. In particular, we hypothesise that the repeated 
requirement to self-assess one’s performance causes participants to adopt a 
performance-focused control strategy while performing the task. By asking 
participants to rate the likelihood that they answered an item correctly, confidence 
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ratings direct attention to performance, which is likely to prompt them to either 
consciously or unconsciously regulate their cognitive behaviour within the task to 
prioritise immediate performance rather than outcomes that are not necessarily 
associated with performance (e.g. mastering the task). This may be particularly 
effective at improving short term performance in older individuals, because older 
individuals often use metacognitive strategies that are focused on content mastery 
rather than immediate performance (Justice & Dornan, 2001) and age is negatively 
correlated with performance orientation (Button, Mathieu, & Zajac, 1996). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Mitchum et al. (2016) observed that when 
asked to perform judgements of learning participants would adopt a more 
conservative study strategy. They found when participants were asked to study related 
and unrelated word pairs, those that did so while providing judgements of learning, 
spent longer studying the easier related word-pairs and less time studying the difficult 
unrelated word-pairs, ultimately impairing their performance on unrelated word pairs 
on the recall test (related word-pair performance was unaffected by performing 
judgements of learning). In support of this notion they found that reactivity was only 
observed if related and unrelated word pairs were presented in the same study list; 
unrelated word pairs presented alone did not display reactivity to judgments of 
learning. Mitchum et al. (2016) argue that when easy and difficult items were both to 
be recalled, participants modified their study decisions in order to adopt a more 
performance-orientated mindset rather than trying to master the difficult items. 
4.2.3 Timed Procedure 
 The current study utilised a timed reasoning task to examine the impact of 
confidence ratings on both object-level cognitive performance and the metacognitive 
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control and monitoring processes. A timed task was utilised because the decision 
making in a timed task relies on metacognitive control to a greater extent than 
untimed tasks (for a comprehensive theory, see Ackerman, 2014). Within a timed 
procedure, a participant must balance persisting with the current item with 
progressing to the next within a set time limit. Thus there are two obvious strategies 
that exist as a trade-off, a short-term strategy where one spends more time on the 
current item but may get through fewer items, or a more long-term strategy where one 
spends less time on each item but answers more items.  
4.3. Method  
4.3.1 Participants  
A community sample of 89 participants (82.02% female) was recruited using 
an advertisement placed in a newsletter of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation as 
part of a research partnership with the University of Sydney (Mage = 64.18, SD = 9.07; 
range = 27-84). Participants performed a reasoning task (latin square task) either with 
or without confidence ratings. 46 participants were randomly assigned to the control 
group (No-CR) and 43 participants were assigned to the confidence ratings group 
(CR). All participants completed a measure of prospective confidence (predicting 
their expected performance on the task) and a retrospective appraisal (retrospectively 
estimating their overall performance). Participants received no remuneration for 
participating in the study. Participants completed the study online using their own 
computer and was administered using Inquisit (Inquisit, 2016). All study materials 
were programmed to present in a standardised fashion.  
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4.3.2 Materials and Procedure 
Latin Square Task (LST; Birney, Halford, & Andrews, 2006): Participants 
were presented with 36 items drawn from the original LST. As depicted in Figure 4-2, 
each item consisted of a 4 x 4 matrix filled with a number of symbols as well as a 
missing symbol. Each row and column could only contain one instance of each 
symbol (the defining characteristic of a Latin squares and Sudoku type problems) and 
participants were tasked with determining the symbol that completed the matrix. The 
LST task was selected due the appropriateness of the task’s difficulty for a 
community sample, and the fact that the task has been shown to be a reliable predictor 
of fluid intelligence (Birney, Bowman, Beckmann, & Seah, 2012). After each item, 
participants in the CR group had to rate their confidence on a 6-point scale ranging 
from (0% to 100%) that asked “how confident are you in your previous answer?”, 
whereas a control condition was presented with a blank screen for 3000ms in order to 
control for any effect of a delay. Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the 
task with a timer being displayed on screen at all times. The timer was paused when 
participants were performing confidence ratings. Response times were calculated as 
the time from stimulus onset to response/answer. Items were presented in randomised 
blocked design of cognitive complexity (i.e. participants performed an easy item, then 
medium difficulty item, then difficult item and then repeated the sequence). 
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Figure 4-2. Two example items from the latin square task. 
 
Prospective self-confidence/Retrospective appraisal: All participants provided 
a prospective estimate of their performance and a retrospective appraisal of their 
performance. The prospective estimate was obtained after being presented with two 
example questions and answers. Participants were asked to predict their performance 
on the test as a percentage on a continuous slider scale from 0-100; this was used as a 
measure of participants’ initial confidence, referred to henceforth as prospective 
confidence. The retrospective appraisal was performed immediately after completion 
of the task and required participants to estimate their overall performance on the task 
as a percentage using a continuous slider scale from 0-100.  
4.3.3 Scoring 
Two measures of performance on the LST were of interest: 1) the overall 
number of items correct in the time limit (15 minutes) calculated as a percentage 
(items correct/total items*100), which we refer to as overall accuracy and 2) the 
mean accuracy, the number of items correctly answered of those actually attempted 
calculated as a percentage (items correct/items attempted*100). 
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4.3.4 Calibration 
 To assess the calibration between actual performance and participants’ 
retrospective appraisals we calculated a miscalibration score for each participant 
using the following formula described in Schraw (2009): 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 −  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)2  
 where p is equal to the actual performance of the ith participant and a is equal 
to the appraisal provided by the ith participant. Both p and a were calculated as a 
percentage.  
4.4. Results 
The data was analysed using R version 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2017) and plots 
were produced using ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham, 2009). Table 4-1 presents descriptive 
statistics of study variables as well as bivariate correlations. Each criterion variable 
was analysed using the same linear regression model with experimental group, 
prospective confidence and their interaction as the predictor variables. Prospective 
confidence was mean centred and experimental group was dummy coded. 
Homoscedasticity and the normality of residuals were checked for each regression by 
plotting standardized residuals vs. fitted values and a Q-Q plot respectively. No 
substantial violations were noted for any of the regression models.  
4.4.1 Performance 
Overall accuracy across groups was 73.41% (SD = 18.12). A regression model (R2 = 
.17, F(3,85) = 5.97, p < .001) indicated that there was no significant difference 
between experimental groups in terms of overall accuracy, b = - 2.33, t = -.65, p = 
.515. Prospective confidence was a significant positive predictor of overall 
performance, b = 38.95, t = 2.90, p = .005. Furthermore, the group X prospective 
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confidence interaction was not significant, b = 1.46, t = .08, p = .940. Turning now to 
mean accuracy, average mean accuracy across groups was 81.61% (SD = 13.20). The 
regression model (R2 = .35, F(3,85) = 15.56, p < .001) indicated that there was no 
main effect of experimental group on mean accuracy, b= -2.10, t = -.09, p = .362. 
Prospective confidence was a significant positive predictor of mean accuracy, b= 
24.13, t = 2.79, p = .007. Notably, the group X prospective confidence interaction was 
also significant, b= 29.82, t = 2.41, p = .018. As shown in Figure 4-3, participants 
high in prospective confidence performed better when confidence ratings were 
elicited, whereas participants low in prospective confidence performed worse when 
asked to provide confidence ratings. 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Mean accuracy (items correct/items attempted) as a function of 
experimental group and prospective confidence. Moderator values of 1 standard 
deviation above and below the mean were used for high and low prospective 
confidence, respectively. Error bars represent + 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Table 4-1 
Means (SD) for key study variables as well as bivariate correlations. Correlations in the upper quadrant are for the No-CR group, correlations in 
the lower quadrant are for the CR group. 
Statistic 
CR 
M (SD) 
No-CR 
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Prospective 
Confidence 62.79% (18.81) 65.22 (18.59) 1 .421** .401** -.312* .469** .036 
2. Overall 
Accuracy 71.71% (19.13) 75 (17.18) .397** 1 .656** -.740** .580** .063 
3. Mean 
Accuracy  80.03% (15.05) 83.09 (11.18) .674** .668** 1 -.045 .517** .114 
4. Av. Response 
Time (sec) 23.65 (13.07) 23.63 (11.45) .19 -.581** .159 1 -.370* -.001 
5. Retrospective 
Appraisal 61.86% (23.43) 64.78 (17.48) .744** .398** .680** .191 1 -.401** 
6. Calibration 642.36 (781.98) 351.53 (452) -.229 -.208 .053 .318* -.400** 1 
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Av = average. 
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As a follow-up analysis we probed the moderation using the Johnson-Neyman 
technique, which provides a region of significance in which group differences fall 
outside of a 95% confidence band (Bauer & Curran, 2005).The Johnson-Neyman 
technique indicated that the group difference between the CR and No-CR groups was 
significant when prospective confidence was less than .11 standard deviations below 
the mean (prospective confidence < 62.09%), but not significant with higher values of 
prospective confidence, see Figure 4-4. The results indicated that there was a 
significant group difference between the CR and No-CR group for participants with 
prospective confidence below 62.09, such that participants in the CR group performed 
worse than controls within this region. These findings largely replicate the results of 
Double and Birney (2017a) with respect to the interaction between confidence and 
reactivity.  
 
 
Figure 4-4. Conditional effect of group on mean LST accuracy as a function of 
prospective confidence. The shaded region indicates the values of prospective 
confidence within which the effect of CR is significant using a 95% confidence 
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interval. Positive conditional effect values indicate improved performance in the CR 
group, whereas negative values indicate impaired performance in the CR group 
 
The shaded region indicates the values of prospective confidence within which the 
group effect is significant using a 95% confidence interval. To explain the differential 
effect of confidence ratings on overall accuracy compared with mean accuracy we 
analysed response time difference. Using the same model as above, a regression using 
mean response time as the criterion variable was utilised (R2 = .06, F(3,85) = 1.93, p 
= .131). There was no significant main effect of group on response time, b= -.03, t = -
.013, p = .9897. Prospective confidence was a significant negative predictor of 
response time, b = -19.20, t = -2.00, p = .049, and the group X perspective confidence 
interaction was significant, b = 32.44, t = 2.36, p = .021. As shown in Figure 4-5, high 
confidence participants spent longer on each individual item if asked to provide 
confidence ratings, whereas low confidence participants answered more quickly if 
asked to provide confidence ratings (compared to No-CR controls). Again, the 
Johnson-Neyman technique was used to probe the moderation. The findings 
suggested that CR participants responded significantly slower than controls for values 
of prospective confidence above .30 standard deviations above the mean (prospective 
confidence > 69.57%), and quicker for values .29 standard deviations below the mean 
of prospective confidence (prospective confidence <  58.71%), see Figure 4-6. This 
suggests that the effect of confidence ratings on participants’ decision-making 
depended on their prospective confidence. 
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Figure 4-5. Mean response time (seconds) as a function of experimental group and 
prospective confidence. Moderator values of 1 standard deviation above and below 
the mean were used for high and low prospective confidence, respectively. Error bars 
represent + 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
4.4.2 Performance Monitoring 
 To assess performance monitoring we used miscalibration as the criterion 
variable using the same model as above. The regression model (R2 = .09, F(3,85) = 
2.74, p = .048) indicated that averaging across prospective confidence, the CR group 
(M = 642.36, SD = 781.98) was significantly more miscalibrated than the No-CR 
group (M = 351.53, SD = 452.00); b = 279.90, t = 2.10, p = .039. That is to say the 
CR group made significantly less accurate retrospective appraisals of their 
performance. There was no main effect of prospective confidence, b = 87.88, t = .175, 
p = .862, and the group X prospective confidence was not significant, b = -1041.42, t 
= -1.45, p = .152. 
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Figure 4-6. Conditional effect of group on mean response time as a function of 
prospective confidence. The shaded region indicates the values of prospective 
confidence within which the effect of CR is significant using a 95% confidence 
interval. Positive conditional effect values indicate slower response time in the CR 
group, whereas negative values indicate quicker response time in the CR group 
 
 To explore this effect further, we examined the predictors of participants’ 
retrospective appraisals. Retrospective appraisal was entered as the criterion variable, 
while prospective confidence and overall performance were entered as predictor 
variables along with the interaction between each of these effects and group. This 
allowed us to model the extent to which prospective confidence and actual 
performance differentially predicted participants’ retrospective appraisals (i.e. how 
did participants weigh their prospective confidence and actual performance when 
making their appraisals).  
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The model indicated that neither group, b = -.53, t = -0.17, p = .868, nor 
prospective confidence was a significant predictor of participants’ retrospective 
appraisals, b = 25.67, t = 1.96, p = .054. Overall accuracy was a significant positive 
predictor of participants’ retrospective appraisals, b = .47, t = 3.33, p = .001. 
Crucially, the group X prospective confidence interaction effect was significant, b = 
61.02, t = 3.27, p = .002. Simple slopes analysis indicated that prospective confidence 
significantly positively predicted retrospective appraisals only in the CR group, b = 
86.69, t = 6.54, p < .001 but not the No-CR group, b = 25.67, t = 1.96, p = .054 (see 
Figure 4-7). This result suggests that participants in the CR group tended to formulate 
their retrospective appraisals based on their prospective confidence to a greater extent 
than the No-CR group. 
4.5. Discussion 
Confidence ratings often provide important information about metacognitive 
processes. Our findings, however, add to the growing body of evidence that 
challenges the assumption that confidence ratings can be elicited as an unobtrusive 
method of assessing metacognition (Birney et al., 2017; Double & Birney, 2017a). 
Furthermore, like Double and Birney (2017a; 2017b) we found that confidence may 
be important  in determining how older participants react to performing confidence 
ratings, both in terms of whether or not their performance is facilitated, and the 
metacognitive control strategies they appear to adopt as a result of performing ratings. 
In addition to evaluating the effect of confidence ratings on cognitive performance, 
we also evaluated their impact on meta-level processes. In terms of metacognitive 
monitoring, the current results suggest that eliciting confidence ratings resulted in less 
accurate retrospective self-appraisals of performance and supports the notion that 
confidence ratings draw on information-based cues rather than experience-based cues. 
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In terms of metacognitive control, our findings suggest that performing confidence 
ratings prompts participants to adopt a different control strategy than they ordinary 
would, whereby immediate rather than long-term performance is prioritised.  
 
 
Figure 4-7. Retrospective appraisal as a function of experimental group and 
prospective confidence. 
 
4.5.1 Reactivity 
 The present results replicate earlier findings that confidence ratings are 
reactive and the direction of this effect depends on participants’ self-confidence 
(Birney et al., 2017; Double & Birney, 2017a). Although reactivity has always been a 
concern for research using some methods of measuring metacognition such as think-
aloud protocols, it is only recently that reactivity to seemingly unobtrusive measures 
of assessing metacognition has received significant research. For example, recent 
empirical work by Mitchum et al. (2016) and Soderstrom et al. (2015) has challenged 
the notion that judgements of learning can be elicited without affecting participants 
performance. In addition, reactivity to confidence ratings appears to depend on 
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participants’ self-confidence – in the current study the performance of participants 
low in confidence was impaired, whereas confidence ratings appeared to be somewhat 
beneficial or at least to have little effect on those who were high in self-confidence. It 
has been well established that confidence ratings are highly related to actual cognitive 
performance (Lazar Stankov, 2000; Stankov, 2013; Stankov et al., 2014). This 
correlation may, however, be somewhat inflated by the asymmetrical effect of 
eliciting confidence ratings, if high self-confidence participants react to confidence 
ratings positively, whereas low self-confidence participants react negatively then the 
effect of confidence when confidence ratings will be exaggerated and so too will the 
correlation between confidence and performance. Although further research is needed 
to confirm this hypothesis, it is worth mentioning that the typical correlations between 
online (contemporaneous) confidence ratings and performance are far greater than the 
correlations between self-report, trait-like measures of confidence and performance 
(Stankov et al., 2012; Stankov et al., 2014). 
 Apart from the obvious methodological implications of the current findings, 
the present reactivity effects also suggest that participants appear to differ in the way 
they make decisions about progressing through a task when confidence ratings are 
elicited compared to when they are not. For confidence ratings to be reactive, they 
must presumably direct attention to information that participants would not have 
otherwise attend to (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), which leads them to modify their 
metacognitive control during the task. This suggests that either the judgements 
elicited by confidence ratings do not necessarily occur spontaneously when 
confidence ratings aren’t provided or that the metacognitive process is, at least in part, 
an implicit processes. This may need to be further considered by theories of cognitive 
decision–making that argue that individuals use their subjective confidence to decide 
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when to progress to the next item in a test (Ackerman, 2014), which may not 
ordinarily happen in the same way as it does when confidence ratings are elicited.  
4.5.2 Metacognitive Monitoring 
We examined the effect of eliciting confidence ratings on the accuracy of 
metacognitive monitoring. Because confidence ratings require participants to evaluate 
their performance, it is intuitive to expect that confidence ratings would facilitate 
performance monitoring, which would in turn benefit performance. This belief is a  
informed by the often-held assumption that increasing the frequency of self-
monitoring is equivalent to increasing the quality of self-monitoring. As a result of 
this assumption, self-reflection and self-evaluation are often encouraged in learning 
environments and workplaces as a way to increase metacognitive monitoring (Bannert 
et al., 2009; Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008; Bannert & Reimann, 2012; Carver & 
Scheier, 2001). However, we find no evidence that performing confidence ratings 
resulted in more accurate metacognitive monitoring; on the contrary, participants who 
performed confidence ratings in the current study were significantly less calibrated in 
their retrospective appraisals of their performance. The results tend to indicate that 
participants in the CR group based their retrospective appraisals on their prospective 
self-confidence to a greater extent than the No-CR group. This suggests that 
confidence ratings may direct attention toward self-relevant beliefs and concepts such 
as prospective confidence, and away from monitoring performance on the task at 
hand. This finding is in keeping with the idea that confidence ratings rely on 
information-based cues (Dunning et al., 2003; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). 
While further replication is needed, the fact that the retrospective appraisals of the CR 
group deviated less from their prospective confidence and were less aligned with how 
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they performed, suggests that their prospective confidence was more prominent in 
their metacognitive evaluations as a result of performing the confidence ratings. The 
implication is that performing confidence ratings may direct attention away from 
experience-based cues (i.e., a task-focused) and onto participants’ information-based 
cues, particularly existing (prospective) confidence related beliefs (i.e., self-focused). 
Confidence ratings may therefore serve to reinforce individuals’ pre-existing beliefs 
about their expected performance in general rather than enhancing the accuracy of 
their actual performance monitoring. As such confidence ratings appear to be a poor 
candidate intervention for improving the previously often observed performance 
monitoring deficits in older individuals (e.g. Palmer et al., 2014; Soderstrom et al., 
2012). 
Furthermore, this finding points to long-standing concerns regarding our 
ability to accurately and consistently report on our subjective states (e.g. Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2004). There are also implications for self-regulated learning 
theory and the role of metacognition in decision-making. Attention is central to many 
theories of cognitive control and particularly theories about the role of metacognition 
in learning (Carver & Scheier, 2001; Efklides, 2011; Nelson, 1996). Implicit in these 
theories is the notion that self-monitoring provides an accurate awareness of our 
cognitive process. If instead metacognitive prompts such as confidence ratings, leads 
to a biased view of our internal states then this poses a significant challenge for 
traditional theories of metacognition, which presume that an efficient and accurate 
attentional system is used to coordinate cognitive behaviour. This finding additionally 
poses an interesting question for future research, if introspection does not lead to 
more accurate performance monitoring then what person and task characteristics 
moderate the attention-accuracy relationship?   
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4.5.3 Metacognitive Control 
Our results suggest that the requirement to provide confidence ratings affected 
the control-strategy that older participants used when performing a timed reasoning 
task. Importantly, the nature of the effect depended on participants’ initial confidence 
in the task at hand – high confidence participants persisted longer with each 
individual item compared to No-CR control participants, whereas low-confidence 
participants spent less time on each individual item. Rather than simply prompting 
participants to adopt a more performance orientated mindset, we propose that, in 
keeping with the metacognitive monitoring findings, this was a direct result of 
confidence ratings directing attention to information-based cues, namely confidence 
related beliefs (e.g. “I’m really good at problem solving”). For high-confidence 
participants, when their self-confidence related beliefs were activated they persisted 
longer with reasoning problems, believing that they would eventually answer them 
correctly. On the other hand, when attention was directed to the confidence-related 
beliefs of low-confidence participants, they were less likely to persist with each item, 
because they lacked confidence that they would eventually answer it accurately.  
We thus propose a two-stage model of reactivity to confidence ratings. The 
first stage premises that participants attend to confidence related beliefs when they 
perform confidence ratings i.e. they rely on information-based cues. In the second 
stage, participants make strategic control decisions (e.g. speed-accuracy trade-off) 
within a task based on those activated beliefs – decisions that will eventually affect 
their performance on the task. This explanation of reactivity is in keeping with 
traditional models of self-focused attention (e.g. Objective Self-Awareness Theory, 
Silvia and Duval, 2001) which propose that self-focused attention leads an individual 
to become aware of discrepancies between one’s behaviour and goals. This awareness 
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prompts the individual to reduce the discrepancy (or at least an awareness of the 
discrepancy) by improving their performance, reducing their goal, or disengaging 
from the task. As a result, self-focused attention is likely to strengthen and reinforce 
beliefs (which may or may not be accurate) and encourage individuals to act in 
accordance with these beliefs (Silvia & Duval, 2001). 
4.5.4 Limitations 
The current results suggest that prompting participants to rate their confidence 
may affect cognitive performance through impairing performance monitoring. 
Educators have often been encouraged to introduce metacognitive prompts into 
classroom environments in order to enhance learning (e.g. Aurah, 2014; Bannert & 
Mengelkamp, 2008; Bannert & Reimann, 2012; Chen, 2007; Garrison, 1997). Using 
confidence ratings as an intervention as a metacognitive prompt may be problematic 
given that these prompts may disproportionately assist high-confidence individuals, 
and may in fact reinforce inaccurate confidence-related beliefs learners have about 
their ability, therefore it is advisable that using confidence ratings in an educational 
context is done with caution. However, the extent to which these effects can be 
attributed to the specific wording of confidence ratings is not yet clear. Confidence 
ratings tend to explicitly refer to confidence, and in doing so may be particularly 
prone to reinforcing individuals’ existing beliefs about their abilities compared with 
other types of metacognitive prompts. It may be preferable to use prompts that require 
learners to reflect on either their cognitive processes (e.g. rating how deeply you 
thought about a problem) or their cognitive performance without actually providing 
an evaluation of that performance, although further work is needed to examine the 
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specific characteristics of metacognitive prompts that produce positive and negative 
outcomes. 
Furthermore, it is not yet clear to what extent these findings generalise to the 
younger samples that are typically observed in psychological studies (although such 
samples are themselves far from representative). Further research is necessary to 
better understand the extent to which population characteristics (e.g. age, intelligence, 
education etc.) determine the extent to which reactivity effects and the proposed 
mechanism generalise to other populations. In addition, there a host of other variables 
that have been shown to affect the accuracy of confidence ratings (e.g. task difficulty, 
awareness of ignorance, alternative answers, feedback, social cognition, motivation, 
and gender) that may also affect reactivity and therefore require further investigation. 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
The current results have provided insight into the effect of confidence ratings 
on both reasoning performance and the accuracy of participants’ metacognitive 
monitoring in a sample of older participants. These results suggest that participants 
may react to performing confidence ratings, and this effect may be moderated by 
prospective confidence. To evaluate potential metacognitive effects of reactivity we 
evaluated both metacognitive monitoring (through retrospective self-appraisals of 
performance) and metacognitive control (through progression decisions in a timed 
cognitive task). Our results suggest that performing confidence ratings impaired 
participants’ metacognitive monitoring, by directing attention to information-based 
cues, specifically existing self-confidence related beliefs, rather than to experience-
based cues related to their actual subjective experience of performing the task. This 
activation of confidence related beliefs may help explain the moderating effect of 
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confidence on reactivity. In terms of metacognitive control, participants who had high 
prospective confidence and were asked to perform confidence ratings appeared to 
adopt a conservative approach to the task, focusing on short-term performance, when 
compared to controls. Conversely, low prospective confidence participants who 
performed confidence ratings spent less time on each item (and correspondingly had 
lower mean accuracy), which is consistent with the notion that due to their low 
prospective confidence being activated they chose to give up quicker and progress to 
the next item. 
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CHAPTER 5: Do Confidence Ratings prime Confidence? 
 
The contents of this chapter have been submitted for publication in Psychological 
Science. 
 
5.1 Chapter Synopsis 
Confidence ratings (CR) are one of the most frequently used measures in 
psychological research. However, recent evidence has suggested that eliciting CR 
from participants may result in changes to cognitive performance, so called reactivity. 
Here, we examine whether reactivity to CR can be better explained by added task-
relevant introspection, or, alternatively, the unintentional priming of confidence-
related beliefs. First, we compare participants’ performance in a making CR group 
with a group making a task-irrelevant control rating, and a second group who made 
the same task-irrelevant rating, but with the word ‘confident’ included in the rating’s 
wording. The results suggest reactivity is driven by the presentation of the word 
‘confident’ and reactivity does not require task-relevant introspection. Additionally, 
we show that re-phrasing CR to remove the word ‘confident’ neutralises reactivity. 
This suggests that reactivity may represent a significant problem for researchers using 
CR, but rephrasing CR may remedy these concerns in relatively simple fashion. 
5.2 Introduction 
Confidence ratings are commonly used within metacognitive research to assess 
the effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Confidence 
ratings are generally elicited in an ‘online’ fashion, after each item on a task. Overall, 
confidence ratings are strongly related to accuracy in a range of domains, including 
general knowledge tests (Perfect, Watson, & Wagstaff, 1993), perceptual decisions 
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(Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010), and reasoning tasks (Lazar Stankov, 
2000). There are, however, significant individual differences in metacognitive ability 
as captured by confidence ratings (Fleming et al., 2010). While, confidence ratings 
have been utilised to provide valuable insights into metacognitive processes, they 
have typically been elicited with little consideration as to their effect on the 
underlying cognitive process. Here we directly examine the effect of performing 
confidence ratings on reasoning performance, while isolating the possible mechanism 
responsible for such effects. 
Reactivity occurs when performing a self-report measure causes a change in 
performance on a task. Reactivity can be positive, when performance improves or 
negative, when performance declines. Methods for assessing metacognition may be 
particularly prone to reactivity as they often involve collecting ‘online’ self-report 
measures while a participant performs a cognitive task. In theory, reactivity should 
occur when, and only when, a self-report measure elicits information that would not 
have otherwise been attended to (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). This claim was supported 
by a meta-analysis of 94 studies conducted by Fox et al. (2011) that found think-aloud 
procedures that do not demand additional information from a subject (i.e. they require 
only that the subjects vocalises their current cognitions), were not reactive, whereas 
protocols that directed subjects for additional information, such as to provide 
explanations for their thought processes, displayed positive reactivity. Similarly, 
another meta-analysis of different metacognitive rating, judgements of learning, 
showed that in some circumstance they too are reactive (Double et al., 2018). 
Notably, the analysis showed that judgements of learning were only (positively) 
reactive when they were elicited from related, but not unrelated, word pairs, which 
suggests that task-characteristics can also influence reactivity.  
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 Petrusic and Baranski (2003) provided one of the first examinations of 
reactivity to confidence ratings during a perceptual choice task. They found that 
confidence increased decision-making times but did not significantly affect decision 
accuracy. However, as the authors noted, errors were higher when confidence ratings 
were elicited on 80% of the stimuli used, and the failure to reach significance was 
possibly a type-2 error due to their small sample size (N = 28). A subsequent study by 
Birney et al. (2017) in a sample of business managers, found that, compared to a no-
rating control, participants who provided confidence ratings had impaired 
performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Performance was particularly impaired 
on the difficult items of the task. However, Double and Birney (2017a) recently 
showed that the direction of reactivity to confidence ratings depends on the pre-
existing self-confidence of participants (measured separately using a self-report 
measure). Participants with high pre-existing confidence performed better on Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices, while performance was impaired when confidence ratings were 
collected from participants with low pre-existing self-confidence, these effects 
remained even after cognitive ability was controlled for. This led the authors to argue 
for the cognizant confidence hypothesis, which proposes that rather than providing a 
general benefit to cognitive performance through metacognitive reflection, confidence 
ratings prime pre-existing confidence and thus have contrasting effects on high vs. 
low confidence participants. 
If confidence ratings do indeed differentially affect high and low confidence 
participants, it is not yet clear what it is about confidence ratings that leads to such 
effects. Two hypothesised mechanism appear mostly likely to account for the effect. 
Firstly, it may be that the repeated presentation of the word ‘confident’ (as in “How 
confident are you that your last response was correct?”) primes participants’ pre-
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existing self-confidence, which in turn affects their performance. Evidence suggests 
that goals and motivation can be unconsciously primed such that when one pays 
attention to a stimulus, the probability that they become consciously aware of it 
increases (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). We argue that the repetition of the word 
‘confident’ makes participants more consciously aware of their subjective confidence, 
which in turn effects their performance because self-confidence is an important 
determinant of performance (Bandura, 1993; Schunk, 1989; Zimmerman, 2000). We 
refer to this as the priming hypothesis. 
Alternatively, confidence ratings may result in self-confidence determined 
changes in reasoning performance because they represent an explicit demand to 
reflect on one’s performance after each decision. The introspection caused by this 
demand may have a dynamic effect on participants as they progress through the task 
and gain insights into the effectiveness (or not) of their reasoning strategies, which 
they are able to apply to later items. In support of this notion, there is some evidence 
that metacognitive interventions are effective at improving performance (Azevedo, 
2005; Coburn, 2013; Gagniere, Betrancourt, & Detienne, 2012; van den Boom, Paas, 
van Merriënboer, & van Gog, 2004). However, the effect of metacognitive 
introspection is likely to depend on self-confidence. While high self-confidence 
participants may benefit from the enhanced monitoring in the manner outlined, for 
low self-confidence participants it may trigger task-irrelevant processing, anxiety, and 
self-doubt. This in turn can have a negative impact on subsequent performance 
(Bouffard et al., 1995; Heslin, Latham, & VandeWalle, 2005; Zimmerman, 2000). We 
refer to this as the introspection hypothesis. 
The current study investigates the mechanism(s) underlying reactivity to 
confidence ratings by assessing the effect of eliciting confidence ratings during 
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Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM). In Experiment 5-1, we compare RPM 
performance of a group who performs the task with confidence ratings, with two 
active control groups who make task irrelevant ratings after each item. The task-
irrelevant rating includes the word ‘confident’ in one of the groups, but not the other. 
Hence we can determine whether the word ‘confidence’ is in fact priming pre-existing 
self-confidence, or if instead task-relevant introspection (i.e. reflection on one’s task 
performance) is necessary for reactivity to occur. To preview the results, we find that 
priming appears to be driving reactivity effects and thus in Experiment 5-2, we 
examine the extent to which reactivity occurs to confidence ratings if they are re-
phrased to remove the word ‘confident’.  
5.3 EXPERIMENT 5-1 
5.3.1 Method 
5.3.1.1 Participants and Materials 
125 participants (62.4% female) were recruited using Amazon’s Mturk (Mage = 
33.73, SD = 7.81). Participants for whom two or fewer correct responses were 
recorded were automatically discarded (n = 23). All participants completed RPM. 
After each RPM item, participants provided a particular rating depending on the 
condition they were randomly allocated to. The confidence rating (CR) group (n = 34) 
had to provide confidence ratings; the priming (prime) group (n = 34) rated how 
confident two squares were identical in colour; and the task-irrelevant rating (control) 
group (n = 34), rated the extent to which two squares were the same colour. The same 
squares were used in the prime and control groups. All materials were administered 
using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2017). 
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Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM, Raven & Court, 1998): Participants 
completed one of two computerised 12-item sets drawn from the Ravens’ Advanced 
Progressive Matrices Task (the complete set was counterbalanced across participants). 
Reduced versions of RPM have been shown to have similar concurrent validity and 
predictive power as the full version (Bors & Stokes, 1998). Items were ordered in the 
traditional fashion, which roughly corresponds to ascending difficulty.  
Ratings: All groups made their confidence rating on the same 6-point scale 
ranging from (0% to 100%). The confidence ratings were displayed after a 
participant’s response and participants could neither view nor change their earlier 
question/answer when making the confidence rating. The CR group was asked, “How 
confident are you that you answered the previous item correctly?”. The prime and 
control groups were shown two coloured squares while making their rating. On half 
of the trials, the squares were identical in colour, while on the other half they differed 
slightly in terms of colour. Both groups saw the same squares. Participants in the 
priming group were asked: “How confident are you that these two squares are the 
EXACT same colour?”. Participants in the control group were asked: “To what extent 
are these two squares the EXACT same colour?”. See Figure 5-1 for an example of 
study materials.  
Predicted cognitive ability (PCA): In order to measure confidence proximally 
for the current task, we assessed participants’ predictions of their performance before 
completing the task. After reading the instructions for RPM and seeing two example 
items, participants were asked “Before you begin please predict your overall score on 
the test as a percentage”. Participants made their prediction on a continuous scale 
form 0 to 100.  
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Figure 5-1. Experimental procedure for (A) the CR group, (B) the priming group, and 
(C) task-irrelevant rating group 
5.3.2 Results 
All data analysis was performed using R version 3.4.1 (R Core Team, 2017). 
Plots were produced with the ‘ggplot2’ package (Wickham, 2009). Descriptive 
statistics are available in Table 5-1. We utilised a linear regression model to examine 
the extent to which PCA moderated the effect of experimental group. The dummy 
coded group effect and PCA (mean-centred), as well as their interaction were entered 
as predictors. The task-irrelevant rating (control group) was entered as the reference 
group. In addition, sex and age were entered as covariates in the model to control for 
demographic effects. Standardized betas are provided as a metric of effect size. 
Table 5-1 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 5-1 
Measure M (SD) 2 4 4 
1. Sex  1.37 (0.49) 0.132 -0.05 -0.203** 
2. Age 34.23 (8.12) 
 
0.014 0.066 
3. PCA 71.26 (16.71) 
  
0.174 
4. RPM 7.04 (2.46) 
   Note. ** p < .001, * p < .001. PCA = predicted cognitive abilities. RPM = Raven’s 
Progressive matrices. Sex was coded 1 = male, 0 = female 
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The results suggest that there was no significant overall difference between the 
CR group (M = 7.06) and the control group (M = 6.88); β = 0.10, t = 0.91, p = .365. 
Similarly, there was no overall difference between the prime (M = 7.18) and the 
control group; β = .04, t = 0.33, p = .740. PCA was not a significant predictor of RPM 
score; β = -.28, t = -1.27, p = .209. This was qualified by a significant interaction 
between PCA and the CR vs. control effect; β = .35, t = 2.00, p = .048. Similarly, 
there was a significant interaction between PCA and the prime vs. control group 
effect; β = .36, t = 2.15, p = .034. Depicted in Figure 5-2, high PCA individuals did 
substantially better in the CR and prime groups, compared to controls, while, low 
PCA participants did marginally worse. For completeness we re-performed the 
analysis using the CR condition as the reference group. The CR group did not differ 
significantly from the prime group, β = -.07, t = .57, p = .570. Furthermore, the prime 
vs. CR group effect did not significantly interact with PCA, β = .03, t = .22, p = .828. 
 
Figure 5-2. RPM score (out of 12) as a function of experimental group and PCA for 
Experiment 5-1. PCA = predicted cognitive abilities. Moderator values of 1 standard 
deviation above and below the mean were used for high and low PCA, respectively. 
Error bars represent +1 standard error of the mean. 
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5.4 EXPERIMENT 5-2 
 The results of Experiment 5-1 reconfirms previous studies that suggest that 
confidence ratings are reactive (Birney et al., 2017; Double & Birney, 2017a). 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that reactivity to confidence ratings is a 
consequence of repeatedly presenting the word ‘confident’ to participants. The 
relationship between PCA and performance was positive only in the CR and prime 
groups, suggesting that the relationship between PCA and performance was 
exaggerated whenever the word ‘confident’ was present in inter-trial ratings. Based 
on this finding, in Experiment 5-2 we assess whether reactivity to confidence ratings 
can be reduced or even eliminated by rephrasing the confidence ratings to remove the 
word ‘confident’. 
5.4.1 Method 
5.4.1.1 Participants and Materials 
162 participants (55.6% female) were recruited using Amazon’s Mturk (Mage = 
35.85, SD = 11.48). Participants for whom two or fewer correct responses were 
recorded were automatically discarded (n = 41). All participants completed RPM in 
the same fashion described in Experiment 5-1. After each RPM item, participants 
provided a particular rating. The CR group (n = 40) again had to provide confidence 
ratings (“How confident are you that you answered the previous item correctly?”). 
The likelihood group (n = 42) rated how likely it was that their previous answer was 
correct (“How likely is it you that you answered the previous item correctly?”). 
Finally, the control group (n = 39) again rated the extent to which two squares were 
the same colour. PCA was assessed in the same manner as Experiment 5-1.  
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5.4.2 Results 
All data analysis was performed in the same fashion as Experiment 5-1 
Descriptive statistics are available in Table 5-2. We utilised a linear regression model 
to examine the extent to which PCA moderated the effect of experimental group. The 
dummy coded group effect and PCA (mean-centred), as well as their interaction were 
entered as predictors. The task-irrelevant rating (control group) was entered as the 
reference group. In addition, sex and age were entered as covariates in the model to 
control for demographic effects. 
 
Table 5-2 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 5-2 
Measure M (SD) 2 3 4 
1. Sex 1.49 (.5) .12 -.24** -.07 
2. Age 36.55 (11.46)  -.09 .12 
3. PCA 68.79 (20.63)  
 
.22* 
4. RPM 6.28 (2.25)  
  Note. ** p < .001, * p < .001. PCA = predicted cognitive abilities. RPM = Raven’s 
progressive matrices. Sex was coded 1 = male, 0 = female 
 
The results suggest that there was no significant overall difference between the 
CR group (M = 5.98) and the control group (M = 6.33); β = -.10, t = 0.92, p = .361. 
Similarly, there was no overall difference between the likelihood (M = 6.52) and the 
control group; β = .17, t = 0.47, p = .641. PCA was not a significant predictor of RPM 
score; β = -.05, t = .28, p = .780. This was qualified by a significant interaction 
between PCA and the CR vs. control effect; β = 0.30, t = 2.22, p = .029. As shown in 
Figure 5-3, this effect was largely driven by impaired performance of low PCA 
participants in the CR group. There was no significant interaction between PCA and 
the likelihood vs. control group effect; β = .17, t = 1.19, p = .237. For completeness 
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we also re-ran the analysis with the CR group as the reference group. The results 
suggest that the CR group was not different to the likelihood group in terms of overall 
performance, β = .15, t = 1.41, p = .160. The difference between PCA and the CR vs. 
likelihood was not significant; β = -.16, t = 1.19, p = .236. 
 
Figure 5-3. RPM score (out of 12) as a function of experimental group and PCA for 
Experiment 5-2. PCA = predicted cognitive abilities. Moderator values of 1 standard 
deviation above and below the mean were used for high and low PCA, respectively. 
Error bars represent +1 standard error of the mean. 
 
5.5 General Discussion 
The current study examined reactivity to confidence ratings and the extent to 
which reactivity is moderated by confidence. First, there was no overall reactivity 
effect for either the CR or Prime conditions. However, using a measure of confidence 
as a moderator (PCA), we showed that high confidence participants tended to 
experience positive reactivity to confidence ratings, while low confidence participants 
did not show significant reactivity effects. This is consistent with previous research 
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that establishes the moderating effect of self-confidence on reactivity to confidence 
ratings (Double & Birney, 2017a, 2017b; Double et al., 2018). In addition, this study 
was the first to specifically examine the mechanism for reactivity to confidence 
ratings. We evaluated two distinct hypothesised mechanisms, a priming mechanism 
where reactivity is driven by the repeated presentation of the word ‘confident’ and a 
metacognitive introspection mechanism, which proposed that task-relevant 
introspection prompted reactivity. Our results provided support for a priming 
mechanism driving reactivity. 
Reactivity to metacognitive ratings has shown inconsistent effects, with some 
authors observing positive reactivity (e.g. Double & Birney, 2017a; Double et al., 
2018; Soderstrom et al., 2015; Witherby & Tauber, 2017), others observing negative 
reactivity (Birney et al., 2017; Mitchum et al., 2016), and still others finding no 
reactivity effects (Kelemen & Weaver III, 1997; Tauber, Dunlosky, & Rawson, 
2015). It has been proposed elsewhere that the direction and magnitude of reactivity is 
in part determined by task characteristics (Double et al., 2018) or participant 
characteristics, such a self-confidence (Double & Birney, 2017a). The current 
findings support such individual differences models of reactivity by showing that self-
confidence (measured using PCA) moderates the direction of reactivity to confidence 
ratings. This is an important finding from a methodological view, because it suggests 
not only that confidence ratings cannot be considered an innocuous self-report 
measure when collected during an experiment, but eliciting confidence ratings may 
exaggerate confidence related differences in cognitive performance.  
The current results suggest that, regardless of whether a rating is task-relevant, 
if the word ‘confident’ is included then self-confidence related reactivity is observed. 
This supports the notion that reactivity is driven by priming participants’ self-
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confidence, brought about by the repeated presentation of the word ‘confident. This 
finding provides an important insight into the nature of reactivity to confidence 
ratings, in suggesting that reactivity is a specific response to the language of the 
rating. This provides an obvious recourse to reactivity effects by using more neutral 
language (i.e. not including the word confident), which we demonstrated to be 
somewhat effective in Experiment 5-2, to the extent that the likelihood ratings group 
did not show any significant difference from the control group. Therefore it is 
advisable that researchers interested in eliciting confidence ratings adopt a more 
neutral phrasing in order to eliminate unintentional reactivity effects. Furthermore, it 
suggests that cognitive performance can be enhanced in high self-confidence 
individuals by priming these self-confidence related beliefs. This finding is congruent 
with earlier evidence that suggest that goals and motivation can be unconsciously 
primed (e.g. Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010) and that proximally primed self-confidence 
can affect performance on an intelligence test (Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
Many theories of self-regulated learning espouse the benefits of metacognitive 
introspection to learning outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 2001; Efklides, 2011). 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that metacognitive prompts can have a beneficial 
effect on learning (Bannert, 2006; Bannert et al., 2009; Bannert, Sonnenberg, 
Mengelkamp, & Pieger, 2015). Previous studies that have shown positive reactivity to 
metacognitive ratings have posited that this may be a result of the metacognitive 
introspection demanded by such ratings (Double & Birney, 2017a). However, the 
present findings suggest that there is little benefit to the metacognitive reflection 
provided by confidence ratings, instead reactivity effects can be found even when 
task-irrelevant ratings are made, so long as confidence is primed. This suggests that a 
more controlled approach to the examination of reactivity and the evaluation of 
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metacognitive prompts is needed, as the effects may well be driven by the specific 
wording of the prompt, rather than the introspection produced, as is often assumed.  
In adding to the body of research establishing reactivity to confidence ratings, 
the current findings have raised methodological issues for the measurement of 
metacognition. However, the fact that the specific wording of the rating may drive 
reactivity to confidence ratings provides a clear avenue to reduce reactivity effects by 
modifying the language used in confidence ratings. In addition, it remains unclear to 
what extent these priming effects depend on the accuracy of self-confidence 
judgements. Presumably, priming the confidence of high self-confidence individuals 
is beneficial regardless of whether they are in fact overconfident in their abilities, but 
this remains a largely open question. Follow-up studies are needed to confirm this by 
examining the extent to which over/under-confidence is important in moderating 
these effects or if it is simply the magnitude of one’s confidence, independent of their 
actual abilities that determines reactivity.  
The present study has provided further support to the notion of reactivity to 
confidence ratings and replicated the previous findings showing that high self-
confident individuals experience positive reactivity, while low self-confident 
individuals do not show significant reactivity effects. Furthermore, this was the first 
study to show evidence that reactivity to confidence ratings occurs due to a priming 
effect driven by the use of the word ‘confident’ in the rating. These findings are 
important for researchers who intend to assess metacognition using confidence ratings 
and suggest that the use of more neutral language in confidence ratings is an effective 
way to reduce unintentional reactivity effects. 
  
 
106 
 
  
  
 
107 
CHAPTER 6: Reactivity to Confidence Ratings: Evidence that Prospective 
Ratings Improve Performance 
 
The contents of this chapter have been submitted for publication in Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 
 
6.1 Chapter Synopsis 
Confidence ratings are often used to elicit metacognitive evaluations from 
participants. Recent evidence, however, suggests that eliciting confidence ratings 
from participants can lead to differences in performance compared to controls that do 
not rate their confidence. Whether performance is facilitated or impaired as a result of 
providing confidence ratings appears to depend on a participant’s perceived cognitive 
performance. Unlike previous studies, here we present two studies that examine the 
effect of eliciting confidence ratings prior to a participant’s response on an anagram-
solving task. Experiment 6-1 investigated the effect in a sample of university students, 
while Experiment 6-2 utilised an older community sample (Mage = 65.16). Both 
experiments showed that eliciting prospective confidence ratings facilitates 
performance, and the effect was not moderated by perceived cognitive performance. 
Implications for using prospective confidence ratings as a tool for improving 
cognitive performance in both educational settings and adult learning are discussed.   
6.2 Introduction 
The ability to evaluate and control one’s own cognitive processing is often 
referred to as metacognition (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Metacognitive evaluation is an 
important aspect of human cognition because it allows us to regulate the use of 
cognitive resources and judge the success of a response. Metacognition is often 
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assessed by evaluating the sensitivity at which individuals monitor their performance. 
Across a wide range of empirical fields, metacognitive monitoring is typically 
assessed by eliciting confidence ratings retrospectively from participants after each 
item/response. Evidence suggests that such judgements are relatively aligned with 
actual performance, although, there are systematic individual difference that have 
been observed (Stankov & Lee, 2008). While, confidence ratings have been 
invaluable in providing insight into the metacognitive processes that guide cognition, 
they have often been implemented with little consideration as to the effect that 
providing item-by-item ratings of confidence may have on the participant’s cognitive 
performance. Here, we attempt to redress this by examining the effect of providing 
confidence ratings on performance. 
Increasingly, educators and students have adopted principles from the 
metacognitive literature to use within an educational context (for a review, see 
Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, & Willingham, 2013). A number of authors have 
suggested that metacognitive evaluation may be a promising way to improve 
cognitive and academic outcomes (e.g. Azevedo & Hadwin, 2005; Roll, Aleven, 
McLaren, & Koedinger, 2011). The use of metacognitive evaluation is typically 
supported by the strong correlation between metacognition and learning outcomes 
(Sitzmann & Ely, 2011) and is a central component of the burgeoning field of self-
regulated learning (Zimmerman & Moylan, 2009).  
However, the potential utility of metacognitive evaluation as an intervention 
appears to be somewhat undermined by the moderating effect of reasoning self-
confidence and perceived difficulty, which can lead some participants to experience 
negative reactivity. As such it is pertinent to examine methods for introducing 
metacognitive evaluation that maximises the opportunity for positive reactivity while 
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minimising the likelihood that low PCP participants will experience negative 
reactivity.  
6.2.1 Prospective Confidence Ratings  
One possibility is to change the way confidence ratings are administered. 
While, confidence ratings are typically administered retrospectively after each item on 
a task (e.g. “how confident are you that you answered the last item correctly?”), they 
can also be administered prospectively before a participant has the option to respond 
(i.e. after seeing the question but before selecting a response option). Retrospective 
confidence ratings are somewhat problematic in that, when a participant cannot 
answer a question (due to its difficulty) they are then asked to immediately evaluate 
their failure using a confidence rating. Prospective judgements, however, are 
performed prior to the participant responding therefore they are less likely to be aware 
of the items difficulty (which will also minimise any negative effect on their 
reasoning self-confidence) when the confidence rating is being performed. Given that 
no previous studies have examined reactivity to prospective confidence ratings, the 
two experiments presented here aim to examine whether such judgments can facilitate 
performance and whether they can negate the effect of self-confidence/difficulty. 
6.2.2 Age 
 The extent to which age moderates reactivity effects is currently unclear. 
Double and Birney (2017a) showed that positive reactivity occurred in both university 
students and high-confidence participants in an older community sample who 
performed Raven’s Progressive Matrices, whereas the low confidence participants in 
the older sample showed negative reactivity. Additionally, Fox and Charness (2010) 
found that older participants improved their performance on Raven’s Progressive 
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Matrices in response to being asked to verbalise their reasoning processes, whereas 
younger participants did not benefit. Given that age may play a role in reactivity 
effects, we will examine both a student sample and an older community sample in the 
current study.   
6.2.3 Present Study 
 The current study presents two experiments that evaluate the effect of 
prospective confidence ratings on cognitive performance in an anagram-solving task. 
In order to examine any moderating effect of self-confidence, we include both an 
individual differences measure of predicted cognitive performance (PCP), measured 
using participants’ self-predicted (future) performance after attempting a small 
number of ‘practice’ items, as well as experimentally manipulate task-specific PCP by 
varying the difficulty of the practice items participants are exposed to before 
performing the task. Experiment 6-1 examines the results in a university sample, 
while Experiment 6-2 uses an older community sample. In both studies, we look at 
the moderating effect of PCP and item difficulty on the experimental effect of 
eliciting prospective confidence ratings.  
6.3 EXPERIMENT 6-1 
 Experiment 6-1 was designed to establish whether prospective confidence 
ratings are reactive and to what extent this effect is moderated by PCP using a 
university student sample. We utilised an anagram-solving task because, unlike many 
other reasoning tasks, the difficulty of solving an anagram in not immediately 
apparent on presentation of the stimulus (all anagrams were 6-letters long), yet at the 
same time, items of substantially different difficulty can be utilised.  
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6.3.1 Method 
6.3.1.1 Participants and Materials 
 Seventy-five participants were recruited from the first-year psychology pool 
from an Australian university (Female = 62.67%). One participant did not follow 
instructions and his/her data was excluded from all analyses (they answered with the 
scrambled version of the anagram). Participants were randomly allocated by computer 
to either the prospective confidence rating group (CR, n = 40) or the control group 
(No-CR, n = 34). Furthermore, participants were allocated to perform either easy (n = 
36) or difficult (n = 38) practice items. The experiment was completed in the 
university laboratory on a computer under the supervision of an experimenter. Up to 
10 participants were tested concurrently in each testing session. Participants 
completed the following task. 
Anagram-solving task: Participants were asked to solve a series of 6-letter 
anagrams using a text response. Participants first completed a practice session with 
either 5 easy items (e.g. “POLIEC” Answer: Police) or 5 difficult items (e.g. 
“UFTRUE” Answer: Future). After the practice session, we assessed PCP by having 
participants predict how they would perform on the test as a percentage of correct 
items. Following the prediction, participants completed a 24-item test phase, with 
items presented in the same random order for all participants. For participants in the 
CR group, they were first presented with the anagram for 3000ms, the anagram would 
then disappear and, participants were asked to rate their confidence that they would 
successfully solve the anagram as a percentage (“How confident are you that you will 
be able to solve the anagram that was just presented?”). Participants were given as 
long as they liked to make the confidence rating. After rating their confidence, the 
  
 
112 
confidence question disappeared and the anagram reappeared and participants were 
able to respond using a text box. Participants in the No-CR group were simply 
presented with the anagram for 3000ms, before a text box appeared and they were 
able to respond. No accuracy feedback was provided. 
6.3.2 Results 
All analyses were performed with R version 3.4.1 (R Core Team, 2017). 
Linear Mixed Effects (LME) models were performed with the ‘lme4’ (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and ‘lmerTest’ (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2016) packages. Plots were produced with ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham, 2009).  
 
Figure 6-1. Calibration plots depicting average performance for given predicted 
performance (confidence) rating levels in (a) Experiment 6-1 and (b) Experiment 6-2. 
Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
Mean performance across all conditions was 64.25% (SD = 17.73%). Mean 
confidence for the CR group was 57.52% (SD = 17.41%), see Figure 6-1a for 
calibration plots. The within-subjects Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation between 
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actual performance and prospective confidence ratings was significant (γ = .71, 95% 
CI = .66 to .77). As expected, the easy practice group (M = 63.33%, SD = 20.56%) 
had higher PCP than the hard practice group (M = 36.32%, SD = 20.19%), F(1,72) = 
32.51, p < .001. Confidence ratings took on average 1.29 seconds. 
 
6.3.2.1 Group Differences in Performance 
A binomial LME model (Model 1) was performed using item accuracy 
(correct vs. incorrect) as the criterion variable. Rating (CR vs. No-CR) and practice 
difficulty (easy vs. hard) were entered as predictor variables. PCP was also entered as 
a variable. All two-way interactions and the three-way interaction were also included 
in the model. Subjects and item were entered as random intercept terms. Crucially, 
Model 1 indicated that overall, the CR group (M = 66.35%, SD = 17.74%) 
significantly outperformed the No-CR group (M = 61.76%, SD = 17.66%), b = 1.02, z 
= 2.25, p = .025. Furthermore, the hard practice group (M = 65.13%, SD = 15.95%) 
outperformed the easy practice group (M = 63.31%, SD = 19.61%), b = 1.21 z = 2.43, 
p = .015. PCP was a significant positive predictor of actual performance, b = 1.07, z = 
3.03 p = .002. None of the interaction terms were significant (all p > .05). 
6.3.2.2 Item Difficulty and Performance 
Anagram difficulty (actual experienced difficulty) was estimated using the 
Rasch item-analysis method (Linacre, 2017). Model 2 extended on Model 1 by 
including anagram difficulty and all respective interactions. The results of Model 2 
were practically unchanged to Model 1. Crucially, there was no significant interaction 
between anagram difficulty and any of the experimental effects (all p > .10). 
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6.3.2.3 Response Latency 
 As a supplementary analysis, we assessed group differences in response 
latency. Using Model 1, described above, there were no significant group differences 
in response latency as a function of rating (CR vs. No-CR), p = .393 or practice 
difficulty (easy vs. hard), p = .753. Again, none of the interaction terms were 
significant (all p > .10). 
6.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 6-1 suggest positive reactivity – that prospective 
confidence ratings facilitate performance – in a sample of university students. This 
effect did not differ as a function of either participants predicted performance or the 
difficulty of practice items they experienced. This supports our principle hypothesis 
that prospective confidence judgments may impact performance in a way that is not 
moderated by the initial confidence of participants to perform well or the difficulty of 
the encountered item.  
6.4 EXPERIMENT 6-2 
There were two substantive goals for Experiment 6-2, firstly, to replicate the 
positive reactivity findings with respect to prospective confidence judgements and 
secondly, to expand the findings into a broad older community sample. This was 
deemed particularly important due to the previously observed differences in effects 
between age groups (Double & Birney, 2017a; Fox & Charness, 2010). In addition, 
given that the practice difficulty had no moderating effect on the impact of CR, and in 
order to avoid interdependence between PCP and practice item difficulty, we simply 
administered easy practice items to all participants. 
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6.4.1 Method 
6.4.1.1 Participants and Materials 
A community sample of 55 participants (28 No-CR; 27 CR) was recruited 
using an advertisement placed in a newsletter of the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation as part of a research partnership with the University of Sydney (Mage = 
65.16, SD = 10.94; Female = 70%). Participants received no remuneration for 
participating in the study. 
All study materials were the same as those described in Experiment 6-1, 
except all participants completed 5 easy practice items, rather than being randomly 
allocated to easy or hard items.  
6.4.2 Results 
Mean performance was 76.29% (SD = 13.75%). Mean confidence for the CR 
group was 44.31% (SD = 18.99%). Average predicted performance was 64.00% (SD 
= 29.01%). The within-subjects Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation between 
performance and confidence showed a significant relationship between the two γ = 
.53 (95% CI = .46 to .61;see Figure 6-1b for calibration plots). Confidence ratings 
took on average 1.29 seconds. 
6.4.2.1 Group Differences in Performance 
Again, a binomial LME model was performed using item accuracy (correct vs. 
incorrect) as the criterion variable. Rating (CR vs. No-CR) and PCP were entered as 
predictor variables, along with the interaction between the two. Subjects and item 
were entered as random intercept terms. The model indicated that overall the CR 
group (M = 79.78%, SD = 11.54%) outperformed the No-CR group (M = 72.92%, SD 
= 15.02%), b = .77, z  = 2.79, p = .005. PCP was a marginally non-significant positive 
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predictor of performance, b = .44, z = 1.92, p = .055. The group × PCP interaction 
term was not significant, b = .04, z = .13, p = .895. 
6.4.2.2 Item Difficulty and Performance 
 We performed the same model described above, except we included empirical 
anagram difficulty (Rasch calibrated) term and all possible interactions in the model. 
The results of the previous model are practically unchanged. Crucially, there was no 
significant interaction between anagram difficulty and any of the experimental effects 
(all p > .10).    
6.4.2.3 Response Latency 
 As a supplementary analysis we assessed for group differences in response 
latency. There were no significant differences in response latency (all p > .10).  
6.5 General Discussion 
The present research was the first to evaluate the influence of prospective 
judgements on cognitive performance. In two experiments we showed that 
prospective confidence ratings facilitate performance on an anagram-solving task. 
The prospective confidence effect was present both in a university student sample and 
an older community sample. Crucially, the effect of confidence ratings did not depend 
on participants’ PCP, even when PCP was experimentally manipulated by altering 
practice item difficulty. Taken together, this data suggests that prospective confidence 
ratings may be a useful tool to improve cognitive performance in both young and old 
learners. 
There is mixed evidence that confidence ratings are reactive, both in terms of 
the magnitude and direction of reactivity (Birney et al., 2017; Double & Birney, 
2017a; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003). Previous studies have shown that reactivity is 
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determined by both task characteristics and person characteristics. In particular, 
evidence suggests that the direction of reactivity (positive vs. negative) to 
metacognitive evaluation depends on the difficulty of items (Birney et al., 2017; 
Mitchum et al., 2016; Soderstrom et al., 2015) or on participant PCP (Double & 
Birney, 2017a, 2017b). Here, we have shown that prospective confidence ratings 
facilitate performance regardless of either item difficulty or participant PCP following 
practice. These findings suggest that prospective confidence ratings facilitate 
cognitive performance in both young and old participants.  
We argue that reactivity to prospective confidence ratings is not moderated by 
PCP, unlike retrospective confidence ratings, because, before responding to the rating, 
participants had relatively little chance to experience the difficulty of the item. When 
performing retrospective confidence ratings, participant may subsequently benefit 
from enhanced metacognitive reflection and regulation that this primes (at least in 
confident individuals), as appears to be the case with prospective confidence ratings. 
However, retrospective ratings may trigger task-irrelevant stress and self-doubt in low 
PCP participants because participants are asked to immediately reflect on their 
performance (which may be poor). This may, in turn, negatively affect their 
subsequent cognitive performance (Bouffard et al., 1995; Heslin et al., 2005; 
Zimmerman, 2000). That is, cognitive performance may be impaired in retrospective 
ratings because negative self-evaluation triggers a shift in attentional resources to 
negative thoughts; for example, ruminating about others' evaluation of their 
performance (Steele-Johnson, Beauregard, Hoover, & Schmidt, 2000) and the stakes 
of the assessment (Moutafi, Furnham, & Tsaousis, 2006). 
In contrast, prospective confidence ratings represent an explicit prompt to 
reflect on one’s cognitive resources and goals before answering a question. The 
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reflection caused by this demand appears to facilitate performance during a cognitive 
task, presumably due to better metacognitive regulation targeted at the problem to be 
subsequently solved. Metacognitive reflection is important for allocating cognitive 
resources and strategy selection (Cary & Reder, 2002; Karpicke, 2009). It is likely 
that performing prospective confidence ratings helps participants answer a question 
by prompting initial reflection on the difficulty of the item, because perceived item 
difficulty is likely to be a salient cue for the effort required when making their 
confidence rating – for planning and goal setting (Koriat, 2008; Koriat & Ma'ayan, 
2005). We actually see some evidence for this in Experiment 6-1, where there was an 
overall practice-type effect. Participants who practiced on difficult anagrams went on 
to perform significantly better on the test anagrams than those who practiced on the 
easier items, suggesting they were metacognitively better prepared. Interestingly, 
although those who practiced on difficult items reported significantly lower predicted 
test performance than those who practiced on easy items, (as expected and replicating 
confidence/performance alignment), level of prior confidence did not moderate the 
advantage of practicing on difficult anagrams. This was the case regardless of whether 
participants provided inter-trial prospective confidence ratings or not. 
The facilitative effect of prospective confidence ratings suggests that they may 
be an effective tool for facilitating cognitive performance. Metacognitive prompts 
have shown varying degrees of efficacy, with evidence that prompts are effective at 
improving learning (Bannert et al., 2009; Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008; Bannert et 
al., 2015). However, metacognitive prompts tend to be complex and domain specific, 
for example, asking participants to list the strategies they are using when solving a 
math problem or prompting participants to reflect on alternative answers. Prospective 
confidence ratings are relatively uninvolved and domain-general, and relative to 
  
 
119 
retrospective ratings, are inherently future thinking, suggesting they may be an 
effective and simple metacognitive prompt for improving cognitive performance. 
Further work is needed to determine whether prospective confidence ratings occupy a 
similar place in the nomological network of individual differences as retrospective 
confidence ratings (e.g., Stankov & Lee, 2008). 
The present study has provided two experimental demonstrations that 
prospective confidence ratings benefit cognitive performance on an anagram-solving 
task. This provides further insights into the nature of the reactivity of confidence 
ratings. Furthermore, it suggests that performing task-relevant reflection prior to 
solving a problem is beneficial to cognitive performance. Unlike retrospective 
confidence ratings, the effect of prospective confidence ratings was not moderated by 
PCP. This finding has important implications for the use of metacognitive prompts as 
an intervention, specifically suggesting that prospective confidence ratings may be an 
effective tool for enhancing cognitive performance.  
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CHAPTER 7: Thesis Discussion 
7.1 Overview of Findings 
Confidence ratings have been used in a variety of experimental settings as a way 
to measure metacognitive processes (Fleming & Lau, 2014). It has almost always 
been assumed that confidence ratings are an unobtrusive means for measuring 
metacognition and, as such, participants do not react to performing confidence ratings 
in any meaningful way. Our findings have extended the growing body of literature 
that has examined reactivity to metacognitive self-report measures by assessing 
reactivity to confidence ratings (Birney et al., 2017; Fox et al., 2011; Mitchum et al., 
2016). Reactivity effects were examined in the context of the interplay between goals, 
self-confidence, and performance. The aim of this research was to better understand 
the processes that occur when individuals evaluate their own performance by 
assessing the interactive effects of task and participant characteristics on reactivity 
effects. 
In the meta-analysis reported in Chapter 2, we examined the extant studies that 
have analysed reactivity to JoL, the rating that most closely resembles confidence 
ratings. The meta-analysis demonstrated that there is a small but significant positive 
effect of performing JoL on memory performance when word pairs are related. 
Although we observed consistency in regards to the magnitude of reactivity effects 
(with most studies finding some reactivity), this finding was, however, obscured by 
the large heterogeneity in the direction of observed reactivity effects as well as the 
small number of studies that had examined reactivity to JoL. Nonetheless, the 
consistent presence of reactivity effects in related but not related word-pairs provided 
an initial impetus for hypothesising that confidence ratings might be reactive and this 
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reactivity may depend on self-confidence (which differs between related and 
unrelated word-pairs). 
Chapter 3 described two experiments that directly tested reactivity to confidence 
ratings. The first experiment compared performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
between participants who provided confidence ratings after each trial with a control 
condition who did not provide ratings. The results of the first experiment indicated 
that participants who performed confidence ratings performed better overall on 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices than controls, with no observed differences in response 
time. Experiment 3-2 attempted to distinguish between two hypothesised mechanisms 
for this effect - the cognizant confidence hypothesis and the general cognitive benefit 
hypothesis. The defining distinction between these two proposed mechanisms was the 
fact that the cognizant confidence hypothesis predicted that only confident 
participants would benefit from providing confidence ratings. In Experiment 3-2, 
participants performed a battery of reasoning tasks, designed to broadly assess their 
reasoning abilities, as well as a self-report measure of their reasoning self-confidence. 
After these initial measures, they then performed Raven’s Progressive Matrices either 
with or without confidence ratings. The results of Experiment 3-2 indicated that 
performing confidence ratings facilitated the performance of high self-confidence 
participants, but impaired the performance of low self-confidence participants and this 
result held even when existing reasoning ability was controlled for. These results were 
tentatively interpreted as supporting the cognizant confidence account of reactivity.  
In Chapter 4, we extended our examination of reactivity to an additional reasoning 
tasks the Latin Square Task, while further examining the effect of performing 
confidence ratings on participants’ metacognitive monitoring and control. To 
accomplish this we had all participants provide a retrospective appraisal of their 
  
 
123 
performance after they performed the Latin Square Task either with or without 
confidence ratings. The results suggested that participants with high initial 
prospective self-confidence who perform confidence ratings adopt a more immediate 
metacognitive control strategy, which improves short-term (average) performance but 
has no effect on overall performance in a timed task. Additionally, the results 
interestingly suggested that performing confidence ratings resulted in participants 
providing less accurate retrospective appraisals of their performance than controls. 
Subsequent analyses suggest that participants in the confidence rating group used 
their initial self-confidence (before beginning the task) as the basis for their 
retrospective appraisal, whereas participants in the control condition instead used their 
actual performance as the basis of their retrospective appraisal, leading to a more 
accurate appraisal. This suggested that providing confidence ratings caused 
participants to fail to moderate their appraisals based on their actual performance. 
This somewhat counterintuitive finding challenged the perceptual accuracy 
hypothesis; the idea that self-monitoring leads to more accurate self-knowledge. 
Instead, the finding was interpreted as supporting the predictions of Objective-self 
Awareness Theory (OST; Duval & Wicklund, 1972, 1973; Silvia & Duval, 2001), 
which proposes that self-directed attention results in motivated goal-directed 
behaviour and activates existing self-related beliefs. Furthermore, it suggests that 
confidence ratings utilise information-based cues (beliefs about one’s competence) 
rather than experience-based cues (subjectively experienced difficulty). 
In Chapter 5 we extended our study of the mechanisms of reactivity by examining 
the extent to which reactivity can be accounted for by priming compared with genuine 
metacognitive introspection. In the first experiment, we showed that reactivity occurs, 
and is moderated by self-confidence, both in traditional confidence ratings and in a 
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condition where participants performed task-irrelevant confidence ratings. However, 
reactivity did not occur when participants made task-irrelevant ratings but the word 
‘confident’ was absent. The second experiment expanded this finding by 
demonstrating that reactivity effects were somewhat negated when the word 
‘confident’ was replaced with the word ‘likely’. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 we examined effect of prospective confidence ratings in an 
anagram-solving task. In addition we looked at the moderating role of a participant’s 
confidence, which we experimentally manipulated (Experiment 6-1). We found 
evidence that prospective confidence ratings improved performance on the anagram-
solving task in a student sample, but this effect was not moderated by either 
experimentally manipulated confidence or item difficulty. In the second experiment, 
we showed that prospective confidence additionally facilitated performance in a 
sample of older individuals; again these effects were not moderated by either self-
confidence or item difficulty. These findings indicated that prospective confidence 
ratings have a more generalizable facilitative effect compared with retrospective 
confidence ratings, thus making them more appropriate as an educational 
intervention. 
7.2 Implications for Research and Theory 
7.2.1 The Relationship Between Confidence and Performance  
The results of this thesis provide a clear indication that, under certain conditions, 
confidence ratings are reactive. Notably, the results suggest that providing confidence 
not only modifies an individual’s underlying cognitive performance (Chapters 3-6), 
but also their metacognitive performance (Chapter 4). Confidence ratings are one of 
the most widely used measures of metacognitive processes (Fleming & Lau, 2014) 
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and a large amount of metacognitive research has relied on the assumption that 
confidence ratings are an accurate method for measuring metacognition. These results 
somewhat challenge these assumptions.  
The potential reactivity of confidence ratings may be particularly problematic for 
metacognitive measurement because the magnitude and direction of reactivity appears 
to be inconsistent across participants, with some participants benefiting from 
providing confidence ratings, whereas others are impaired or do not react. Given these 
reactivity effects appear to vary systematically based on participants’ self-confidence 
this may lead to systematic inaccuracies when assessing metacognition using 
confidence ratings. A strong and consistent relationship between confidence (assessed 
using confidence ratings) and performance has been observed in the literature 
(Stankov & Lee, 2014b; Stankov et al., 2012). This correlation may, however, be 
inflated by the asymmetrical effect of performing confidence ratings on participants’ 
performance - if confidence ratings selective enhance the performance of high self-
confidence participants (and possible impair the performance of low self-confidence 
participants) then trait confidence is likely to be driving both confidence ratings and 
actual performance, as well as exaggerating the correlation between the two. 
Although further research is needed to confirm this hypothesis, it is noteworthy that 
correlations between confidence ratings and performance far exceed the correlation 
between self-report measures of confidence and performance (Stankov et al., 2012; 
Stankov et al., 2014). 
7.2.2 The Nature of Spontaneous Confidence Judgements in Reasoning 
The fact that confidence ratings are reactive suggests a number of implications 
about the nature and role of confidence during reasoning and problem solving under 
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conditions when confidence ratings are not elicited. In order for confidence ratings to 
be reactive, they must presumably direct attention to information that participants 
would not otherwise attend to (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). This suggests that either the 
judgements elicited by confidence ratings do not necessarily occur spontaneously 
when confidence ratings are not elicited or that the metacognitive process is, at least 
in part, an implicit process. 
 Recent theories of cognitive control have posited that confidence judgements are 
used as the basis for decision-making in cognitive tasks (Ackerman, 2014). According 
to these models of metacognitive regulation, individuals decide to progress to the next 
item of a complex task when their confidence reaches a specific stopping criterion. 
These models argue that, at least for complex tasks, an individual’s stopping criterion 
is not fixed but rather diminishes gradually over time. Accordingly, as a subject 
spends more time on an item, they will gradually become more willing to accept a 
lower level of confidence as a criterion for progressing to the next item. In support of 
such theories is the often-observed negative correlation between confidence and 
response time during cognitive tasks (Ackerman & Koriat, 2011; Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993). It is possible that such stopping thresholds are in part a reaction to the demands 
of performing confidence ratings. If confidence ratings direct attention to self-
confidence related beliefs, participants may be more likely to use their confidence as 
the basis for decision making (metacognitive control) when confidence ratings are 
elicited compared to situations where they occur spontaneously.  
7.2.3 Self-evaluation and Metacognitive Monitoring 
Our results (Chapter 4) suggest that providing confidence ratings resulted in less 
accurate retrospective beliefs about one’s own performance. In terms of the 
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measurement of metacognition this has significant implications. If, as suggested by 
our findings, confidence ratings direct attention to pre-existing self-confidence and 
away from actual performance then this suggests that confidence ratings are utilising 
information-based cues (pre-existing beliefs about one’s confidence) rather than 
experience-based cues (the subjective experience of solving an item). While this 
distinction has received substantial empirical study in the meta-memory literature 
(e.g. Hertzog, Hines, & Touron, 2013; Koriat, 1997), this has not been the case with 
regards to confidence ratings, where it has typically been assumed that when an 
individual performs a confidence rating, they are utilising metacognitive monitoring 
to assess their performance on the previous item. Our results suggest this is not the 
case, at least not entirely. Instead, our results suggest that when an individual 
performs a confidence rating their attention is drawn to their pre-existing and 
potentially trait like sense of self-confidence and they then use this as the basis for 
their confidence ratings. As such, the accuracy of confidence ratings may represent an 
individual’s trait self-confidence, rather than a micro-level assessment of their 
performance. 
This result also challenges the common practice of encouraging self-evaluation. 
Schools and workplaces often encourage frequent self-evaluation because such 
practices are presumed to reduce the likelihood that errors are repeated in the future. 
However, research has consistently pointed to the fact that people have substantial 
limitations in their ability to accurately report their subjective states (e.g. Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2004). Interventions that utilise metacognitive prompts 
(Bannert, 2006; Bannert et al., 2009; Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008; Peters & 
Kitsantas, 2010) often presume that any benefit from prompting is the result of 
enhanced metacognitive monitoring. The present results suggest that self-evaluation 
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may not be a particularly effective means for improving metacognitive monitoring of 
one’s performance and may instead simply reinforce existing beliefs. The 
implications for metacognitive interventions are discussed in more detail in Section 
7.3. 
7.2.4 Self-confidence  
The experiments included in Chapters 3-5 all suggest that reactivity to confidence 
ratings is in part moderated by self-confidence. These experiments utilised different 
cognitive task and assessed self-confidence in a variety of ways including self-report 
(Chapter 3) and self-predicted performance (Chapters 4-5). The results of these 
experiments consistently suggested that high self-confidence participants tended to 
benefit from performing confidence ratings more than their low self-confidence peers.  
We argue that for high self-confidence participants, performing confidence ratings 
can be affirming, which in turn benefits their subsequent performance. However, for 
low self-confidence participants the continuous requirement to self-assess is likely to 
be threatening and promote task-irrelevant thoughts (e.g. rumination). This has 
implications for measuring the relationship between confidence and performance 
(discussed in Section 7.2.1) and for the implementation of metacognitive prompting 
based interventions (discussed in Section 7.3.1). 
7.2.5 Prospective Ratings   
Chapter 6 demonstrated that self-confidence does not moderate reactivity in either 
young or old individuals when ratings are elicited prospectively. This suggests that the 
temporal order of items and ratings is important in determining reactivity. Crucially, 
we argue that because prospective ratings are performed before a participant has had a 
chance to respond to an item, prospective ratings are less threatening to low self-
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confidence individuals (who are likely to find at least some items difficult). As such, 
it appears that prospective confidence ratings offer a substantially better opportunity 
for improving performance on cognitive tasks in both old and young individuals. 
7.2.6 Reducing Reactivity   
 Chapter 6 demonstrated that researchers can reduce reactivity by substituting the 
word ‘confident’ with the word ‘likely’. This suggests that the specific wording of 
confidence ratings drives reactivity effects rather than metacognitive introspection, 
and in particular it appears that it is the word ‘confident’ which directs attention to 
pre-existing beliefs about one’s competence. However, this may not be the case for 
judgments of learning where reactivity has been shown without the specific use of the 
word ‘confident’ (Janes et al., 2018; Soderstrom et al., 2015). While providing insight 
into the mechanisms of reactivity, perhaps the most crucial insight from this study is 
that re-wording confidence ratings represents a relatively simple avenue for 
researchers who are concerned about unintentional reactivity when assessing 
metacognitive processes. However, before endorsing the use of likelihood ratings as a 
substitute for confidence ratings, further research is needed to establish whether 
confidence ratings and likelihood ratings converge in other respects, that is do they 
capture the equivalent information about the metacognitive process in other respects. 
7.2.5 Detecting Heterogeneous Effects  
We have observed significantly heterogeneity in terms of the magnitude and 
direction of reactivity effects. A similar trend was observed in JoL reactivity reported 
in Chapter 2. Others have found differences between groups with differing cultural 
backgrounds (Kim, 2002), ages (Fox & Charness, 2010), and abilities (Short, Evans, 
Friebert, & Schatschneider, 1991). It is worth noting that the sample sizes of the 
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individual studies may not be able to accurately assess the potentially small reactivity 
effects particularly with the diverse sample and apparent individual differences 
(although reactivity was consistently observed throughout the thesis). As such, future 
research should look at using meta-analytic techniques to examine reactivity to 
confidence ratings in the same fashion as the meta-analysis of JoL reactivity 
performed in Chapter 2.  
To address concerns about heterogeneity, that this thesis has deliberately 
conceptually replicated reactivity effects numerous times while varying key study 
characteristics. The number of replications and the use of different tasks and samples 
(Mturk workers, students, older individuals) provides strong evidence for the 
robustness of reactivity effects with respect to confidence ratings and the findings 
presented here. 
7.3 Implications for Metacognitive Interventions 
Metacognitive prompting has been used as an educational intervention in a variety 
of content domains (Bannert, 2006; Bannert et al., 2009; Bannert & Mengelkamp, 
2008; Bannert & Reimann, 2012; Peters & Kitsantas, 2010). Such interventions have 
utilised a variety of metacognitive prompts and shown mixed efficacy and a number 
of moderating factors (e.g. Belenky & Nokes, 2009; Berthold et al., 2007). 
Confidence ratings represent one possible prompt that has been readily integrated into 
learning and educational settings. Below we discuss the implications for using 
confidence ratings as a prompt in such settings.  
7.3.1 The Costs and Benefits of Metacognitive Prompting 
Given the importance of metacognition for learning and academic achievement 
(Pintrich, 2000; Sitzmann & Ely, 2011), it is possible that integrating confidence 
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judgements into learning and testing procedures may be a relatively easy and effective 
avenue for enhancing performance. Compared with previous metacognitive 
interventions confidence judgements are noteworthy in that they are reasonably 
domain general. While there are a host of prompts that have specifically been devised 
for use in particular domains, for instance reading (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995) and 
mathematics (Kramarski & Mevarech, 2003), confidence judgements can be 
implemented into most learning and training environments with little modification 
across content domains. While our results suggest that performing confidence ratings 
can be beneficial, evidently retrospective confidence ratings appear to not benefit high 
and low-confidence individuals equally and may in fact impair the performance of 
low self-confidence individuals. Therefore it is recommended that prospective 
confidence ratings be utilised in educational interventions rather than retrospective 
ratings. In addition, it has also been found elsewhere that providing confidence ratings 
may be detrimental to performance on difficult items on a test but facilitate 
performance on easier items (Birney et al., 2017). These findings present a challenge 
for those who would implement confidence ratings, and perhaps other metacognitive 
prompts, into educational settings as such interventions may unintentionally 
disadvantage low-confidence students.  
Besides utilising prospective confidence ratings, another possible solution to the 
asymmetry in reactivity effects may be to combine metacognitive prompting with 
activities designed to boost confidence. Situational confidence can be improved in 
many ways (Feather & Simon, 1971). In Chapter 6, we explored manipulating 
confidence experimentally, however, this endeavour was somewhat complicated by 
the fact that confidence is reasonably dynamic – even if we can increase/decrease 
confidence prior to a task, it is likely that participants will re-calibrate their 
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confidence when the task begins proper. Therefore, it may be that reactivity is 
specifically tied to dispositional self-confidence beliefs, which are more difficult to 
modify (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). Future research may consider experimentally 
manipulating situational confidence to further clarify whether such an approach can 
be used to supplement metacognitive prompting.  
One characteristic of confidence ratings that may make them particularly prone to 
selectively facilitating high-confidence individuals is their evaluative nature. As 
noted, metacognitive prompting interventions have utilised a wide variety of prompts 
and it may be more effective to use prompts that avoid specific self-evaluation (for 
example asking individuals to self-report the strategy they used or rationale for their 
selection after each item). Negative self-evaluation, which may result when low self-
confidence individuals provide confidence ratings, may be seen as threatening 
particularly in the context of an intelligence/reasoning test. It is also worth noting that 
self-evaluation and accurate self-knowledge can have distinct long and short-term 
effects (Brown & Dutton, 1995) and as such self-evaluation may benefit long term 
performance by reducing repeated errors (Yeung & Summerfield, 2014), while at the 
same time causing short-term damage to an individuals self-confidence (and in turn 
their performance). For instance, Sahakyan et al. (2004) found that eliciting aggregate 
JOLs following a free recall test of previously memorised words caused participants 
to change from poor encoding strategies such as rote rehearsal to more effective 
encoding strategies when memorising a subsequent list of words. As such more work 
is needed to clarify the medium and long-term effects of metacognitive prompting 
before their utility can be concluded. 
7.4 Limitations and Future Directions 
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7.4.1 Metacognitive Accuracy as a Modifier 
Another question that remains unanswered by the current research is the extent to 
which metacognitive accuracy modifies reactivity. There exists significant individual 
differences in both metacognitive monitoring accuracy (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014) 
and the extent to which individuals naturally monitor their own performance (Pirolli 
& Recker, 1994). It is plausible then that performing confidence ratings may be more 
helpful to individuals who are less likely to spontaneously monitor their own 
performance or to monitor their performance inaccurately. However, as shown in 
Chapter 4 eliciting confidence ratings does not necessarily enhance the metacognitive 
process. Because the current studies utilised a design where only one condition 
provided confidence ratings it is difficult to assess whether metacognitive accuracy 
modified the reactivity1. A future design which may better assess this possibility 
would be to have all participants provide confidence ratings on an initial task (to 
assess their monitoring accuracy) before having half of them provide confidence 
ratings on a second task and the other half provide no-ratings. In addition, it should be 
mentioned that while control groups were shown blank screens in experiments in 
Chapter 3-6 and a number of the experiments used untimed tasks, it was not possible 
to entirely control for total time spent on task and this may have contributed to the 
effects. 
                                                
1 Assessing the relationship between metacognitive accuracy and performance in 
just the confidence rating group would merely indicate the relationship between 
monitoring accuracy and performance and say nothing about reactivity.   
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7.4.2 Participant Characteristics  
The majority of the studies included here recruited from a broad community based 
sample. As a result the average age across the included experiments is considerably 
older than the student samples traditionally used. While this sample was selected to 
provide a relatively representative sample of the broader population (who are often 
not well represented in cognitive psychology experiments), this characteristics of the 
sample may have contributed to the obtained results. It has been observed that 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy is relatively unaffected by age related decline, 
however, age does affect beliefs about cognitive ability and cognitive control 
(Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). These differences in beliefs about one’s cognition may 
have played a role in the effects observed here and it is unclear whether all of the 
findings would necessarily generalise to a sample of students at the peak of their 
cognitive abilities. For instance, when directly comparing an older and younger 
sample Fox and Charness (2010) found that reactivity only occurred in the older 
sample. While we observed reactivity in a student sample in Experiment 3-1 of 
Chapter 3 and Experiment 6-1 of Chapter 6, as well as younger Mturk samples in 
Chapter 5, it may nonetheless be that some of the other findings were observed only 
due to the relatively older age of the sample. Further research is needed to assess 
whether these effects generalise to different samples with differing cognitive abilities 
and beliefs about their own cognition.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Metacognition is an important component of reasoning and problem solving, 
which requires the coordination of both cognitive control and performance 
monitoring. Confidence ratings are often utilised to assess the effectiveness of an 
individual’s metacognitive abilities. However, the implicit assumption underlying this 
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approach is the idea that eliciting confidence ratings from individuals does not alter 
the processes that the confidence rating was designed to measure. The current 
research has challenged this assumption by demonstrating that participants do in fact 
react to performing confidence ratings. Perhaps more problematically from a 
measurement perspective it appears that individuals react to providing confidence 
ratings in systematically different ways, with high self-confidence participants 
benefiting and low self-confidence participants being impaired or not reacting. This, 
however, appears not to be the case for prospective confidence ratings, where positive 
reactivity was observed regardless of self-confidence, although we report only two 
experiments using such an approach here and, as such, proportionally more work is 
needed examining prospective confidence ratings. 
In addition, the current results suggest that performing confidence ratings actually 
impairs the metacognitive monitoring processes by directing attention towards pre-
existing confidence and away from actual performance. This finding challenges the 
traditional rationale for metacognitive prompting, which argues that such prompts 
facilitate greater self-knowledge and metacognitive monitoring. Finally, the specific 
wording of confidence ratings appears to drive reactivity effects and thus utilising 
subtlety different wordings has the potential to reduce reactivity effects. These 
findings have implications for our understanding of the measurement and nature of 
metacognition and challenge the practical viability of using metacognitive ratings as 
an intervention in schools and workplaces. By better understanding how individuals 
react when confidence ratings are elicited, this research challenges the dominant 
measurement paradigm in metacognition research and points to the importance of 
both task and person-level characteristics in determining how self-directed attention 
shapes performance. 
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A meta-analysis and systematic review of reactivity to judgements of learning
Kit S. Double, Damian P. Birney and Sarah A. Walker
School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
Judgements of learning (JoL) are often used in memory research as a means for assessing an
individual’s metacognitive beliefs about their learning. JoL have been shown to reliably
predict performance as well as learning behaviours and decisions . Participants may,
however, modify their behaviour in response to performing JoL. There has, however, been
little consensus as to the reliability and direction of the effect. We report on a meta-analyses
that assesses the evidence that memory performance is reactive to JoL. The results indicate
that overall providing JoL does not have a significant effect on memory performance (g =
0.054, 95% CI −0.027 to 0.135). However, sub-groups analysis showed that this effect
depends on the nature of the stimuli to be recalled, with moderate positive reactivity
observed for related word pairs (g = 0.323, 95% CI 0.083 to 0.563) and word lists (g = 0.384,
95% CI 0.146 to 0.622) but no reactivity when pairs were unrelated or a mixture of related
and unrelated pairs. These results indicate that researchers should be aware that eliciting JoL
may well influence participants’ underlying encoding processes, especially when using
related word pairs or word lists.
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Judgements of learning (JoL) are metacognitive ratings
whereby participants indicate the likelihood that they will
recall learnt material on a future test (Rhodes, 2016). JoL
are typically elicited after each item within a series of
items that are to be remembered. For example, when par-
ticipants are memorising a series of word pairs, JoL are
often elicited after the presentation of each word pair.
This methodology may make JoL susceptible to what is
commonly referred to as reactivity (Rhodes & Tauber,
2011). Reactivity occurs when an individual either inten-
tionally or unintentionally alters their performance or
behaviour in response to being measured (Harris &
Lahey, 1982). Reactivity can occur when participants are
observed by an experimenter (e.g., McCarney et al.,
2007), or when a participant self-reports on their own
behaviour (e.g., Fox & Charness, 2010).
Due to the potential for reactivity, researchers have cri-
ticised the use of self-report measures collected concur-
rently with behaviour (Leow & Morgan-Short, 2004). So
called “online” self-report measures, however, remain com-
monplace in cognitive psychology (Fox, Ericsson, & Best,
2011). Online self-report measures have been widely
used in studies of memory (Ackerman, 2014; Koriat, 2000,
2012; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005), reasoning (Pallier et al.,
2002; Stankov, 2000; Stankov & Lee, 2008), and decision-
making (Balakrishnan & Ratcliff, 1996; Jackson & Kleitman,
2014). Despite widespread use of online self-report
measures, empirical studies directly examining reactivity
are relatively rare (Fox et al., 2011). Furthermore, reactivity
may vary depending on a number of factors including par-
ticipant characteristics, methodological differences, and
features of the self-report measure itself (Ericsson &
Simon, 1993). The current systematic review and meta-
analysis focuses on the effect of online self-report
measures on cognitive performance, specifically reactivity
to JoL on memory performance.
A number of researchers have argued that the
additional data gathered from online self-reports measures
justifies the risk of reactivity (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).
Online self-report measures have typically been used to
provide insight into an individual’s metacognitive proces-
sing (Koriat & Helstrup, 2007). The accuracy of these self-
report measures can often provide a behavioural
measure of the effectiveness of an individual’s metacogni-
tive monitoring (Thompson, 1999; Yan, 2015). For example,
a large body of research has demonstrated that JoL made
after a delay are more accurate than immediate JoL (e.g.,
Narens, Nelson, & Scheck, 2008; Nelson & Dunlosky,
1991), which may help guide educational practice
(Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). Furthermore, online self-
report measures have been shown to predict performance,
not only on the task at hand, but also on real-world out-
comes such as academic achievement (Stankov, 2013).
In other areas, reactivity to self-report measures has
been used as the basis off an intervention. For instance,
in a series of experiments, Kazdin (1974) demonstrated
that the direction of reactivity depends on the valence of
the behaviour. Participants will tend to reduce negative
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behaviours, while at the same time increasing positive
behaviours. In contrast, eliciting self-report measures
does not appear to affect neutral behaviours. As such, reac-
tive self-monitoring has been used as the basis for redu-
cing a wide variety of negative behaviours including
compulsive nail biting (Adesso, Vargas, & Siddall, 1979),
smoking (McCarthy, Minami, Yeh, & Bold, 2015), and
over-eating (Latner &Wilson, 2002). Additionally, self-moni-
toring has been used to increase positive behaviours such
as staying on-task (Carr & Punzo, 1993) and exercise main-
tenance (Izawa et al., 2005).
JoL are one of the most frequently used concurrent self-
report measures. JoL have been used to gain a range of
insights into metacognitive evaluations and the study
decisions individuals make when learning material. For
example, JoL are often used to evaluate how various exper-
imental manipulations can affect a participant’s subjective
confidence in their learning (e.g., Susser, Jin, & Mulligan,
2016; Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 1980). Traditionally,
reactivity is rarely assessed and it is particularly rare that
evaluating reactivity was the primary aim of a study (Fox
et al., 2011). In a previous review of JoL reactivity, Rhodes
and Tauber (2011) compared immediate JoL and delayed
JoL in terms of the effect they have on memory perform-
ance. Their review found that, compared to immediate
JoL, delayed JoL have a small positive effect on memory
performance. The present systematic review and meta-
analysis aims to extend on this work by summarising the
findings of studies that compare immediate JoL to no jud-
gement control conditions in order to assess whether
immediate JoL, like delayed JoL, affect memory perform-
ance relative to “uncontaminated” controls.
Reactivity occurs when a self-report measure elicits
information that would not otherwise be consciously
attended to (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Reactivity effects
are problematic from a measurement perspective
because they suggest that a self-report measure is uninten-
tionally directing attention to information related to the
judgement. This may over-inflate the importance of such
information for an individual and modify their judgement
and/or their learning. For example, if a participant is
asked to provide a JoL, they may be more likely than other-
wise to base study time decisions on whatever information
is utilised when making the JoL. As a result, eliciting JoL
may over-emphasise the importance of judgement rel-
evant information and inflate correlations between such
judgements and behavioural measures such as study
time and performance.
Assessing reactivity effects is important not only for
determining if a self-report measure is unintentionally
affecting the performance of a participant but can also
indicate whether such judgements occur without prompt-
ing. If providing JoL affects the performance of participants
then this suggests that such metacognitive judgements are
not necessarily made spontaneously in the same way as
they are when JoL are elicited. This would imply that
under conditions where JoL are not elicited, the equivalent
metacognitive judgements are not made, or at least not
made in the same way. Reactivity research provides some
insight into basic learning processes, and could be utilised
to better understand the contexts where such judgements
occur spontaneously (and where they do not). Together,
they facilitate a better understanding of the role of meta-
cognition in various settings and the conditions that give
rise to metacognitive monitoring.
Although there are relatively few studies looking at reac-
tivity to JoL, there are a number of reasons why ameta-ana-
lytic approach is appropriate. Firstly, as reactivity is rarely the
primary aim of a study, such effects are often underempha-
sised when reporting results, and thus it is important for
these findings to bemore closely evaluated. Secondly, reac-
tivity effects are not necessarily large andmaywell not reach
significance in individual studies with small sample sizes
(Fox et al., 2011). A meta-analytic approach may therefore
observe trends that may have otherwise been overlooked.
Finally, specific characteristics of the stimuli used within
an experiment (e.g., the relatedness of the word pairs
used) may affect the magnitude and direction of reactivity
effects (Mitchum, Kelley, & Fox, 2016), therefore it is prefer-
able to average across a variety of stimuli to assesses over-
arching trends in the data, as well as utilise meta-analytic
procedures to determine if specific stimuli characteristics
determine reactivity effects in a systematic way.
This review is timely given that a number of recent
studies have started to investigate reactivity to JoL directly.
Mitchum et al. (2016) reported a series of five experiments
that examined the contextual situations under which reac-
tivity to JoL occurs. They found that reactivity in a word-
pair learning tasks depended on the relatedness of the
word pair and the presence of cues that indicate the rela-
tive difficulty of a word pair (i.e., whether unrelated and
related pairs were presented as part of the same list).
Specifically, recall of unrelated word pairs was disrupted
by the provision of JoL, whereas recall of related pairs
was not reactive to JoL. Alternatively and in apparent con-
tradiction, using a similar paradigm Soderstrom, Clark,
Halamish, and Bjork (2015) found that recall to related
pairs was facilitated by JoL whereas unrelated pairs were
not reactive. Such studies indicate that pair relatedness
may be important at determining reactivity effects, a
hypothesis which we will test across studies in the
present meta-analysis.
In addition to indicating the possible moderating role of
word pair relatedness, the contradictory nature of these
findings is representative of the mixed findings regarding
reactivity to JoL in the extant literature. Overall, a number
of authors have found positive reactivity (Dougherty,
Scheck, Nelson, & Narens, 2005; Soderstrom et al., 2015;
Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 1980), whereas other have
found no reactivity (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998;
Kelemen & Weaver, 1997; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012), and
still others have found negative reactivity (Mitchum et al.,
2016). Hence, a meta-analysis will be useful to summarise
this contradictory literature.
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Method
Study eligibility
Study types
In order to be eligible for inclusion, a study had to be a pub-
lished peer-reviewed article that compared performance
on a cognitive task performed with a JoL vs. with a no jud-
gement control condition. Both between-subject designs
and within-subject designs were eligible, provided that
participants were randomly allocated to condition/order.
Only English language papers were considered.
Participant types
Only studies using adult neuro-typical and non-clinical
populations were eligible for inclusion.
Outcome types
Studies needed to assess performance on a recognised
cognitive task, including memory tasks, reasoning tasks,
intelligence tasks, and decision-making tasks.1
Judgement types
Studies were eligible if they assessed performance with vs.
without JoL, regardless of the specifics of the scale or the
wording of the question.
Study selection
Given that reactivity is rarely assessed directly, a deliber-
ately broad set of search terms was selected. A search of
PsychINFO and Science Direct was conducted in August
2016. Search terms for JoL (“judgements of learning” OR
“judgments of Learning” OR “JOL” OR “delayed judgments
of learning” OR “delayed judgements of learning” OR “con-
fidence ratings” OR “confidence judgements” OR “meta-
cognitive judgements” OR “metacognitive ratings”) were
combined with cognitive ability search terms (“reactivity”
OR “cognitive Performance” OR “cognitive ability” OR
“Memory” OR “problem solving” OR “decision making” OR
“Intelligence”) (see Note 1). Reference lists were also
scanned for eligible studies.
Assessing eligibility
Two reviewers independently screened the titles and
abstracts of the search results for eligibility. When eligibility
was unclear full text versions of the articles were assessed.
In the instance of disagreement between the two
reviewers a third reviewer was consulted to assessed eligi-
bility and resolve any disagreements. If a study was eligible
but did not provide sufficient data regarding the compari-
son, then the original authors were contacted requesting
the necessary data.
Meta-analytic approach
A fixed effects meta-analysis was carried out as they are
considered more conservative and less susceptible to
bias (Greenland, 1994; Poole & Greenland, 1999). The
primary outcome was standardised mean difference
(SMD) between JoL and No-JoL conditions, calculated
using Hedge’s g. A positive SMD indicates comparatively
better cognitive performance in the JoL group (i.e., positive
reactivity). Between-subjects and within-subjects designs
were combined by first converting to a common effect
size metric (Morris & DeShon, 2002). Stimuli type was
entered as a sub-group variable with four categories
(related, unrelated, mixed, word list) found. All analyses
were performed using comprehensive meta-analysis
(CMA). Figures were created using the “metafor” package
(Viechtbauer, 2010) in R version 3.2.4 (R Core Team, 2015).
Results
Description of studies
The study selection processes and the associated out-
comes are presented in Figure 1. Eight studies comprising
17 experiments were included in the final meta-analysis.
Four experiments were within-subjects designs and the
remaining 13 were between-subjects designs. Two exper-
iments manipulated pair relatedness within subject so
the effects were entered separately2 (increasing the total
number of effect sizes to 19). One author provided
additional data upon request. A summary of the included
studies is presented in Table 1.
Included studies consisted of 1321 participants (mean
JoL group size = 45.54 (SD = 25.86); mean control group
size = 44.77 (SD = 25.59); mean within-subjects study size
= 36.75 (SD = 13.60)). For studies in which multiple JoL
effects were reported (e.g., immediate and delayed JoL)
the immediate JoL vs. control condition effect was used
due to the fact that delayed JoL have previously been
shown to have a greater effect on memory than immediate
JoL and thus examining the immediate JoL condition
should provide a minimal baseline for possible reactivity
effects (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). All included experiments
involved either word-pair learning (n = 14) or word-list
learning (where participants were presented a list of
single words to learn; n = 3).
Study design
In the 14 word-pair learning experiments, participants were
presented with a series of word pairs to learn after which
they completed a recall test wherein they were presented
with one member of the pair and had to recall the other. In
four of the experiments, the JoL group was allowed to
restudy the word after making the JoL. In 4 of the word-
pair learning experiments participants were able to
decide how long to study the word pair, whereas 10 of
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the word-pair experiments had a fixed study duration with
a mean study duration of 6.91 s (SD = 2.02 s). In one word-
pair learning experiment presentation time was exper-
imentally manipulated (3 vs. 12 s).3 The three word-list
experiments presented participants with a list of words
to learn after which participants performed either a recog-
nition test (n = 1) where they had to discriminate between
learnt words and distractors or a free-recall test (n = 2)
where they had to recall as many words from the list as
possible.
Stimuli
The mean number of word pairs to be recalled was 70.35
pairs (SD = 75.54). The mean number of words in the
word-list experiments was 106.8 words (SD = 142.52).
Three experiments included only related pairs, six included
only unrelated pairs, and five included both related and
unrelated pairs. In addition, Mitchum et al. (2016; Exper-
iment 1) manipulated the direction of the associative relat-
edness (forward and backward) and Mitchum et al. (2016;
Experiment 2) manipulated the emotional valence of the
words, although neither manipulation was found to
affect reactivity. Furthermore, Tauber and Rhodes (2012)
manipulated the abstractness of the words in their list,
but found no effect of abstractness on reactivity.
Mitchum et al. (2016; Experiments 1 and 2) and Soderstrom
et al. (2015) performed within-subjects comparisons of
reactivity using related and unrelated pairs presented as
part of the same series. Mitchum et al. found recall of unre-
lated pairs was subject to negative reactivity, but recall of
related pairs showed no reactivity, while Soderstrom
et al. found related pairs exhibited positive reactivity
whereas there was no reactivity in unrelated pairs. As reac-
tivity was demonstrably different between related and
unrelated pairs we opted not to average across the
stimuli types, instead including the unrelated and related
word pairs separately in the meta-analysis (see Note 2).
However, as Soderstrom et al. (2015) only reported that
p > .05 for the unrelated pairs effect, only the related
pairs effect could be included in the meta-analysis.
Reactivity
Three experiments found that performance was better
under the JoL condition compared to the no-judgement
condition. Nine experiments found no significant differ-
ence between the JoL group and controls. Five exper-
iments found that the effect depended on cue
relatedness (described above). Finally, no experiments
found negative reactivity.
Meta-analysis
The meta-analyses indicated that overall there was no sig-
nificant effect of JoL on memory performance (g = 0.054,
95% CI −0.027 to 0.135, p = .190, see Figure 2). Heterogen-
eity between the included studies was assessed using a
Chi-square test, which assesses whether observed differ-
ences in results are likely due to chance alone (Schwarzer,
Carpenter, & Rücker, 2015). This Chi-square test indicated
there was significant heterogeneity among the studies (Q
= 53.59 p < .001), as such a number of sub-groups analyses
were performed to attempt to explain the heterogeneity
in observed effect (see below). Funnel plots comparing
the relationship between observed effects and standard
error were inspected for asymmetry, where symmetry
would indicate possible risk of publication bias in the
included studies (Schwarzer et al., 2015). A regression
test for funnel plot asymmetry (Viechtbauer, 2010) indi-
cated that the meta-analyses showed significant signs of
asymmetry and the Egger’s test, a test of symmetry, was
not significant (p = .124), suggesting that the risk of pub-
lication bias in the included studies is relatively low, see
Figure 3.
Figure 1. Study selection and exclusion procedure.
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Sub-groups analysis
Firstly, a sub-groups analysis examined whether there was
a difference in between and within-subject designs. The
sub-groups analysis indicated that there was no significant
difference between the effect sizes as a function of
between-subjects vs. within-subjects design (p > .05). A
second sub-groups analysis compared effects as a function
of stimuli type. Four groups (related, unrelated, mixed,
word list) were formed. The sub-groups analysis indicated
significant differences in reactivity as a function of stimuli
type, see Figure 4. Moderate positive reactivity was
observed for related word pairs (g = 0.323, 95% CI 0.083
to 0.563, p = .008) and word lists (g = 0.384, 95% CI 0.146
to 0.622, p = .002) but no reactivity was found when pairs
were unrelated (g =−0.014, 95% CI −0.156 to 0.128,
p = .128) or in studies with a mix of related and unrelated
pairs (g =−0.049, 95% CI −0.169 to 0.071, p = .424).
Discussion
Researchers are often interested in the metacognitive jud-
gements that an individual makes when learning new
material. Although these metacognitive processes are
likely to determine a number of important learning beha-
viours (e.g., the allocation of study time), the current
meta-analytic results suggest that JoL, the primary way in
which we currently assess such processes, may uninten-
tionally influence the underlying behaviour in some cir-
cumstances. This finding has important implications for
research practice and challenges the presumption that
JoL can be used as an unobtrusive measure of metacogni-
tive processes.
The current results imply that participants either inten-
tionally or unintentionally modify their behaviour in
response to JoL in some situations. This has a number of
implications for researchers interested in measuring meta-
cognitive processes during learning. Although the potential
for reactivity may not be particularly problematic in some
experimental contexts, it is worth noting that having partici-
pants perform JoL may improve their monitoring processes
and decrease the likelihood that participants will engage in
ineffective learning practices, which may be of primary
interest to a researcher. Given such measures are not
uncommon in the memory research literature, reactivity
should be considered as a potential threat to the interpret-
ation of findings. In order to avoid reactivity effects,
researchers may wish to use alternative measures of meta-
cognitive processes that are less reactive, such as think-
aloud protocols (for a meta-analytic review, see Fox et al.,
2011). Think-aloud protocols may be less reactive because
they do not elicit extra information that an individual
would not otherwise have attend to, instead participants
are encouraged to verbally report their internal thoughts
only as they are (for a review, see Ericsson & Simon, 1993).
The results of the sub-group analysis provide a clear
indication that the type of stimuli drives the magnitudeTa
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and direction of reactivity. While, related word pairs and
word lists showed a moderate positive reactivity effect,
non-significant effects were found in all other sub-
groups. This raises the question of why (positive) reactivity
only occurs in related word pairs and word lists? A poss-
ible explanation comes from recent work examining
reactivity to confidence ratings, where it has been
shown that positive reactivity only occurs for high-confi-
dence participants, whereas negative or no-reactivity is
observed in low-confidence participants (Double &
Birney, 2017). Participants generally have higher confi-
dence in their ability to recall related word pairs
Figure 2. Fixed effects meta-analysis of reactivity. Positive effects indicate positive reactivity and negative effects indicate negative reactivity.
6 K. S. DOUBLE ET AL.
compared to unrelated word pairs and it may be that per-
forming a JoL draws participant’s attention to their subjec-
tive confidence, which is beneficial when confidence is
high but detrimental when confidence is low. Double
and Birney (2017) put forward the cognisant confidence
hypothesis as a way of explaining the mechanisms under-
lying heterogeneity in reactivity effects. The cognisant
confidence hypothesis proposes that, rather than provid-
ing a direct enhancement of metacognitive monitoring,
self-report measures draw attention to activated self-
related beliefs (e.g., confidence and goals), which may
be beneficial to performance if such beliefs are affirming
but in contrast may impair performance if those beliefs
are negative or threatening. More research is needed to
establish if confidence similarly moderates JoL reactivity,
particularly as such findings may not generalise from con-
fidence ratings as JoL differ from confidence ratings in
that they are a prospective rather that retrospective jud-
gements which may change the nature of the relationship
between confidence and reactivity. Speaking more
broadly, additional empirical research is needed to
examine the mechanisms underlying the effect of pair
relatedness on reactivity, particularly as the effect may
be complex and depend on numerous factors such as par-
ticipant goals and precise experimental characteristics
(Mitchum et al., 2016). In particularly it is currently
unclear why word-list experiments show reactivity
effects, although this effect should be interpreted cau-
tiously as only three word-list experiments were included
in the meta-analysis. Nevertheless, the current findings
provide a clear indication of when reactivity is likely to
occur, which is both useful for future investigations of
reactivity and for establishing when researchers should
be most concerned about unintentional reactivity.
Although some researchers have suggested that JoL
enhance performance by increasing the quality of monitor-
ing processes, the specifics of such a cognitive effect (e.g.,
the precise cognitive mechanisms that improve when JoL
are performed) are relatively unknown. JoL require a par-
ticipant to retrospectively evaluate the effectiveness of
their learning. At least in the studies reported here, this is
done repeatedly during testing and thus a prospective
evaluation is also likely to be primed. That is, the continued
task demand to evaluate one’s own performance may lead
to enhanced learning due to incidental improvements in
the effectiveness of the learning processes or as a strategic
response by the individual to perform better in the face of
frequent self-assessment. Future research is needed to
Figure 3. A funnel plot of overall effects as a function of standard error.
Figure 4. Effect sizes as a function of stimuli type.
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disentangle and specify the mechanisms by which reactiv-
ity occurs and the contextual factors that give rise to reac-
tivity effects.
The results also have interesting practical implications
because they suggest that there is sometimes a benefit
to performing behaviours that enhance monitoring. As
such, JoL may be a useful tool for enhancing learning par-
ticularly for low-performing students who do not naturally
engage in performance monitoring effectively (for a review
see Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). Further
experimental work is necessary to investigate the role of
JoL in enhancing monitoring in those that display a moni-
toring deficit. Compared with previous metacognitive
interventions, JoL are noteworthy in that they are reason-
ably domain general. While there are a host of prompts
that have specifically been devised for use in a particular
domain, for instance reading (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995)
and mathematics (Kramarski & Mevarech, 2003), JoL can
be implemented into most learning and training environ-
ments with little modification across content domains,
making them an easy tool to integrate into classroom
and learning environments. For example, some researchers
have used computerised programs to prompt and enhance
the metacognitive processes with success (Azevedo, 2005).
It is also pertinent to note that the above effects may
have important individual difference qualifiers. If JoL
enhance the performance monitoring processes of partici-
pants, then the direction and magnitude of any reactivity
effects will depend on the difference between the quality
of an individual’s natural unprompted monitoring pro-
cesses and their prompted monitoring process. Further,
consideration is needed to determine the task and
person characteristics that influence the direction and
magnitude of reactivity.
Reactivity to online self-report measures is a general
problem in psychology and it is worth noting that reactivity
to other common self-report measures has received far less
attention and may be equally problematic. For example,
confidence ratings have often been incorporated into
fluid intelligence tasks (Crawford & Stankov, 1996;
Stankov, 2000; Stankov & Lee, 2008) with little consider-
ation of whether judgements influence performance.
Although the above results can only speak to reactivity
to JoL, it seems pertinent that reactivity to a broad range
of self-report measures receives greater attention in cogni-
tive psychology.
It is worth acknowledging that the current meta-analy-
sis may have been limited by the nature of reactivity
research. Evaluating reactivity effects is rarely the primary
aim of a study; often such comparisons are only carried
out as a pre-cautionary step (Fox et al., 2011). As a result,
while every effort to find and include relevant studies has
been made, it is possible that relevant effects have been
evaluated but not directly mentioned in paper abstracts
and therefore overlooked in the current analysis.
The current meta-analysis has provided an indication
that JoL are positively reactive when related word pairs
are used. These findings suggest that researchers, when
designing experimental paradigms that rely on online
JoL, should consider the potential for reactivity. A further
implication of these results is the potential to use JoL in
some situations as a mechanism to enhance learning.
The next challenge is to determine the mechanisms that
influence the magnitude and direction of reactivity
effects, in particular the mechanisms driving the link
between pair relatedness and reactivity, as well as the
extent to which the above findings generalise beyond JoL.
Notes
1. Originally the review was open to looking at reactivity to con-
fidence ratings as well, because they are retrospective judge-
ments and would have provided a useful comparison to JoL,
hence the more expansive list of keywords and outcome
types. Unfortunately, no such studies examining confidence
ratings were found thus the focus of the review was sub-
sequently narrowed.
2. Including two outcomes from the same set of participants in
the meta-analysis is sometimes problematic due to the fact
that the participants are not independent. This procedure
was, however, considered preferable to averaging out the
effects due the marked differences between related and unre-
lated pairs. In order to prevent inflation of the weighting of the
two studies in question, half (rounded to the nearest person) of
their respective samples was used when calculating weighted
effect sizes.
3. For the meta-analysis, data was averaged across the 3- and 12-s
conditions as recommended by Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins,
and Rothstein (2009).
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Are you sure about that? Eliciting conﬁdence ratings
may inﬂuence performance on Raven’s progressive
matrices
Kit S. Double and Damian P. Birney
Department of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
Conﬁdence ratings (CR) have often been integrated into reasoning and
intelligence tasks as a means for assessing meta-reasoning processes. Although
it is often assumed that eliciting these judgements throughout reasoning tasks
has no effect on the underlying performance outcomes, this is yet to be
established empirically. The current study examines whether eliciting CR from
participants during a ﬂuid-reasoning task inﬂuences their performance and how
this effect is moderated by their initial self-conﬁdence in their own reasoning
abilities. In a ﬁrst experiment, we found that participants performing CR during
Raven’s Progressive Matrices signiﬁcantly outperformed a control group who
did not provide ratings. Additionally, a second experiment demonstrated that
CR only facilitated performance in participants who have a high level of initial
self-conﬁdence in their reasoning ability, whereas they were detrimental to
participants low in self-conﬁdence.
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Introduction
Meta-reasoning refers to the meta-level processes involved in regulating and
monitoring reasoning (Ackerman & Thompson, 2015). Conﬁdence ratings (CR)
have often been used as a convenient behavioural measure of meta-
reasoning processes (Fleming & Lau, 2014). In the domain of reasoning and
intelligence, conﬁdence research has typically involved eliciting CR from a
participant in an “online” fashion, either after each response or concurrently
as part of the response (Overgaard, 2015). Academic interest in these judge-
ments has largely focused on the accuracy of such judgements (e.g., Fleming
& Lau, 2014; Schraw, 2009; Stankov, 1998) or on the unique variance captured
by conﬁdence over and above performance (e.g., Stankov & Lee, 2014;
Stankov, Lee, Luo, & Hogan, 2012). Although this research has provided
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valuable insight into meta-reasoning processes, it has largely presumed that
the act of eliciting conﬁdence judgements does not alter the underlying pat-
tern of performance. Here, we describe two experiments that evaluate
whether integrating CR into reasoning tasks affects performance.
The notion that task performance changes in reaction to a self-report mea-
sure is sometimes referred to as reactivity (e.g., Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011;
Mitchum, Kelley, & Fox, 2016). Positive reactivity occurs when a self-report
measure facilitates performance, whereas negative reactivity occurs when a
self-report measure has a detrimental effect on performance. Although some
self-report measures such as think-aloud protocols are rarely reactive (for a
review, see Fox et al., 2011), performance on reasoning tasks may be particu-
larly positively reactive to prompted self-report measures (Russo, Johnson, &
Stephens, 1989). For instance, Fox and Charness (2010) found that the perfor-
mance of older participants on Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) improved
by 11 IQ points if they were asked to verbally report their thoughts as they
solved each problem.
Currently, there appears to be little literature speciﬁcally and directly
assessing reactivity to CR. A much larger examination of reactivity has, how-
ever, occurred in the memory literature, particularly in regards to the effect of
judgements of learning (JoL) on word-pair recall, a task that involves leaning
and memorisation rather than reasoning. JoL closely resemble CR, except,
rather than a participant rating their conﬁdence in the previous response,
they rate the likelihood that they will accurately recall the previously pre-
sented word-pair at a later time. The ﬁndings from this line of research are
largely equivocal about an effect of eliciting JoL on performance. Recently, in
an extensive series of experiments, Mitchum et al. (2016) found that perfor-
mance on a word-pair recalls task was lower for participants who provided
JoL during the encoding phase compared to a control group who did not,
but negative reactivity only occurred when both easy and difﬁcult items were
presented in the same word list, when the entire list was difﬁcult there was
no reactivity effect. In contrast, using a similar word-pair learning paradigm,
Soderstrom, Clark, Halamish, and Bjork (2015) and Dougherty, Scheck, Nelson,
and Narens (2005) found that JoL facilitated recall performance, while others
have found that providing JoL had no effect on recall (Ackerman & Goldsmith,
2008; Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Kelemen & Weaver III, 1997; Tauber &
Rhodes, 2012). The mixed nature of these results may be due to subtle differ-
ences in methodology, such as the timing of the judgement within the
encoding process (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) and participant characteristics
(Fox & Charness, 2010). For example, when examining screen versus paper
performance, Sidi, Ophir, and Ackerman (2016) found that performing conﬁ-
dence ratings interacted with disﬂuency cues in the task, such that disﬂuency
improved performance on screen and hindered it on paper when conﬁdence
ratings were elicited but had no effect when they were not.
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Reactivity occurs when a self-report measure increases awareness of infor-
mation that the participant would not otherwise be cognizant of (Mitchum
et al., 2016). Online CR represent an explicit requirement for participants to
monitor and assess their prior performance. However, if a participant naturally
performs such monitoring with an equivalent level of awareness without
being prompted, then there is unlikely to be any effect of providing CR. Most
research suggests that participants are largely unaware of their cognitive and
metacognitive processes. For example, Cary and Reder (2002) found that par-
ticipants are often unaware of the cognitive strategies they employ when
solving a reasoning task and apply different strategies without conscious
awareness.
In addition to examining whether there is reactivity to CR during reasoning
tasks, a secondary aim of the present study is to better understand the mech-
anisms by which reactivity occurs. Below we propose two alternative path-
ways that we hypothesise may assist in explaining how CR affect cognitive
performance – the general cognitive beneﬁt hypothesis and the cognizant
conﬁdence hypothesis.
General cognitive beneﬁt
The general cognitive beneﬁt hypothesis predicts that CR confer some kind of
beneﬁt to performance monitoring, which in turn facilitates cognitive pro-
cesses, such as more effective strategy selection or rule-learning, and leads to
better performance. To report CR, a participant must retroactively quantify
their subjective conﬁdence in the accuracy of their previous response
(Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013) and reﬂect on the reasoning process to devise
their response. The continued requirement to assess performance may lead
to enhanced performance monitoring on succeeding items, either due to an
incidental facilitation of the cognitive process or as a strategic behaviour per-
formed by the participant to enhance the accuracy of subsequent CR. Evi-
dence suggests that monitoring plays an important role in cognitive
processes such as strategy selection and decision-making during reasoning
tasks (Ackerman, 2014).
There is evidence that metacognitive prompts facilitate performance moni-
toring. Previous successful efforts to enhance metacognition have largely
involved instructional questions or prompts designed to encourage learner
reﬂection. For example, Kramarski and Mevarech (2003) found that asking stu-
dents who were solving mathematical problems comprehension questions
about their strategy use and connections between the current problem and
the pre-existing knowledge, improved their metacognitive strategy knowl-
edge and performance. Similarly, Sahakyan, Delaney, and Kelley (2004) found
that providing JoL reduced the likelihood that participants would carry on
using ineffective encoding strategies.
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Effective metacognitive monitoring has been linked to better performance
in a number of domains including perceptual tasks (Prins, Veenman, &
Elshout, 2006), problem solving (Desoete & Roeyers, 2006) and reading
(Pressley, 2002). Monitoring is particularly important for deciding when to
progress to new stimuli (Ackerman, 2014). For instance, if you are conﬁdent
that you have correctly answered a question in a reasoning task then you will
progress to the next item, whereas you may stay on the current item if your
conﬁdence in your success so far has not reached an acceptable level. Effec-
tively deciding when to progress to the next problem/item in a task, there-
fore, requires optimal monitoring of one’s own performance (Ackerman,
2014; Thompson, 2009).
Cognizant conﬁdence
With respect to dispositional or trait-level conﬁdence (as opposed to the
micro-level conﬁdence captured by conﬁdence ratings), a large body of litera-
ture has established that conﬁdence is a strong predictor of cognitive perfor-
mance over and above ability (Stankov, 2013; Stankov & Crawford, 1997;
Stankov & Lee, 2008, 2014). Specifying the precise mechanism by which conﬁ-
dence inﬂuences cognitive performance is difﬁcult, but there is evidence that
conﬁdence affects the level of on-task behaviour (Vancouver, 2000), motiva-
tion (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998) and persistence with problem solving (Lester,
Garofalo, & Kroll, 1989). The cognizant conﬁdence hypothesis predicts that
repeatedly prompting elicitation of CR increases participant’s awareness of
their conﬁdence. CR act as a form of self-assessment which may be afﬁrming
if a participant believes they are performing well, or alternatively, be seen as
threatening if the participant thinks they are performing poorly. Therefore, if
a participant is currently conﬁdent in their performance, then performing CR
will reafﬁrm their sense of conﬁdence by increasing their cognizance of their
current level of conﬁdence. By the same logic, if a participant is not conﬁdent,
CR will make them more aware of their lack of conﬁdence and be seen as a
threat to their self-concept. Reafﬁrming self-conﬁdence leads to greater per-
sistence, motivation and self-efﬁcacy (Pajares & Johnson, 1994; Stajkovic &
Luthans, 1979). In contrast, Vancouver and Tischner (2004) argue that threats
to self-conﬁdence divert resources away from the task leading to even poorer
performance. As a result, the cognizant conﬁdence hypothesis predicts that
CR will have a contrasting effect on conﬁdent and unconﬁdent participants –
ratings will facilitate performance in conﬁdent participants but be detrimental
to performance in unconﬁdent participants. This distinction separates the
cognizant conﬁdence hypothesis from the general cognitive hypothesis, in
that the cognizant conﬁdence hypothesis predicts that the beneﬁt of provid-
ing CR will be exclusive to conﬁdent participants.
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Current study
Experiment 1
The current study aims to contribute to our understanding of reasoning by
examining reactivity to CR in the context of reasoning tasks and evaluating
whether CR provide a general cognitive beneﬁt or instead beneﬁt self-conﬁ-
dent participants selectively. Brieﬂy, in Experiment 1, participants completed
RPM either with or without providing CR after each item. This initial experi-
ment was designed to establish how, if at all, CR inﬂuence the underlying pat-
tern of performance in reasoning tasks. RPM was selected as it is a classic test
of reasoning abilities and a proliﬁc assessment tool that has often incorpo-
rated CR (e.g., Stankov & Crawford, 1997). Experiment 2 examines whether a
participant’s initial levels of self-reported conﬁdence in their own reasoning
abilities moderate reactivity to CR.
Method
Participants and materials. A power analysis using G!Power was performed
to determine the intended sample size. An effect size of d D .5 was utilised in
the analysis, as effect sizes in this region have been found by previous studies
(Kelemen & Weaver III, 1997; Mitchum et al., 2016). The analysis indicated a
recommended sample of 65. We attempted to meet this recommendation, as
well as recruit a number of extra participants in case some participant’s data
needed to be excluded.
Sixty-nine participants were recruited from the ﬁrst-year psychology stu-
dent pool at the University of Sydney, and received course credit for complet-
ing the study. All assessments were completed in the university laboratory on
a computer under the supervision of an experimenter. Up to 10 participants
were tested concurrently in each testing session. Participants were randomly
allocated to either the CR group (n D 33), who had to provide CR after each
trial/item or the control group (No-CR; n D 36), who completed the task with-
out providing any CR.
RPM (Raven & Court, 1998): Participants completed a computerised 20-item
set drawn from the Ravens’ Advanced Progressive Matrices Task. Reduced
versions of RPM have been shown to have similar concurrent validity and pre-
dictive power as the full version (Bors & Stokes, 1998). Both groups completed
the same set of 20 items, which consisted of the odd-numbered items from
the original version as well as the two hardest even-numbered items. Items
were ordered in the traditional fashion, which roughly corresponds to ascend-
ing difﬁculty. Participants were given 20 minutes to complete the task. A
countdown timer was displayed at all times; however, the timer was paused
while the conﬁdence group completed their conﬁdence judgements. The CR
group had to rate their conﬁdence on a 6-point scale ranging from 0% to
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100% that asked: “How conﬁdent are you in your previous answer?” The CR
were displayed after a participant’s response and participants could neither
view nor change their earlier question/answer when making the CR.
Results
All analyses were performed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS, version 23). Sixty-eight (98.6%) participants completed all 20 items
within the 20-minute time limit. The average score was 54.49% (SD D 17.05)
and the average response time for each item was 37.56 seconds (SD D 12.42).
The average conﬁdence for the CR group was 60.64% (SD D 15.87), indicating
that participants were somewhat overconﬁdent (see Figure 1(a) for calibration
plots). The correlation between conﬁdence and accuracy was signiﬁcant,
r D .469, p D .006.
Figure 1. Calibration plots depicting average performance for given conﬁdence ratings
in (a) Experiment 1 and (b) Experiment 2. Error bars represent §1 standard error of the
mean.
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The results indicated that the CR group (M D 11.85, 95% CI D 10.70–13.00)
signiﬁcantly outperformed the No-CR group (M D 10.03, 95% CI D 8.93–
11.13); F(1, 67) D 5.22, p D .026, h2 D .072. This suggests that participants
reacted positively to performing CR. A subsequent analysis indicated that
response time did not differ between groups (p > .05).
An additional analysis examined the effect of performing CR compared
with No-CR controls, breaking down the CR group by mean conﬁdence (as
assessed by the item-level CR). A median split was used to obtain a high and
a low CR group, which were then compared to the No-CR group. The results
indicated that there was an overall effect of group on performance F(2, 66) D
6.44, p D .003. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction indicated
that high-conﬁdence CR group outperformed both the low-conﬁdence CR
group (p D .028) and the No-CR group (p D .002). There was no signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the low-conﬁdence CR group and the No-CR group (p > .05)
Figure 2. Performance as a function of condition with the CR group broken down by
mean conﬁdence on the task. A median split was performed to obtain the high and low
groups, respectively. Error bars represent §1 standard error of the mean.
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(see Figure 2). This result provides a preliminary indication that the beneﬁt of
providing CR may be exclusive to high-conﬁdence participants; however, this
ﬁnding is of course limited by the fact that the No-CR group cannot be broken
down by task conﬁdence.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provides some evidence that overall participants react posi-
tively to providing CR. However, the fact that high-conﬁdence participants
outperformed the No-CR group, but participant in the low-CR group did not,
provides some preliminary evidence for the cognizant conﬁdence hypothesis.
Speciﬁcally, this affords some indication that the beneﬁt of eliciting conﬁ-
dence ratings may be moderated by a participant’s conﬁdence. This effect
may of course simply be an artefact of the fact that we are unable to assess
participants’ conﬁdence in the No-CR group when performing this compari-
son. Experiment 2 is designed speciﬁcally to disentangle this confound by
obtaining measures of conﬁdence before the task from all participants and
using this conﬁdence measure to examine the moderating effect of conﬁ-
dence proposed by the cognizant conﬁdence hypothesis.
The aim of Experiment 2 was (1) to replicate the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 in
a more heterogeneous sample and (2) to examine the moderating role of ini-
tial conﬁdence on the performance effects of eliciting CR. To accomplish this,
a diverse community sample completed a self-report measure of their conﬁ-
dence in their reasoning and problem-solving abilities before performing
RPM with or without CR. In addition, participants completed a number of
problem-solving tasks so that their baseline cognitive abilities could be con-
trolled for and we could evaluate the moderating effects of conﬁdence over
and above ability.
Method
Participants and materials. As with Experiment 1, a G!Power analysis was
performed using an effect size of d D .5. Based on this analysis, a sample of
100 was sought, again with a number of extra participants in case data
needed to be excluded. A community sample of 104 participants (48 No-CR;
56 CR) was recruited using an advertisement placed in a newsletter of the
Australian Broadcasting Corporation as part of a research partnership with
the University of Sydney (Mage D 62.51, SD D 9.68). Participants received no
remuneration for participating in the study.
Before completing RPM in the same method as Experiment 1, participants
ﬁrst completed the following self-report assessment of their reasoning and
problem-solving conﬁdence.
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Reasoning self-conﬁdence: Reasoning self-conﬁdence was assessed using
the Memory and Reasoning Competence Inventory (MARCI; Kleitman &
Stankov, 2007). The MARCI consists of two sub-scales: one assess memory
conﬁdence and the other reasoning conﬁdence. Participants completed only
the eight reasoning items from the MARCI (e.g., I feel conﬁdent when solving
problems that require reasoning skills). The observed Cronbach’s alpha in the
current sample was .94.
Problem-solving ability
Our goal was to examine whether conﬁdence moderated the reactivity effect;
however, as conﬁdence and task performance are related (e.g., Stankov,
2000), we attempted to control for objective intellectual ability by administer-
ing a short battery of reasoning tasks that representatively captured, verbal,
numerical and ﬁgural (non-verbal) reasoning domains, a common high-level
taxonomy of intellectual abilities (Marshalek, Lohman, & Snow, 1983). These
also represent a broad range of the reasoning abilities typically used in for-
malised notions of reasoning (McGrew, 2009; Sternberg, Kaufman, &
Grigorenko, 2008) as well as public conceptions of reasoning (Sternberg,
1985).
The problem-solving battery was administered online in two separate ses-
sions after participants had completed RPM. The number series task was
administered in a ﬁrst session and the ﬁgure exchange and verbal compre-
hension were administered in the second follow-up session. All tasks were
completed by participants on their own computers but were presented in a
standardised fashion.
Figure-exchange task (working memory, ﬂuid intelligence) (Schweizer, 1996):
A modiﬁed version of the original ﬁgure exchange task was administered,
where participants were presented with four ﬁgures arranged in a random
order (e.g., a spade, heart, diamond and club) and the same four ﬁgures in a
target arrangement. Participants had to indicate how many exchanges
needed to be made to the observed set so that it matched the target set.
Only directly adjacent ﬁgures could be exchanged. Both arrangements of ﬁg-
ures were displayed on the screen the entire time. The number of exchanges
ranged from 1 to 5. Participants had four minutes to complete as many items
correctly as possible.
Verbal inference (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976): A modiﬁed
version of the original verbal inference task was performed. Participants were
presented with a series of statements that they were required to read (e.g.,
one year a particular farmer’s stand of wheat yielded 40 bushels per acre),
they then selected from four possible statements the one that could be logi-
cally inferred from the sentence without assuming any additional information.
The 20-item task was presented in a multiple-choice fashion.
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Number series task (Thurstone, 1938): The number series task presented
participants with a series of numbers (e.g., 53, 55, 57, 59, ?) and they were
required to indicate what number would complete the series. There were
seven items and participants had six minutes to complete as many items as
possible.
Results
Eighty-one (77.9%) participants completed all 20 items within the 20-minute
time limit. The average score was 43.03% (SD D 17.00) and the average
response time for each item was 49.06 seconds (SD D 16.12). The average
conﬁdence for the CR group was 51.80% (SD D 21.76), indicating that partici-
pants were somewhat overconﬁdent (see Figure 1(b) for calibration plots).
Due to the diverse nature of the sample, group differences in age and sex
were examined but neither were signiﬁcant (both p > .05). A multiple regres-
sion analysis was performed using RPM performance as the dependent vari-
able. Experimental group (CR vs. No-CR) and scaled reasoning self-conﬁdence
were entered as the predictor variables along with the relevant interaction.1
The results indicated that the main effect of group fell just below signiﬁ-
cance: b D .170, t D 1.83, p D .070, 95% CI D ¡.01 to 2.40. Additionally, rea-
soning self-conﬁdence was not a signiﬁcant predictor of RPM performance:
bD .072, tD .619, pD .537, 95% CID¡.54 to 1.03. Crucially, however, the rea-
soning self-conﬁdence X group interaction was also signiﬁcant: b D .315, t D
2.74, p D .007, 95% CI D .49–3.09. An examination of simple effects indicated
that the relationship between conﬁdence and performance was signiﬁcant
for the CR group (b D .358, t D 3.90, p < .001, 95% CI D 1.00–3.07) but not
the No-CR group (b D .057, t D .619, p D .537, 95% CI D ¡.539 to 1.03). As
suggested by Aiken, West, and Reno (1991), an examination of group differen-
ces using the value one standard deviation above, and the value one standard
deviation below the mean as values of the moderator indicates that providing
CR was beneﬁcial to those high in reasoning self-conﬁdence, but detrimental
to those participants low in reasoning self-conﬁdence (see Figure 3(a)). We
attribute our inability to replicate the main effect of experimental group
found in Experiment 1 to the presumed higher heterogeneity in the reason-
ing conﬁdence of a diverse community sample compared to a student
sample.
Controlling for problem-solving ability
As cognitive ability and reasoning self-conﬁdence may be related (although
reasoning self-conﬁdence was not a signiﬁcant predictor of RPM performance
1The moderating effects of response time and age on the group difference (CR vs. No-CR) were also
examined, but neither was signiﬁcant (p > .05).
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in the current sample), the previous results could instead be interpreted as a
product of cognitive ability rather than conﬁdence moderating the effect of
performing CR. In order to disentangle these hypotheses, the three measures
of problem-solving ability were entered as covariates in the model. Due to
attrition in the follow-up sessions, only 68 participants were included in this
analysis.
The model was the same as above but included scaled scores from the
three problem-solving ability tasks as covariates. The results indicated that
the main effect of experimental group was again not signiﬁcant: b D .039,
t D .352, p D .726; 95% CI D ¡1.31 to 1.87, nor was the main effect of reason-
ing self-conﬁdence: b D ¡.015, t D .108, p D .914, 95% CI D ¡.91 to .82.
Figure 3. Average performance on RPM as a function of experimental group. Moderator
values of 1 standard deviation above and below the mean were used for high- and low-
reasoning self-conﬁdence, respectively. Reasoning SC D reasoning self-conﬁdence. Error
bars represent §1 standard error of the mean. Results are depicted (a) without problem-
solving covariates and (B) with problem-solving ability covariates (ﬁgure exchange, ver-
bal inference, number series) mean centred.
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Crucially, however, the reasoning self-conﬁdence X group interaction
remained signiﬁcant even after the problem-solving ability scores were
entered as covariates: b D .321, t D 2.47, p D .016, 95% CI D .315–2.99 (see
Figure 3(b)). These results expand on the results of Experiment 1 in suggest-
ing that providing CR was beneﬁcial to participants high in reasoning self-
conﬁdence and detrimental to participants low in reasoning self-conﬁdence,
even after problem-solving ability was controlled for.
General discussion
Experiment 1 is in line with previous studies of young, educated adults (e.g.,
Mitchum et al., 2016) and supports the view that eliciting self-report measures
may have an effect on performance, while expanding these ﬁndings to CR
and reasoning performance. Results from Experiment 2 in an older, more
diverse community sample, suggests self-conﬁdence is an important qualiﬁer
to be considered. Participants high in reasoning self-conﬁdence were shown
to react positively to CR, whereas participants low in reasoning self-conﬁ-
dence reacted negatively. This effect, which holds even after controlling for
participants’ cognitive ability, supports the predictions of the cognizant conﬁ-
dence hypothesis that differential reactivity may in part be determined by
increasing participants’ focus on their own conﬁdence (or lack thereof), rather
than conveying a general beneﬁt to strategy selection, attention or some
other cognitive mechanism that applies equally to all.
This is important because it has often been thought that reactivity to self-
report measures occurs due to unintended positive effects on cognitive pro-
cesses, e.g., improved strategy selection (e.g., Fox et al., 2011). Our ﬁndings
indicate that CR may lead to differential performance as a function of an
important metacognitive process – conﬁdence in the correctness of one’s
response. This is in line with the earlier ﬁndings of Mitchum et al. (2016), who
found that metacognitive study decisions were affected by making JoL and
further supports the notion that online self-report measures are not inert, and
can cause substantial changes in the processes they are designed to measure
and have unintended effects on performance.
These results have important methodological and theoretical implications.
CR have often been utilised under the assumption that they are an unobtru-
sive means for assessing and evaluating metacognitive processes. The current
results suggest that CR have the potential to exaggerate the effect of conﬁ-
dence on reasoning performance. Given how prevalent such measures are in
the metacognitive literature, it is possible that reactivity may play some role
in previous research. For instance, the strong positive correlation between
performance and conﬁdence on a task, which is pervasive in the metacogni-
tion literature (Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 2000),
may be somewhat inﬂated due to reactivity effects. Eliciting conﬁdence
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ratings, at least in the current context, appears to strengthen/exaggerate the
relationship between conﬁdence and performance, which may result in artiﬁ-
cial inﬂations of the correlation between the two. Because measuring conﬁ-
dence appears to cause changes in performance (and potentially conﬁdence
itself), deriving an estimate of conﬁdence effects is not straightforward; indi-
rect assessments of self-conﬁdence are one avenue to consider in future
research design, as are within-subject designs and item-trajectory designs.
Of course there are a number of factors that may contribute to reactivity
which have not yet been fully explicated and may limit the generalisability of
reactivity ﬁndings, including our own. For example, time pressure, item difﬁ-
culty or the nature of the community population used. In particular, conﬁ-
dence may play a more important role in the older population utilised here.
In addition, the extant literature surrounding reactivity and cognitive abilities
is currently characterised by equivocal results (e.g., Mitchum et al., 2016;
Soderstrom et al., 2015), which may have resulted from important individual
differences not being captured by the commonly used protocols. For
instance, studies may differ in terms of the conﬁdence of participants or fac-
tors that may affect this (e.g., the difﬁculty of the task). While our results do
not offer any conclusive resolution to the mixed ﬁndings with respect to reac-
tivity, we argue that a better understanding of the individual differences,
such as the self-conﬁdence of participants, may go some way to clarifying
some of the person-level factors that determine reactivity.
The mechanism by which self-conﬁdence moderates the effect of perform-
ing conﬁdence ratings is not yet entirely clear. Given that conﬁdence has
been well established as a predictor of performance (e.g., Stankov, 2000,
2013), it is possible that by explicitly referring to conﬁdence, conﬁdence rat-
ings simply increase participants’ awareness of their conﬁdence and in turn
heighten the relationship between conﬁdence and performance. Alterna-
tively, the self-evaluation that comes from eliciting conﬁdence rating may
increase arousal and engagement, motivating better performance for those
who are conﬁdent in their reasoning ability, but inducing anxiety in
those with lower conﬁdence in their ability. Research has shown that, in indi-
viduals with low self-conﬁdence, self-evaluation can lead them to disengage
from a task if they become aware of the fact that they are performing below
their self-selected standards and do not believe they can reduce the perfor-
mance discrepancy (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001). If a partici-
pant has high self-conﬁdence, however, when they become aware of a
performance discrepancy they are often motivated to perform better to
reduce the discrepancy (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001). Future
research should examine whether these effects can be explained by stress/
anxiety as well as task engagement.
Further research is also needed to clarify the role of metacognitive accu-
racy in moderating these effects. Although participants with high
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self-conﬁdence beneﬁted from providing CR, it is not clear to what extent this
effect depends on the accuracy/alignment of a participant’s belief in their rea-
soning abilities. In particular, individuals with highly developed metacognitive
processes may tend to perform these monitoring and control processes natu-
rally, whereas individuals with less well-regulated metacognitive processes
may beneﬁt more from prompting as they are less likely to perform such
judgements naturally (Zimmerman, 1998).
The present set of experiments has shown that integrating a meta-reason-
ing judgement into a reasoning task may inﬂuence performance outcomes.
Although, more research is needed to clarify the mechanism for these bene-
ﬁts and the role of self-conﬁdence at moderating this effect, the current
results nonetheless suggest that assessing metacognition using CR may be
beneﬁcial to the reasoning performance of high-conﬁdence individuals and
detrimental to the performance of low-conﬁdence individuals at least within
a broad community-based sample. Further research is, however, needed to
clarify the situational and individual differences factors that determine the
direction and magnitude of reactivity.
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